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This dissertation is an historical examination of policy and discourse as it impacts on 
ecological questions in South Africa, with a focus on land, mining and fishing. It shows how 
ecological issues are embedded in relations of class, race and gender. It argues that relation of 
nature and society and social relations form each other historically. Specifically, it makes 
visible how apparently progressive ideas to overcome the legacy of apartheid have served to 
perpetuate the ecological crisis after the end of apartheid. That is, although liberation ideology 
aims to overcome irrational and harmful forms of domination, current strategies of overcoming 
racial dispossession on the basis of capitalism rely on increasing and unbridled exploitation of 
natural resources. The dissertation concludes with a consideration of political perspectives and 
agency responding to the ecological crisis in South Africa today. It provides a survey of 
government, activist and community initiatives and assesses their capacity to help create a new 
relationship of nature and society, as the basis for a new society.  
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This work is an academic dissertation, but also the continuation, in a different form, of activist 
thought and practice. By outlining the background to the writing of the dissertation, I hope to 
situate its aims and character more broadly, and make them more intelligible to the reader. I 
will describe that background as three (sometimes overlapping) moments in my own 
development.  
First, this dissertation draws on the experience of working with rural small-scale 
women farmers between 2007 and 2013, through HEKS/EPER Swiss Church Aid. Over the six 
years with HEKS, I supported and worked closely with Itireleng Development and Education 
Trust and Mopani Farmers Association in Limpopo as well as Farmer Support Group based in 
Pietermaritzburg and five rural community organisations in Msinga, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). 
From 2008 onwards, many of these farmers shifted towards agro-ecological farming or in some 
instances, never farmed using commercial methods. Throughout this period, the small-scale 
farmers raised concerns regarding access to land, water, rainfall challenges and climate change 
that were adversely affecting their livelihoods and household food sovereignty.  
A few of the small-scale farmers associations approached HEKS to assist with climate 
mitigation and adaptation plans. We helped with these plans, but I was very wary of the effect 
of these interventions. These plans appeared somewhat futile to me. Specifically because 
mining extraction continued unabated in close proximity to these small-scale farms and rural 
communities. These particular interventions by small-scale farmers would have very limited 
impact on the huge carbon footprint and ecological degradation such as loss in biodiversity, 
soil, air and water pollution caused by mining in these areas.    
I found myself struggling to come to terms with the political demands (title deeds for 
land, fertiliser and pesticide, corporate social responsibility from mining companies, 
community shares in mining companies, electrification and roads, fishing quotas etc.) being 
made by some of these communities. They seemed divergent from how people lived with 
nature. Over time, I came to see that these demands were, in part, a response to how policy was 
framed by the state, as well as how non-governmental organisations fostered particular 
responses to these policies.  
The Marikana Massacre of 2012 and the five month strike that followed in 2014; the 
Western Cape farm workers’ uprising in 2012 and their strike in 2013 that was inspired by the 
Marikana demands; and the Land Act centenary of 2013 were significant political events and 




were not convinced by the rhetoric of their employers or government officials and sacrificed 
their lives and livelihoods in the pursuit of what they saw as just demands. This coupled with 
my experience of small-scale farmers and rural communities and their demands raised, shaped 
my focus and inspired the decision to embark upon this dissertation.    
 Second, I draw on my involvement in debates on climate change and ecological 
questions, often in the global forums in which these issues are addressed. This overlaps with 
parts of same period described above in the first moment. In particular, during participating in 
the World Social Forum in Dakar, Senegal, in 2011 and the United Nations Conference of the 
Parties (COP 17) parallel peoples’ events in Durban, South Africa, that same year, I became 
extremely frustrated by the nature of the climate change discussions. I was discouraged by 
what I perceived as similar engagements on Third World debt policy stalemates in the late 
1990s and the WTO trade and trade-related issues of the 2000s. I was active for many years in 
debt and trade policy debates and processes through Jubilee South, Southern African People’s 
Solidarity Network and Alternative Information and Development Centre. I was looking for the 
transition from “another world is possible” to “another world is necessary” that took into 
account the aspirations, limitations and insights from previous struggles I was part of.  
My perception of the national climate justice and energy democracy campaigns was 
based on what I gleaned from attending various meetings, seminars, dinners, discussions and 
debates over the period 2009 to 2012. I was sympathetic to the reasons for engaging, critiquing 
and debunking the limitations of carbon-trading or lobbying governments on the COP 
negotiating. I thought however that they were limiting and time consuming. I found A million 
climate jobs campaign equally restrictive. I was not drawn to the Rights to Mother Earth 
campaign in South Africa, the months before COP17. It felt disconnected from working class 
people’s organisation and remote from the discussions taking place in rural land based 
movements in South Africa. Between September 2004 and November 2005, I engaged in 
weekly discussion at International Institute for Social Studies, in The Hague, with students 
from Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. In 2006 I lived in Peru and then Bolivia, so understood the 
origins and merits of such a campaign, which arose out of mass-based indigenous impulses. 
But Bolivia was not South Africa.  
Concerns about climate change found many points of convergence, which was unlike 
the anti-Third World debt campaign in 2000 or the anti-World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
period of 1999 – 2004, where agreements by governments were hard to come by. On a broad 




problems need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. There was however consistent failure to 
agree on how to do so. I started to read analyses that sought to offer an explanation for this 
failure. So began this journey in May 2013 into the literature on the ecological crisis.  
Third, reading Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the 
Scientific Revolution in 2013 was transformative. It may have been accidental that Merchant’s 
work served as a catalyst for re-orienting my thought, and it may not have had the same effect 
if I was not ready for it.  But, her work offered an important vantage point from which I was 
able to understand ecological issues not as a single process but rather as part of a complex and 
multi-dimensional historical process, which is deeply connected to social relations.  More so, 
without essentialism or dogmatism, Merchant made the interconnectedness between people and 
nature compelling and concrete for me. This was a critical moment as it made me aware of my 
own values that I attributed to nature. It allowed me to turn everything upside down and 
understand the complex roots of the problem and connect it to broader processes in South 
Africa. This allowed for more authentic local responses, which resisted one-size-fit-all 
analysis.  
Merchant’s chapter on Farm, Fen and Forest inspired, in part, my substantive chapters 
on land, mining and fishing. These specific areas were central to the process of dispossession 
in South Africa. They are critical areas of redress that the liberation ideology spun itself around 
since its inception, hence this made it possible to trace the development of its ideas historically. 
Each area requires rethinking given the ecological crisis and had social movements open to a 
transformative ecological discourse. I had some familiarity with some of the organisations 
working in this area due to my experience since 1999 from an activist and political economy 
perspective, and was in solidarity with the struggles they waged.  
  In summary, the period between my first encounter with ecological questions—at an 
activist youth camp in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1997—and my present, daily engagement 
with these questions, has been transformative. At that time, I had little patience for European 
youth activists easily likening “save the whale” to “save the Third World.” I saw their 
ecological questions as trivial in comparison with the social and economic structural concerns 
in democratic South Africa. It felt completely disconnected from my childhood reality of 
apartheid racism. I carried to Copenhagen many inherited assumptions about nature and 
society, and a particular analysis of capitalism and its inherent features of racism and sexism. 
Seeing how deeply seated these assumptions are within capitalist conceptions of nature and 




understanding the blind spots of ecological discourse in the country since the end of apartheid. 
This process has also been influenced by my daily experience, the organisations I was part of 
building and those with which I am in solidarity. My overall change in perspective, reading for 
this dissertation, and understanding the current struggles being waged against nature’s 
destruction, made it clear to me that another world is necessary. This can only be achieved with 
an understanding that another nature is possible and exists. It is being defended and fought for 
in various communities, organisations and growing movements across the country and the 
world. This whole process has re-shaped my ideas and understanding of the relationship 
between society and nature and how I now engage and contribute as an activist. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Dissertation Focus 
 This dissertation examines the politics of the ecological crisis from the 
perspective of an historian of political thought. It sets out to track inherited ideas, 
assumptions and conceptions of the relationship between society and nature in South 
Africa, which were often first formed during the Scientific Revolution and have since 
become integral to global capitalism. It does so, by focusing on the politics of land, 
mining and fishing in South Africa within its broader historical context.  
More specifically, this dissertation traces how the legacy and experience of 
racial dispossession and the ideology of national liberation have shaped ecological 
discourse in South Africa, and offers an historical examination of the policies and 
discourse on land, mining and fishing as they impact ecological questions in South 
Africa. It shows that without making visible the inherited ideas that inform apparently 
progressive ideas aimed at overcoming the legacy of apartheid, the current ecological 
discourse risks entrenching conceptions of nature that will exacerbate the ecological 
crisis. The dissertation concludes that to address the ecological crisis, new social 
relations need to be imagined and created. This however, is not possible without 
reconceiving our relationship with nature.  
In the sections that follow, this chapter outlines the dissertation research 
questions and how the dissertation intends to approach these questions. It broadly 
sketches three contending approaches to the ecological crisis, so as to situate the 
approach this dissertation seeks to advance.  
Key in this chapter, and those on land, mining and fishing, is to show how 
conceptions of nature come to change over time and the ramifications thereof upon 
the relationship between society and nature. The chapter clarifies why ecological 
discourse is part of the history of political thought as well as how it is connected to 
historical change. In doing so, it explains why ecological discourse must be seen as 
part of a broader complex process taking place in South Africa.  
Having sought to lay a foundation of how inter-related political, economic, 
cultural, social and ecological changes affect and get affected by the conception of 
nature, the remaining sections of the chapter schematically map key processes of the 
transition from apartheid to democracy which affect the natural environment. The 
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section that follows shows, by way of example, how ideas affect the natural 
environment and are connected to larger processes in South Africa. In doing so, it 
illustrates how the approach and method deployed in this dissertation intends to 
unmask the politics of the ecological crisis and ecological discourse in South Africa. 
The last section of the chapter outlines the structure of the dissertation.  
1.2 Research questions 
The dissertation is concerned to clarify the following questions with the view to 
examine the historical, interrelated and unfolding changes which shape ecological 
discourse in South Africa:    
(i) What is the political character of the ecological discourse since the end 
of apartheid and the political ideas, assumptions and arguments that 
reveal themselves? 
(ii) How are those political ideas formed by the capitalist conception of 
nature generally and in the specific context of South Africa? 
(iii) How are changes in the ecological discourse in South Africa connected 
to the character of post-apartheid society? 
(iv) Can historical accounts of interrelated social, economic and 
environmental change in a context such as the Scientific Revolution of 
the seventeenth century provide a framework for understanding the 
ecological crisis in South Africa today? 
1.3 Contending approaches to the ecological crisis 
The ecological crisis is a broad subject of enquiry. It cuts across several disciplines 
and there are substantial and rapidly growing bodies of literature dealing with it. The 
section below is necessarily broad, inexhaustive and does not seek to fully represent 
the nuances and features of the literature in detail. Instead, the discussion aims to 
highlight a sample of some contending responses to the ecological crisis, which can 
be identified in academic, governmental and non-governmental literature. This is 
done so as to situate the approach my dissertation uses.  
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John Bellamy Foster puts forward that the types of response to the current 
ecological crisis “can be divided into two main approaches.”1 One approach, 
according to him, is reflected through ecological modernisation, which seeks to draw 
on technology innovation and “remains within the main ‘possessive-individualist’ 
assumptions of the current social order.”2 The other approach, he argues “emphasizes 
the need to transform the human relation to nature and the constitution of society at its 
roots.”3 I describe below, three of the better-known responses or subsections which 
fall within Foster’s two main approaches. 
First, is a body of literature that documents the state of ecological crisis, arguing 
that there is a crisis and that it requires a commensurate response.4 The literature 
describes in detail the degree of deterioration of the environment in specific areas – 
soil depletion, water scarcity, air pollution, plant and animal species extinction, 
disease and illness, housing and slums, waste and landfills, etc., and most 
prominently, climate change and greenhouse emissions. These areas are studied from 
numerous disciplinary perspectives – environmental studies, natural sciences, social 
studies, conservation studies, security studies, urban geography and so on. For these 
single issues and problems to make sense, they need to be linked to a larger whole – 
for instance, the processes of industrialisation – hence illustrating the connection to 
the larger ecological crisis and what the results would be with a given problem if this 
larger issue continued unchanged. On a global scale, Al Gore’s Inconvenient Truth is 
one well-known recent example of this approach.5 In South Africa, Leonie Joubert’s 
Scorched: South Africa’s Changing Climate and Boiling Point: People in a Changing 
Climate give powerful accounts of the ecological crisis in South Africa.6 
Second, are proposed models of ecological sustainability and a harmonious 
future. These proposals focus on a diagnosis of the current ills and offer ways to live 
within the natural resource limits so as to avert ecological destruction for future 
generations. Proposals vary from governments, non-governmental organisations 
                                                
1 John Bellamy Foster, The Ecological Revolution: Making Peace with the Planet (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 2009), 12.   
2 Foster, Ecological Revolution, 12. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Thomas Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), vii. Princen notes 
that over the past few decades huge amounts of resources have been spent so as to “document the state of the 
environment.”  
5 Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2006). 
6 Leonie Joubert, Scorched: South Africa’s Changing Climate (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2006); 
Boiling Point: People in a Changing Climate (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2008). 
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(NGOs), corporations, global and regional bodies, etc., and differ between wealthy 
countries and countries of the Global South, as well as between and within the Global 
South and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). There are nuances 
within the environmental sector as well – between Wangari Maathai’s Green Belt 
Movement, Greenpeace, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Slow Food 
Movement, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and The Right to 
Nature.7 Reports such as the 1987 Brundtland Report “Our Common Future,” annual 
WWF reports, the Rights of Mother Earth Declarations and the work of journalists 
such as Sipho Kings of the Mail & Guardian are examples of this approach.8 
Third are analyses of the ecological crisis that relate it to the political economy 
of capitalism or a specific phase of capitalism. This can be divided broadly into two 
subdivisions. In a global context, authors such as Joel Kovel, John Bellamy Foster, 
Vandana Shiva, Victor Wallis, Naomi Klein, Michael Löwy, Nnimmo Bassey and 
Ariel Salleh argue that the ecological crisis is caused, by and large, by capitalist 
modes of production; some contribute by developing and enhancing ecofeminist, 
socialist and eco-socialist analysis. In the South African context, authors such as 
Patrick Bond, Jacklyn Cock, David Hallowes, Victor Munnik and Mark Swilling offer 
similar analyses.9 These authors develop a critique of capitalism and try to show that 
the ecological crisis cannot be resolved within current modes of production. 
                                                
7 See, for example Wangari Maathai, The Green Belt Movement: Sharing the Approach and the Experience (New 
York: Lantern Books, 2006); Wangari Maathai, Replenishing the Earth (New York: Doubleday, 2010); 
GreenPeace, “Our Core Values,” accessed December 7, 2015, http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/en/; World Wide 
Fund for Nature, “Who we are,” accessed December 7, 2015, http://www.wwf.org.za/who_we_are/; Slow Food, 
“Our philosophy,” accessed December 7, 2015, https://www.slowfood.com/about-us/our-philosophy/; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Principles and Procedures,” accessed December 8, 2015, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles.pdf. 
8 See, for example Gro Harlem Brundtlund, “Report on the World Commission on Environment and Development: 
Our Common Future,” (United Nations, 1987); WWF, “Living Planet Report 2010,” (Netherlands: WWF, 2010); 
Rights of Mother Earth, “Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth,” accessed at December 15, 2017,  
http://www.rightsofmotherearth.com/declaration-of-the-rights-of-mother-earth; Sipho Kings, “O, Sea, can you 
Save us?” Mail Guardian, February 19 to 25, 2016. See, numerous other environmental coverage by Kings, which 
can be accessed at https://mg.co.za/author/sipho-kings-mcdermott.   
9 See, for exampled Joel Kovel, The Enemy of Nature: The End of Capitalism or the End of the World? (London: 
Zed Books, 2007); John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 2000); Ecology Against Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002); The Ecological Revolution: 
Making Peace with the Planet (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009); Stefano B. Longo, Rebecca Clausen and 
Brett Clark, The Tragedy of the Commodity: Oceans, Fisheries and Aquaculture (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2015); Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy (London: Zed Books, 2006); Making Peace with the 
Earth: Beyond Resources, Land and Food Wars (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2012); Staying Alive: Women, 
Ecology, and Development (Berkely: North Atlantic Books, 2016); Victor Wallis, “Capitalist and Socialist 
Responses to Ecological Crisis,” Monthly Review 60 (2008): 25-40; “Beyond ‘Green Capitalism’,” Monthly 
Review 61 (2010): 32-48; Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything Capitalism vs Climate (London: Allen Lane, 
2014); Michael Löwy, Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe (Chicago: Haymarket 
Books, 2015); Nnimmo Bassey, To Cook a Continent: Destructive Extraction and the Climate Crisis in Africa 
(Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2012); Ariel Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics:Nature, Marx and the Postmodern 
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Unlike the political economists cited above, the ecological crisis and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy is seen by the scholars mentioned below as an 
opportunity to improve and regulate capitalism. Here the aim is to produce more 
environmentally friendly products and services, promote the development of 
technologies and argue for ecological modernisation. This is a perspective that argues 
for sustainable consumption in the countries of the North. Global examples of this 
discussion are found in the works of Arthur PJ Mol and Gert Spaargaren, Joseph 
Murphy, David Sonnenfeld and others.10 These discussions focus broadly on 
regulation and the state, institutional reform, the creation of an environmentally safer 
capitalism and mechanisms to enhance these market-actors. These authors squarely fit 
into Foster’s first category. 
The above responses that are broadly categorised above bear different 
assumptions and consequences for how to understand the ecological crisis and 
therefore how to address it. The approaches show us that ecological discourses are 
influenced by political, ethical and economic imperatives, in ways that are not always 
obvious, predictable or linear. Each develops its own, often contested, set of research 
questions. 
This study draws on material from these approaches to understand the 
ecological crisis, but is not located in any one of them. Instead, it focuses on the less 
frequently studied area of political thought and the historical trajectory of ideas, 
examining arguments and assumptions concerning the environment and the larger 
context of political ideas that impact on them. By examining the political movement 
of ecological ideas, largely through focusing on policy documents, scholarly texts as 
well as declarations and key research material of non-governmental organisation, I 
                                                                                                                                      
(London: Zed Books, 1997); Patrick Bond, Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2012); “Economic Growth, Ecological Modernization or 
Environmental Justice? Conflicting Discourses in Post-apartheid South Africa,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 
11(2009): 33–61; Jacklyn Cock, The War Against Ourselves: Nature, Power and Justice (Johannesburg: Wits 
University Press, 2007); Going Green: People, Politics and the Environment in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); David Hallowes, Toxic Futures: South Africa in the Crisis of Energy, Environment and 
Capital (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press/Ground Work, 2011); David Hallowes and Victor 
Munnik, Peak Poison: The Elite Energy Crisis and Environmental Justice (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-
Natal Press/Ground Work Report, 2007); Mark Swilling and Eve Annecke, Just Transitions: Exploration of 
Sustainability in an Unfair World (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2012); Mark Swilling, Josephine 
Kaviti Musango and Jeremy Wakeford, ed. Greening the South African Economy: Scoping the Issues, Challenges 
and Opportunities (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2016). 
10 See, for example the work of Arthur PJ Mol and Gert Spaargaren, “Ecological Modernisation Theory in Debate: 
A Review,” in Environmental Politics 9 (2000) 17 – 49; Joseph Murphy, “Ecological Modernisation,” in 
Geoforum 31 (2000) 1 – 8; David Sonnenfeld, “Social Movements and Ecological Modernisation: The 
Transformation of Pulp and Paper Manufacturing,” in Development and Change 33 (2002) 1 – 27.  
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make explicit the relationship between nature and society that these ideas presuppose 
and thereby help to validate. Borrowing from Maria Mies, my dissertation aims to 
“find a social and historical explanation for the phenomenon” of the devaluation of 
nature.11 
1.4 Approach used 
This dissertation uses a historical perspective. It draws on the example of Carolyn 
Merchant's reconstruction of the scientific revolution, which enables us to see the 
interrelated and unfolding changes, both in social relations and relations between 
society and nature. Merchant argues that conceptions of nature have changed over 
time and that these changing conceptions have ecological impacts. According to 
Katherine Park, “the most enduring contribution of The Death of Nature” is its focus 
on what Merchant calls the “historical alternatives, both real and utopian, [that] 
challenged some of the excesses of mainstream society.”12 Specifically, Park puts 
forward that “these alternatives were both intellectual and social—ways of conceiving 
the world and ways of reorganizing society.”13 One of the most important aspects of 
Merchant’s contribution is that she “challenged the belief in the socially progressive 
character of the scientific revolution, arguing that the advent of scientific rationalism 
produced a cultural shift from an organic to a mechanical paradigm that legitimized 
the exploitation of women and nature.”14 
1.4.1 Ecological discourse as part of the history of political thought 
How we conceptualise nature and the relationship between nature and society is 
shaped by historical context. The benefit of returning to an earlier historical context is 
that connections between political, economic and environmental change that took 
place then, are now apparent in ways that they were not in their own time. The 
seventeenth century is the specific context the study returns to in order to find a 
context in which the interconnection of ecological, social and intellectual change is 
clearly visible to us. It does so, because it was during the period of the Scientific 
Revolution that a new relationship between nature and society was established. This 
                                                
11 Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Capitalist Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of 
Labour (London: Zed Books, 1998), viii. 
12 Katherine Park, “Women, Gender, and Utopia: The Death of Nature and the Historiography of Early Modern 
Science,” Isis 97 (2006): 494. 
13 Park, “Women, Gender, and Utopia,” 494. 
14 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: the Body and Primitive Accumulation (Delhi: Phoneme, 2013), 13. 
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relationship has continued into the present, has expanded around the entire world and 
has extended into areas of life previously governed by other norms such as an organic 
worldview.15 
Capitalism is central to this project because it was part of the context in which 
the Scientific Revolution occurred and is the operative context informing ecological 
discourse in South Africa today. It was central to the former historical period because 
the separation of nature from society was a key element of the process of primitive 
accumulation, and continues today in new forms of capital accumulation.  
There are many works on the Scientific Revolution and its larger impact. To my 
mind, Carolyn Merchant stands out because her work pioneers an understanding of 
how society affects and is affected by nature. Her work sets out to challenge the 
“hegemony of mechanistic science as a marker of progress” and that, “seventeenth-
century science could be implicated in the ecological crisis, the domination of nature 
and the devaluation of women in the production of scientific knowledge.”16 It is for 
this reason that I have chosen to draw especially on her work. 
In The Death of Nature: Ecology, Women and the Scientific Revolution, 
Merchant argues that, “concepts of nature … are historical and social constructions. 
There are no unchanging ‘essential’ characteristics of sex, gender, or nature. 
Individuals form concepts about nature and their own relationships to it that draw on 
the ideas and norms of the society into which they are born, socialized, and 
educated.”17 Today the dominant context for understanding relations of society and 
nature is from the inception of capitalism.  
Pre-modern societies understood that there was a delicate relationship between 
people and nature. People and nature were part of a whole, conceived of as an organic 
and cosmic unity.18 This was evident from the sacrifices and rituals dedicated to the 
gods and nature so as to maintain harmony and balance in the universe. The pre-
modern world was viewed as organic and interdependent.19 
During the period of feudal Western society nature was “cast in the female 
                                                
15 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1989), 1-14. (All quotations are from the 1989 edition, which will hereafter be cited as Merchant, Death of 
Nature). 
16 Carolyn Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature,” Isis 97 (2006): 513. 
17 Merchant, Death of Nature, xvi. 
18 Merchant, Death of Nature, 6. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
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gender.”20 It was predominantly seen as a nurturing mother but a corresponding 
opposing view was of nature as a wild and uncontrollable female.21 The latter 
conception became dominant as the Scientific Revolution proceeded to mechanise 
and rationalise the worldview.22 This idea of nature as wild, uncontrolled and 
disordered gave rise to the idea of people gaining power over nature. The changing 
idea of nature converges with that of Christianity, capitalism, industrialisation and the 
Scientific Method. This is evident through Francis Bacon’s assertion that, “only let 
mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and 
obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true 
religion.”23  
Mechanism and the domination of nature are new ideas that became core 
concepts of the modern world.24 In this context, Bacon’s idea to exert control over 
nature and man to become its master, takes hold. Merchant levels a fierce critique 
against Bacon’s work as the “search for natural knowledge in terms of a physically 
coercive relationship between male inquirer and female nature, expressed in 
metaphors of marital discipline, inquisition, and rape.”25  
With the expansion of Europe into new markets, the rise of industry and 
commerce, a new conceptualisation of nature emerges, partly enabled by the 
Scientific Revolution.26 Nature comes to be “other”—that is, separated from humanity 
and at its service. Changes arising in human culture shaped the concept of nature. To 
master nature and to master savages became an essential component of, as well as 
justification for, what is meant to “civilise.”27 This particular worldview from the 
Scientific Revolution about control over nature is inextricably linked to ideas of 
progress. This new way of thinking about nature is part of a mechanical model of 
viewing the world that shifts away from an earlier organic worldview. 
Christianity, imperial conquest, the new discipline of economics, the Scientific 
Revolution, capitalist social relations, the bifurcation of gender and the unequal 
                                                
20 Ibid., 2. See also Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women. 
21 Merchant, Death of Nature, 2. 
22 Ibid., 43. 
23 James Spedding and Robert Hawkes Ellis, trans., Novum Organum: Francis Bacon 1561–1626 (London: 
Routledge, 1905). 
24 Merchant, Death of Nature, 2. 
25 Park, “Women, Gender, and Utopia,” 488. 
26 Merchant, Death of Nature, 5. 
27 Bassey, shows how Thomas Pakenham’s The Scramble for Africa and David Livingstone viewed the taming of 
nature and people in Africa. See, Bassey, To Cook a Continent, 5. 
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ascribed value of gender roles and the capacity to exploit nature all form part of a 
single process as shown by Merchant and others.28 These inherited processes and 
effects came to be felt and reflected in South Africa, centuries later, when looking at 
the areas of land, mining and fishing. 
Merchant’s work shows how ideas are shaped and formed. She sets out how the 
concept of nature during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was shaped by 
interrelated processes and ideas. Of great importance, is that she “showed how writers 
could use science both to reinforce oppressive social, political and material orders and 
imagine themselves out of them.”29 In so doing, she opens an understanding of how a 
particular notion of nature is formed and streams into specific ways of society being 




If this approach is taken forward into the twentieth century, in a different but 
equally significant way, Rachel Carson’s work is a second example of how processes 
changing nature are part of a larger whole, affecting society in ways which are not 
obvious at first.30 Silent Spring is an attempt to show how through a larger process 
resulting from World War II, technological innovations and the resulting chemical 
warfare inventions have filtered into the household and fundamentally altered nature 
and society in unforeseen ways.31 Her account shows how pesticides and chemicals 
have become part of the household shopping list and daily domestic life—how the 
expansion of consumer markets made a deadly product normal. The act of using 
pesticide on weeds leads to the contamination of the soil, water and food creating 
health hazards that affect society and the natural environment, and interrelated 
connections are clearly demonstrated. Her work helps to show that the introduction of 
                                                
28 For an extensive and rich discussion of the period before and during the Scientific Revolution read Robert 
Mandrou, From Humanism to Science, 1480–1700 (Great Britain: Pelican Books, 1973); Bruno Latour, Politics of 
Nature: How to Bring Science into Democracy (India: Orient Longman, 2007); We Have Never Been Modern 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993); Kovel, The Enemy of Nature. 
29 Park, “Women, Gender, and Utopia,” 495.  
30  Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (England: Penguin Books, 2000); See Foster, Ecological Revolution, 67 – 83 in 
which Foster outlines the significance of Carson’s ecological critique.  
31 Carson did not articulate this in the same way as Merchant, but if one applies Merchant’s way of seeing how 
things relate and are interrelated, then one can also deduce this from Carson’s Silent Spring. (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1987) Also see how the idea of ‘oikos’ was interpreted in Lesley Green’s “Ecology, Race and the making 
of Environmental Publics: A Dialogue with Silent Spring in South Africa,” (paper presented at the School of 




pesticides and chemicals was both subtle and invasive, as well as how it has become 
tied up in consumerism in ways we find hard to recognise. 
Carson also explores a number of other, simultaneously unfolding processes, 
where the control exacted over nature was not as apparent as with the use of 
pesticides and chemicals. For instance, the Cold War and the consequent drive to 
control territories, peoples and ideas, was critical. In response to this control, the 
Third World as a political project for national liberation emerged. In many instances, 
these liberation struggles inherited and subsequently aspired towards a Western 
conception of modernity. Another unfolding process for instance, was that in the 
United States the production of pesticides and chemicals on a large scale gave rise to 
increased manufacturing and many new products and jobs. This process contributed 
to urbanisation and new areas of work. Specifically, these new areas of work now 
extended to include women. Paid factory work for women coincided with chemical 
control over nature through production and also increased their work day, which now 
included paid work in addition to the unpaid household work. 
Joel Kovel and others have related a similar, although not identical, range of 
changes to the ecological crisis today.32 The changes taking place in South Africa 
since the end of apartheid are perhaps more modest in scale than those of the 
Scientific Revolution, and form part of a global context described by Kovel.33 It is 
hard to estimate their global historical importance while we are in the midst of them. 
It is, however, reasonable to suppose that the same kind of analysis attempted by 
Merchant and others can be attempted in the South Africa context. 
My dissertation is an attempt to analyse the politics of the ecological crisis in 
South Africa within their larger historical context.  
                                                
32 Kovel, Enemy of Nature. 
33 See Kovel, Enemy of Nature, in which he explains the eco-destructive and anti-ecological nature of capitalism. 
Capital is eco-destructive because under the present economic regime, large parts of the natural world are 
becoming undone. He describes the extent of the ecological fallout and deterioration and argues that the era of 
environmental awareness has also been the era of greatest environmental breakdown. Oil consumption has 
increased from 46 million barrels a day to 73 million. Natural gas extraction has increased from 34 trillion cubic 
feet per year to 95 trillion. Human carbon emissions have increased from 3.9 million metric tons annually to an 
estimate 6.4 million – this despite the additional impetus to cut back caused by global warming, which was not 
perceived to be a factor in 1970. Fish were taken at twice the rate as in 1970. The gap between rich and poor 
nations, according to the United Nations went from a factor of 3:1 in 1820 to 35:1 in 1950; 44:1 in 1973 – at the 




1.4.2  Ecological discourse as part of a whole 
Earlier, I used Merchant’s work to briefly sketch how conceptions about nature 
changed over time. Now I draw on her work to show that historical change and 
ecological change are connected. I do this to show that ecological discourse in South 
Africa should be understood as part of a whole and is shaped by processes and events 
taking place in South Africa and globally. 
Merchant puts forward that between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, 
important cultural changes occurred. These included the increases and decreases in 
population growth, conflict over the control of natural resources between landlords 
and peasants, changing values associated with a gendered division of labour, new 
forms of production and values ascribed to them, technological inventions, expansion 
of the capitalist market model and changing philosophies towards nature and the 
earth.34 Critical for Merchant, is to ask how do the changes taking place in the natural 
environment influence human culture and institutions, as well as how does the 
mechanistic model reinforce and accelerate the exploitation of nature and human 
beings as resources.35 The significance of her approach is to link how changes arising 
in culture affected and were affected by the natural environment.  
Merchant’s work on forests, fens and farms during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries shows how in England commerce drove technological 
innovation, which resulted in commercial expansion and ecological destruction. New 
state policies emerged that caused greater economic exploitation of the environment. 
This had a negative effect on livelihoods based around subsistence farming and 
communal living. Communities dependent on the particular environment fought back, 
resisted and revolted.  
People were displaced, forced off their communal lands and out of their homes 
and into new areas of work and ways of living. Women’s work on the land, in homes 
and the community, as well as their related knowledge, was pushed further to the 
margins, rendering them passive. A sharpening of the gendered division of labour 
emerged, giving greater monetary value to the work of men and in so doing devalued 
the work of women. This artificial division gave rise to both paid  and unpaid labour.  
                                                
34 Merchant, Death of Nature, 43. 
35 Merchant, Death of Nature, 43. 
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As the environment was exploited and natural resources became depleted, so 
too did the natural environment change, and in turn, force commerce and technology 
to adapt and evolve. With the depletion and decline of natural resources, the state then 
needed to intervene to conserve natural resources so as to commence the cycle of use, 
expansion and exploitation. The resulting effects were felt at multiple levels in 
society. As industrial capital evolved, so too did encroachment on the environment, 
and in turn, on how people lived, altering the world around them and their conception 
of it. 
Merchant’s expansive exposition and method of examining the historical roots 
of the current ecological crisis shows us the need, and gives us a model and guide, to 
ask: What are the political ideas, assumptions and arguments influencing the 
relationship between society and nature in South Africa? How are those ideas formed 
by the Scientific Revolution’s conception of nature generally and in the context of 
South Africa? What are the changes in the ecological discourse connected to the 
character of the post-apartheid society?  
1.5 Mapping the processes in South Africa affecting the natural environment 
The substantive chapters of this dissertation examine a longer history of the 
relationship of nature and society in South Africa, going back to the mineral 
revolution and the emergence of racial capitalism. However, the aim of the 
dissertation is to explain how the ecological discourse of liberation ideology has 
addressed, or failed to address, the current ecological crisis. In that context, I focus 
very briefly on processes specific to the transition from apartheid to democracy. 
Below, I outline only four processes, which have affected the natural environment 
during transition periods. This is in no way an exhaustive discussion.36  
The first relevant process is the transition from apartheid to democracy. The end 
of apartheid meant the ability of all South Africans to move freely. Relocation and 
movement between rural and urban areas has increased. Population density has risen 
                                                
36 See Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, South Africa Environment Outlook: A report on the 
State of the Environment (Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2006) xix, which argues 
the significant drivers, which affect the environment are population growth, economic activities, governance and 
the levels of technology and innovation. Also see Department of Environmental Affairs, 2nd South Africa 
Environment Outlook: A report on the state of the environment (Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs, 
2012), 18. In addition to significant national drivers this report adds international drivers such as globalisation, 
global governance and multilateral environmental agreements.	
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as a result of population influx from villages. Demand on goods and services rose.37 
Increased pressure has been placed on the natural environment.38  
The second process is the transition from state-interventionism to neo-
liberalism. Centralised state assets and control of natural environments have given 
way to decentralisation. The compartmentalisation of natural environments has 
created a fragmented approach to the protection and maintenance of the natural 
environment. A shift from state-owned public goods to commodification and 
privatisation has undermined state responsibility for stewardship and guardianship of 
the natural environment. Public goods and management of energy, water, waste, 
forestry, mining, etc., have been further privatised in varying degrees through public-
private partnerships (PPP).39 Many public state companies have been sold off, shifting 
the objective of these institutions from public service provision to revenue and profit 
generation. 
Placing a profit motive on the delivery of public goods and services alters where 
and how costs are cut. Public natural resources such as water, clean air, energy and so 
on, shift to being private commodities with the process of commercialisation. The 
social and political aspects and the economics of public goods such as water and 
electricity are now changed. Profiting from public goods such as water, changes how 
it is used and conceived of. For example, large loans for mega-dam infrastructure 
were made. These dams dramatically reshaped water flow, displaced communities 
and denied communities access to water. After 1994, the World Bank’s (WB) 
neoliberal model was adopted and implemented in South Africa with limited regard 
for the ecological fallout. This was a global phenomenon, however, and part of the 
neo-liberal counter-revolution sweeping the globe after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1989.40  
The third process was the reorganisation of apartheid capitalism. Black 
economic empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action were mooted in 1996 as a 
means to deracialise capitalism. In 1997 the Black Economic Empowerment 
                                                
37 Population was 32.2 million in 1984, 40 million in 1994, 47 million in 2004 and 54.1 million in 2014. 
38 The free movement of people to public spaces such as beaches, parks, malls, shops, suburbs, etc., increased with 
the lifting of “white areas.” 
39 Stephen Greenberg, The State, Privatisation and the Public Sector in South Africa (Harare: Southern African 
Peoples' Solidarity Network, 2006), 4–5. 
40 Greenberg, State of Privatisation, 12. 
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Commission was established.41 The National Empowerment Fund has been the 
vehicle facilitating access of previously disadvantaged persons to public assets being 
privatised. This has meant a new and expanding middle class, coupled with new 
lifestyle patterns. The emergence of overt consumerism has been accompanied by 
increasing number of goods and services as well as waste.42 Similarly, there has been 
faster generational turnover of products. Income for new groups of middle class 
society has increased dramatically.  
The liberalisation of goods and services through deregulation of the economy 
means that there are more cars, fridges, electronics, malls, fast food chains, etc., than 
before, resulting in higher energy needs and therefore greater carbon emissions. This 
transition in South Africa has occurred within a larger context of globalisation where 
goods and services know no borders. 
The rise of transnational corporations, and opening up the economy for so-
called foreign direct investment (FDI), has resulted in the financialisation of the 
economy, job losses, increased flexibility of work and stagnation of wages. These 
new processes have contributed to a drive towards super-extractivism and an export-
orientated economy. Due to financial liberalisation, we have seen an increase of 
capital flight and tax evasion within the mining sector. Privatisation has contributed to 
massive and rising unemployment, the intensification of reproductive unwaged work 
subsidising the state and corporates and the spiralling feminisation of poverty.  
The policy approach by the ANC government to address historical issues of 
racial dispossession through capitalism in the new dispensation has not only 
augmented market-relations, but has fostered the intense commodification of nature, 
and borne new forms of enclosure and commodification of commons. To facilitate 
and ensure that the new black elite reap gains from the capitalist system, new capital 
accumulation in the mining sector has meant new and greater areas of exploitation of 
minerals and metals as well as labour, both paid and unpaid.  
                                                
41 See Martin Legassick, Towards Socialist Democracy (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 
463; Greenberg, State of Privatisation, 23; Hein Marais, South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy 
of Change (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2010), 140. 
42 Parallel is a culture of aspiring to opulence. Top Billing, a television show on public television (South African 
Broadcasting Corporation, channel 3) is a reflection of certain middle class cultural aspirations. Importantly, the 
rainbow nation means that we “all” can presumably have everything – equally – if we have the money. Also see, 
Allen Finlay and David Liechti. E-Waste Assessment in South Africa (Durban: E-Waste Association of South 




The fourth process is the emergence of managerial and technicist ethics of 
delivery. In the first few years after 1994, the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) sought to roll out identity documents, electricity, water, land, 
housing, basic health care, telephone landlines, etc., to people who previously were 
off the grid and excluded due to apartheid.43 Although some progress is alleged 
during the immediate post-apartheid period, women and the poor still bear the brunt 
of unequal service distribution and delivery.44  
The introduction of the Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy 
(GEAR) in 1997 saw government spending on basic and social infrastructure decrease 
in real terms. A marked decline in delivery became apparent by 2000. GEAR 
represented the end of liberation euphoria, as many promises of delivery appeared 
empty. Policy proposals in the early period of the new democracy with regard to the 
environment were already drafted with a strong neo-liberal character such that 
implementation plans readily reflect the commercialisation of nature.45  
The language of outsourcing and co-sourcing, vendors and tenders, clients and 
services, procurement, performance management, quality assurance, etc., quickly got 
augmented in this period. Citizens became clients. A shift from “delivery of services” 
discourse to “management of services” occurred and in the process weakened state 
control, skills within state structures and delivery of essential public goods to 
communities. Civil servants were procuring services and skills from private 
businesses. Civil servants became responsible for managing tenders, finding and 
vetting vendors and overseeing quality assurance. When private business is doing the 
                                                
43 According to the Carnegie3 report, unemployment rose between 1995 – 2002 from 15.1% to 30.4% although 
they mention that some progress was made during the early years of the democratic government. For an outline on 
delivery the report puts forward figures for housing etc., built in the periods 1994 – 1995 and 2006 – 2007 
respectively. See Francis Wilson and Vaun Cornell, “Overcoming Poverty and Inequality: Guide to Carnegie3 
Conference,” (Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT, 2014), accessed January 15, 2016, 
http://www.carnegie3.org.za/docs/Carnegie3_April13_WEB.pdf. 
44 See Wilson and Cornell, “Overcoming Poverty and Inequality.” The summary of the Carnegie 3 report notes 
that: “poverty is widespread and severe with over 54% in 2008 of the population living below the poverty datum 
line;” and although poverty declined slightly from 56% to 54% between 1993 and 2008 this was primarily because 
of the roll out of social grants. Furthermore “inequality in the country is very deep” and has deepened over the past 
15 years. The report noted that “[p]oor South Africans are still typically female, African and rural.” There is a 
dispute over the data and if and to what extent progress has been made. See Haroon Bhorat and Carlene Van Der 
Westhuisen, for a literature review of this discussion. They note that regardless of the discrepancies of data, they 
show in fact that “[t]he results, however do suggest that the first five years of democracy were not accompanied by 
significant improvements in the welfare of South Africa’s citizens.” “Poverty, Inequality and the Nature of 
Economic Growth in South Africa,” UCT, Department Policy Research Unit: Working Paper 12/151, 2012, 
accessed November 23, 2015, 
http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/36/DPRU%20WP12-151.pdf. 
45 See Patrick Bond, “Economic Growth, Ecological Modernisation or Environmental Justice? Conflicting 
Discourses in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 11 (2009) 33 -61, accessed June 14, 
2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455750009358896.   
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work of the state, the philosophy of service delivery as a public good has been 
compromised. The agenda is being set from outside the “developmental” state.  
The land question with its ecological, social and political – as well as rural and 
urban – dimensions and pressures is deeply connected to apartheid, as are the politics 
of service delivery or lack thereof in the new democratic era. To develop an 
ecological critique of land linked only to “environmental” concerns and climate 
change is to remain unable to address the deep challenges with regard to the multi-
faceted land question in South Africa.  
Slum conditions have become increasingly common due to the lack of delivery, 
maintenance and healthcare in our lived and built environment. Water sources are 
contaminated due to inadequate sewage disposal. In the townships, overcrowding 
leading to high-density pressure, increased air and water pollution and other such 
negative side effects, has become the norm. This is part of the South African 
ecological crisis. The new public management systems and practices have directly 
contributed to this. The first wave of protests erupted in the 1990s, and protest action 
continues to escalate due to frustration and anger at terrible living conditions and the 
increased lack of delivery.46 For many, this lack of delivery is coupled with neoliberal 
GEAR policies and rampant corruption and looting of public resources by those in 
political office and neoliberal public private partnerships (PPP).47 
1.6 An example of how political and economic changes in South Africa affect 
the natural environment 
Below, I illustrate by way of example, how these specific South African processes 
and more general ones impact on the natural environment after apartheid  
In 1994, Vodacom “switched on” as the first network provider in South Africa 
and at the end of the first five months they had 100 000 users; in 1996 they added a 
pay-as-you-go service and 60 000 customers signed up in the first month; in 1997 
they had a total of 606 000 customers and publicly committed to an environmental 
plan. In 2004 the company had over 1 million users.48 At the start of the 2016 
financial year, Vodacom announced that “there are 34.2 million customers, 2.1 
                                                
46 Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (Scottsville: University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), 84-85; Marais, Pushed to the Limit, 216. 
47 Marais, Pushed to the Limit, 216. 




million up from last year.”49 The Statistics South Africa General Household Survey 
2013 showed that only 5% of households had access to neither landlines nor cellular 
phones, 81.9% only had access to cellular phones and a mere 0.2% use landlines 
only.50 Today it is commonplace for households to have cellular phones, as shown 
above. During apartheid, most socioeconomically disadvantaged people did not have 
direct access to telephonic communication. After apartheid there was an effort to roll 
out telephone lines to households and communities.  
Telkom was a state company and had a monopoly on telecommunications 
provision. By 1997, Telkom was partially privatised.51 Soon after the privatisation 
process was completed, Telkom’s network rollout of new lines and maintenance 
delivery was hindered by the reduction of state subsidies and a shift towards profit 
generation. In 2001 BEE shares were advertised and deals were struck, further 
privatising telecommunications. The cost of calls increased and the rollout to poor 
communities declined, as it was not profitable to service these areas. By 2001, two-
thirds of 2.1 million lines installed over four years were disconnected due to bad 
payments. By 2005, fixed line numbers were lower than the 1997 fixed line exclusive 
period. In 2005 Telkom employed just under 35 000 employees and had retrenched 
some 23 000 since 1995 as a result of privatisation. The profit after tax by 2005 was 
staggering and at the expense of jobs and supplying fixed lines to those that were 
supposed to be beneficiaries of expanded service delivery.52  
In effect, the larger shift to a neoliberal economic model and form of 
governance in the case of telecommunications has meant an increased use of “dirty” 
energy in an over-reliant system under severe strain. The result is an increase in 
carbon emissions which has thus increased the rate of climate change.  
New technologies such as cellular phones were rapidly introduced after 1994. 
Vodacom brought the Internet to cellular phones in 2001, 3G in 2004, mobile 
broadband in 2007 and modem packages soon thereafter. Telkom originally had a 
50% share of Vodacom with no competitors. With the liberalisation of the economy 
other cellular services received licenses. The Competition Commission challenged the 
                                                
49 Vodacom, Vodacom Group Limited: Preliminary results for year ended 31 March 2016, accessed June 3, 2016, 
http://www.vodacom.co.za/cs/groups/public/documents/document/vodacom-prelim-results-march-2.pdf. 
50 Statistics South Africa, General Household Survey 2013, 52. 
51 Greenberg, State of Privatisation, 3. Greenberg explains privatisation is the sale, handover and reorganisation of 
state assets to the private sector. This process can take many forms but a necessary aspect is “corporatisation and 
commercialisation” which orientate “a state entity to the market and competition.” 
52 Greenberg, State of Privatisation, 44-50. 
 18 
 
cellular phone cartel and price fixing was questioned. Thereafter, sim cards, cellular 
phones, contracts, pay-as-you go, airtime, etc., became more affordable. Cellular 
phone purchases increased dramatically due to cheaper prices and Telkom’s inability 
to provide affordable telecommunication. The effect was that cellular phones became 
popular as a mode of communication. 
What is not always obvious is that having and replacing a cellular phone with 
the latest and better model and technology means high consumerism – in most cases 
changing cellular phones is part of the contract deal, thereby locking one into a 
pattern of excessive consumerism. Everyday, millions of people in South Africa have 
to recharge their cellular phones. This is not the case with a landline. Many people 
upgrade their cellular phones and discard the previous one. There is currently no 
trade-in deal with cellular phones, nor an e-waste management and recycling system. 
This is not so readily the case with a landline. This means increased hazardous e-
waste, bigger landfills, non-recycled cellular batteries, and as a result, contaminated 
soil.  
This ecological fallout of the new technology in the case of the cellular phone 
shows the economic, ecological, political, social and cultural implications of the roll-
out of cellular phones and simultaneous demise of household landlines. This is not to 
imply that we should abandon the new technology or specifically denounce the use of 
cellular phones. Instead, it illustrates how new technology is directly linked to 
intended and unintended processes. It means that we need to rethink the consumerism 
and waste that cellular phones entail despite the high tax revenues and “jobs” that the 
cellular phone industry brings. Given the ecological pressure, the best option we have 
is to ring-fence uncomfortable or inconvenient aspects of cellular phone use. 
Likewise, it is the duty of the state and industry to address the concerns about e-waste 
and not fob the problem off onto the “consumer.” 
While making apparent the proliferation of communication through the cellular 
phone, it is necessary in the context of this study to point to how mobile phones have 
promoted the kind of individualism fostered by neoliberalism. Cellular phones are 
privately owned commodities, whereas the landline is a communal resource in the 
same way a personal computer was in the home prior to the introduction of laptops. 
Now what was once a joint shared “asset” for the household is a private item – it is 
not “permissible” to use someone else’s cellular phone. The argument is that they are 
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costly, an investment and a private belonging. And yet Harvey argues that the 
dilemma of being “connected” through technology and neoliberal forms of 
organisation is that “a contradiction arises between the seductive but alienating 
possessive individualism on the one hand and the desire for meaningful collective life 
on the other. While individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed 
to choose to construct strong collective institutions.”53 
Cellular phones and the form of communication that has proliferated with them 
alienate individuals from themselves, the larger society and nature in particular. 
Society, through technology and science, drives the production and consumption of 
cellular phones. This affects nature through the vast extraction of labour, the minerals, 
metals and energy required to produce, recharge and replace the cellular phone, as 
well as the through hazardous waste. This extraction and technology affects society in 
turn, as the more one extracts from nature for wants and not needs, the more one 
delinks from meaningful appreciation for what nature affords one. If we simply 
continue to ignore the excessive drain that cellular phones have, the end result might 
simply mean no cellular phones at all, if or when the limited natural resources require 
us to prioritise boiling water, turning on the lights, heating food and other essentials 
over the charging of cellular phones.  
1.7 Methodological approach 
My dissertation examines land, mining and fishing as they most concretely symbolise 
the natural environment and are critical areas in the history of South Africa. How 
South Africa has developed and transformed socially, politically, economically and 
ecologically can be traced through these three focus areas. I extensively reviewed the 
literature on the political, social and economic dimensions of land, mining, fishing 
and ecological discourse. In each of these areas I traced the historical idea found in 
central texts, which influenced and transformed concepts, and sought to locate where 
these ideas and assumptions originated.  
I traced the shifting conceptions of how land, mining and fishing are understood 
to be part of nature and society, by examining literature sources such as the 
constitution, government policy documents, government reports, research reports, 
historical texts, seminal work in the specific focus areas, scholarly books, journal 
                                                
53 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69. 
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articles, newspaper articles, press releases, union documents written in the sector 
pertaining to the natural environment by government, unions, business, civil society 
and academia from both the period before and after 1994. I had to locate and trace the 
national liberation movement’s ideology and footprint in the ANC-led government’s 
transition documents and subsequent economic and national policy at a broad level 
but also in the various government departments.  
 The dissertation necessitated a close reading of the South African 
environmental policies, international environmental reports and the UN declarations 
and reports on sustainable development, climate change and environment.   
I collected texts such as campaign and popular education materials, slogans, 
declarations and research of South African NGOs, social movements and community 
based organisations with regards to land, mining and fishing. I identified and located 
popular and research organisations that work with environment and trade as well as 
those who worked with environmental justice early on in the democratic period, and 
read their booklets and materials. Similarly, I combed through South African NGO 
archives and declarations with regards to climate change, energy and related issues of 
shale-fracking, acid drainage, green ecology and ecologically friendly technology. 
This data provided an entry point to explore how the relationship between nature and 
society was understood by non-governmental and non-academic institutions. It 
furthermore offered concrete examples of how political and economic changes 
affecting nature impacted communities. Often these non-governmental organisations 
signalled which land, mining and fishing policies has the most direct bearing on 
communities. More often than not, the literature mirrored what was on the 
international agenda with regards ecological discourse. Selecting and reading such a 
broad range of material allowed me to ascertain a sense of the commonly held ideas 
about nature across the South African political spectrum.  
I examined these texts by asking how the relationship between nature and 
society is set out, what sector-specific factors shape this, whether the analyses account 
for the broader ecological crisis, and if so, how.  
1.8 Structure of the dissertation  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation sets out different conceptions of society’s relationship 
with nature. Specifically, I contrast two conceptions of the tragedy of the commons, 
so as to foreground how the idea of private-property and the act of enclosures, 
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privatisation and title deeds or the allocation of private quotas, has transformed nature 
as communal to nature as transferable, owned and controlled. In this chapter, I argue 
that there are historical alternative conceptions of how to relate to nature.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 develop an historical account of the ecological discourse 
in South Africa in relation to land, mining and fishing respectively. In Chapter 3, I 
trace an ill-fated demand for land as private property. I argue that racial dispossession 
of land pre-1994 shaped land policy in the new dispensation and continues to 
influence contemporary calls for the de-racialisation of land ownership by South 
African land movements. The chapter foregrounds the social relations transformed 
with the separation of land and people over time. 
Chapter 4 traces the idea of making mineral wealth work for the people. I 
argue that mineral extraction rests upon one of the most ecologically destructive 
practices in the world and that the jobs and improved living conditions allegedly 
brought about through mining must be critically examined. I bring to the fore both the 
deceit and the illusions about what mining promises to deliver. I show that mining is 
based on the objectification of minerals and metals as well as mineworkers and 
mining-affected communities. 
Chapter 5 traces historically how the South African state goes to great lengths 
to exert control over the fish and marine commons through its policies. I argue that 
fish as nature, life, food and community are transformed over time into commodities 
and objects due to the changing conception of nature. What the fish represented in the 
past, and how it is seen today is made visible in this chapter.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I conclude the dissertation. This final chapter considers 
questions of political perspective and agency related to ecological questions in South 
Africa today. It provides a survey of government, activist and community initiatives 
and an assessment of their potential to contribute to establishing a new relationship 






Chapter Two: Another Nature is Possible 
2.1 Introduction 
To critique existing reality implies that alternatives are possible – theoretically, at 
least, if not historically. This is a potentially endless task, but it is explored here 
mainly to the extent that it clarifies the historical analysis that follows. 
In talking of an alternative relationship of nature and society, we must not lose 
sight of how the dominant relationship was itself the result of a protracted and 
complex process. This involved changes in nature, new productive techniques as well 
as changes in relations of class and gender. The dominance of this relationship and its 
related changes was achieved through imperialist conquest, slavery and the 
establishment of global markets. In a similar way, we should think of an alternative 
relationship as the result of a many-sided process, even if we cannot foresee all its 
component parts. Important is to gain a clearer sense of what makes ideas and 
initiatives potentially part of such an alternative and how the existence of alternatives 
is hidden by the dominant relationship between society and nature. 
The three main aims of this chapter are (i) to set out a case for and against “no 
alternative” to private property in the context of the tragedy of the commons; (ii) to 
show one alternative conception of how society can relate to nature – developed by 
Princen – of the logic of sufficiency (without implying this is the only alternative); 
and (iii) to show how similar alternative conceptions of the relationship between 
society and nature emerged before the current ecological crisis by drawing briefly on 
the work of Gandhi and Schumacher.1 I refer to these alternatives because they clarify 
the scale of alternatives and illuminate an approach that best suits the underpinnings 
of this dissertation, which is to bring to the fore the possibility of a different 
relationship with nature.  
2.2 Historical critique and theoretical alternatives 
Alternatives form part of a broader tradition of developing and thinking about society. 
In particular, they aim to show a society where social relationships are not defined 
and determined by the market. This dissertation reveals the connections between a set 
                                                
1 Thomas Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005); M. K. Gandhi, 
Hind Swaraj and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, 
Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (New York: Harper Perennial, 1989). 
 23 
 
of assumptions about a good, modern society and the consequent impact various 
processes have on nature, both human and non-human. In so doing the dissertation 
seeks to foreground the possibilities of another logic and other driving forces in 
society.  
A deep rupture occurred between society and nature in the seventeenth century 
and the consequences are being felt today. Exposing multiple aspects of the separation 
between society and nature enables us to trace the perhaps unintended consequences 
of this rupture, whilst these various aspects were being forged. These changing 
relationships between society and nature are often contested. They do not evolve in a 
linear process and they have real material outcomes. Practices and lived experiences 
alter and transform landscapes, the relationships within and between communities and 
between humans and nature. To use Merchant’s words, “society affects and gets 
affected by nature.”2 This is evident through the current ecological crisis and as will 
be outlined in the proceeding chapters on land, mining and fishing.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, there are numerous approaches and critiques of 
climate change globally and the broader ecological crisis, some of which are mirrored 
in South Africa. By using an historical approach, this dissertation offers an additional 
lens through which we can identify the potential and limitations of some of these 
critiques. Furthermore, it reveals how we currently relate to nature in South Africa 
and how apparently progressive ideas have served to perpetuate the ecological crisis 
after the end of apartheid. 
2.3 Two tragedies of the commons – Hardin and Merchant 
Historically, the commons refer to natural resources, such as the mountains, land, 
rivers, the sky, oceans and forests, etc. These spaces have been communally shared 
and accessed. They are not privately or state-owned, but are “held by an identifiable 
community of interdependent users” who wished to access or work them.3 The 
conception of the tragedy of the commons brings to our attention how nature is 
conceived of, governed and regulated. The way in which nature is regulated reflects 
social, economic, political, ecological and philosophical beliefs and assumptions 
                                                
2 Merchant, Death of Nature 43. 
3 David Feeny et al., “The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty-Two Years Later,” Human Ecology 18 (1990): 4. 
The authors identify four property regimes: private property (these rights exclude others from using the resources 
and are transferable), state property (resources are vested in and access regulated by the state), open access 
property (absence of well-defined property rights) and communal property. 
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about the relationship between society and nature. There are two distinct ideas that 
underpin very different conceptions of the tragedy of the commons: 
 
(i) The tragedy occurs because of open access leading to exploitation of common 
resources. Thus, the commons need to be enclosed for their protection and 
safeguarding. 
(ii) Or contrastingly, enclosure of the commons is the tragedy, as the shift to 
privately owned property leads to a transformed conception of nature. The 
privatisation of nature in this way results in exploitation, which contributes 
to the current ecological crisis. 
The first conception is set out by Garrett Hardin in his 1968 text, “The tragedy 
of the commons.” This text is regarded as the foundation for economic theory of 
environmental management and market environmentalism.4 Several scholars set out a 
second conception of enclosures, which they regard as being the tragedy of the 
commons. This dissertation focuses on Carolyn Merchant’s critique of Hardin’s 
conception and her alternative conception of nature, which is located within a broader 
historical context. 
2.3.1 Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”  
Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” was a response to the debate on the 
growth of the population at the time. The model he put forward was a simple 
economic equation based on an assumption that human nature is naturally competitive 
and therefore human beings will always act in accordance with their individual 
interests. Elinor Ostrom puts forward that “[s]ince Garrett Hardin’s challenging article 
in Science, the expression ‘the tragedy of the commons’ has come to symbolize the 
degradation of the environment to be expected whenever many individuals use a 
                                                
4 Karen Bakker, “The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and the Human 
Right to Water in the Global South,” Antipode 432 (2007): 431–432. Bakker argues that environmental 
management is “a mode of resource regulation which aims to deploy markets as the solution to environmental 
problems. Market environmentalism offers hope of a virtuous fusion of economic growth, efficiency, and 
environmental conservation: through establishing private property rights, employing markets as allocation 
mechanisms, and incorporating environmental externalities through pricing, proponents of market 
environmentalism assert that environmental goods will be more efficiently allocated if treated as economic goods 
– thereby simultaneously addressing concerns over environmental degradation and inefficient use of resources.” 
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scarce resource in common.”5 Hardin’s key concern was “how best to limit the use of 
natural resources so as to ensure their long-term economic viability.”6  
Hardin theorised that there was a finite number of resources in the world and 
argued that there was no technical solution to the population problem. Many, 
according to him, sought to find a solution to the “evils of overpopulation without 
relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy.”7 He argued that, given Malthus’s 
theory, the share per capita of resources available decreases over time. For Hardin “a 
finite world can support only a finite population.”8 He set his argument out as follows:  
 
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be 
expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. 
Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, 
poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying 
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the 
long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the 
commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or 
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ‘What is the utility to me of adding one more 
animal to my herd?’ This utility has one negative and one positive component. 
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman 
receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly 
+1. 
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more 
animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the 
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. 
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the 
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and 
another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.9 
 
                                                
5 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 2. 
6 Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 1. 
7 Garrett Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1243 
8 Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,” 1243. 
9 Ibid., 1244. 
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Hardin therefore defines rationality as the Rational Beings acting to increase 
their personal gain. A Rational Being is not able to act differently as it would be 
against his interests. The Rational Being does not understand what natural limits are 
or chooses to disregard them. Freedom of the commons, according to Hardin, is thus 
not in the interests of the Rational Being. This freedom is the cause of the ruin, and 
hence the tragedy, of the commons.  
Another example Hardin set out was that of the “freedom of the seas.” 
According to Hardin, over time, fish will be depleted and catches will decline due to 
open access and the individual competitive nature of the fishermen. Each fisherman 
wants to maximise his profits. Because the ocean is freely accessible to each 
fisherman, no one fisherman will act so as to preserve the ocean. The fisherman will 
not see it as his responsibility to fish in a sustainable way. Thus will not have regard 
for the stock levels but will rather focus on increasing his economic and personal 
gain. Hardin argues that, given that each fisherman is inclined to self-interest, they 
will all equally exploit the ocean’s resources in a manner that would reach 
unsustainable levels. In effect, the tragedy of the commons is open access combined 
with the competitive nature of the Rational Being to increase his profit. A critique 
lodged against Hardin is that “his solution, based on the assumption that human 
beings are an economically maximizing species, ignored the cooperative actions of 
subsistence-oriented peoples both in medieval Europe and in native and colonial 
America.”10 
Hardin puts forward that the only way to overcome this tragedy is to find 
mechanisms to coerce fellow fisherman to operate within limits so as to ensure 
economic viability over time. Regulations need to be put in place and the idea of open 
access needs to be addressed. According to Hardin, there are no winners in the 
commons. His solution was the introduction of private property and assumed that 
private ownership implied that owners would better protect natural resources as they 
would have a vested interest in the resources’ longevity. Feeny argues that Hardin 
confuses the property regimes of open access with communal and notes this is a 
mistake that makes the theory incomplete and problematic. Communal property is not 
                                                
10 Carolyn Merchant, “Fish First! The Changing Ethic in Ecosystem Management,” Human Ecology Review 4 
(1990): 25. Drawn from A McEvoy, The Fisherman’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 
1850–1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); SJB Cox, “No Tragedy on the Commons,” 
Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 49–69. R White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
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open access but rather it is property “held by an identifiable community of 
interdependent users.”11 It is not open and nor is it transferable, but it has features of 
self-regulation and governance to ensure safeguarding. 
The idea that open access leads to tragedy because the Rational Being is 
innately competitive and driven by economic self-interest has had a lasting effect on 
natural resource policies and systems. Resource management and environmental 
studies are premised on Hardin’s conception of the tragedy of the commons. The 
introduction of enclosures, rights allocations, or various forms of privatisation 
legislated to avert the “tragedy” have however not averted the ecological crisis we are 
faced with today. Some argue that the tragedy of the commons is in part the very act 
of creating enclosures which is shaped by the logic of economic expansion and profit-
making. It is further argued that this particular conception has contributed to and 
exacerbated the ecological crisis. 
Becky Mansfield challenges Hardin’s conception of the tragedy of the 
commons. She writes that enclosures and privatisation, as advocated by Hardin, 
creates a particular relationship between society and nature, and that enclosures of 
land established in the eighteenth century in England and Scotland are archetypes of 
privatisation. Enclosures transform nature into private property, and therefore nature 
comes to be owned, controlled and transferrable. This results in the dispossession and 
exclusion of non-owners.12 The shift from communal to private property and the 
creation of enclosures fundamentally alters the relationship between human beings 
and the environment, remaking ecosystems, livelihoods and identities.13 One example 
of this remaking of relations is how the enclosures push those who till the soil and 
sustain themselves from it into waged labour.  
Enclosure of commons transforms nature into a commodity that can be bought 
and sold. This transformation needs to be understood as part of a larger accumulation 
strategy and logic.14 In recent years an example of this is the creation of market-based 
instruments (MBIs) for environmental management such as “taxes, charges, fees, 
fines, penalties, liability and compensation schemes, subsidies and incentives, and 
tradable permit schemes. There are several basic principles behind MBIs: the polluter 
                                                
11 Feeny et al, “Twenty-Two Years Later,” 2. 
12 Becky Mansfield, “Privatization: Property and the Remaking of Nature–Society Relations,” Antipode 39 (2007): 
393. 
13 Mansfield, “Privatization,” 393. 
14 Ibid., 394. 
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pays principle, the user/beneficiary pays principle and the principle of full-cost 
recovery.”15 These instruments are underpinned by Hardin’s conception of the tragedy 
of the commons.16  
Mansfield’s critique of privatisation of the commons brings into focus 
privatisation as a fundamental element of liberalising an economy. She argues that the 
changing relationship of society and nature is not only a case of privatisation, but also 
a part of it. According to Mansfield, “privatization has particular salience for 
understanding contemporary nature-society relationship because property has become 
the central mode of regulating multiple forms of nature.”17 Furthermore she says that 
dispossession is an important element of privatisation but that it is necessary to focus 
on how the both owners and non-owners become market subjects. The consequences 
are multidimensional as “privatization does not simply mark an institutional shift, but 
instead entails a more fundamental restructuring of political-economic and nature-
society relations, including people’s senses of themselves as subjects (e.g. subject as 
owner).”18 For instance, privatisation calls for the logic of efficiency, which becomes 
self-imposed on both the owner and non-owner.  When nature is turned into private 
property and commodified as a market good, this process imposes and simultaneously 
transforms conceptions of nature as well as ways of being and relating to one another 
and the environment. It is not only that people in a society are alienated from each 
other and nature, but also that the way we conceive of the world is altered.  
By examining Hardin’s tragedy of the commons with regards to the ocean and 
fishing we reveal some of the assumptions that have informed an approach to—and 
conception of —the relationship between nature and society. These assumptions have 
reinforced an idea that society is essentially individualistic, economically driven and 
human-centred. However, as Merchant shows, this is not historically accurate. 
                                                
15 United Nations Environment Programme, “Guidelines on the Use of Market-based Instruments to Address the 
Problem of Marine Litter,” by P Ten Brink, I Lutchman, S Bassi, S Speck, S Sheavly, K Register, and C 
Woolaway (Brussels: Institute for European Environmental Policy): 2009, 7. 
16 Mansfield, “Privatization,” 394. 
17 Mansfield, “Privatization,” 393. Mansfield draws on the work of Karen Bakker to argue that privatisation 
transforms society-nature relationships in three predominant ways: (1) it “sparks and creates powerful opposition 
and resistance” to the privatisation of nature; (2) “property transforms people’s relationship to themselves, others 
and nature through ownership and market discipline” and (3) “privatization is remaking of nature-society relations 
as property.” 
18 Mansfield, “Privatization,” 396. 
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2.3.2 Merchant on the tragedy of the commons 
Merchant locates Hardin’s tragedy of the commons within a broader historical 
perspective and places it within laissez-faire capitalism of the seventeenth century and 
the Christian ethic that posited human domination over nature. She argues that it 
“dovetails with the Judeo-Christian mandate of Genesis 1:28 – be fruitful and 
multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it.”19 The foundation of these ideas rests 
on the assumption that both the economic model of capitalism and human domination 
of nature are natural. Hardin takes for granted the ideas of mechanistic nature 
declared by Francis Bacon and which is also evident in Hobbes’ political thought.20  
Merchant argues that this type of perspective reflects an egocentric attitude 
toward nature. This egocentric perspective draws on Hobbes’s idea that the natural 
state of people is competitive, hostile and violent.21 According to Hobbes, “nature has 
given all to all,” therefore giving everyone equal rights to nature. It is important to 
note, however, that here a reading “all to all” is understood as an equal right to take 
from nature, hence favouring whoever gets there first. It is this understanding and 
argument, according to Merchant, that “legitimises laissez faire capitalism.”22  
For Hardin, the commons are thus a free market that requires coercion and rules.23  
Merchant examines Hardin’s fishing example and identifies at least six 
assumptions underpinning it. First, his argument is based on the idea that “what is 
good for the individual is good for society as a whole.”24 This implies that he assumes 
the individual good is the highest good. Second, he argues that “fish were ultimately 
passive objects” and “as commodities to be extracted from the state of nature, they 
could be turned into profit. Like the gold that had been discovered in California, fish 
were treated as gold nuggets, serving as the coin of trade.”25 Third, he assumes that 
nature is passive and that its value is only monetary and external. Fourth, the idea that 
once nature is taken it becomes private property. Hence once fish were caught from 
the commons they automatically become owned.26 This reinforces the idea that 
anything gained by your labour becomes your property. Fifth, he takes on a 
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perspective that bifurcates human and non-human, thus separating society and nature. 
Lastly, Hardin’s assumption is that human nature is competitive and capitalist in 
nature. This reinforces the idea that private ownership is best. Furthermore, it assumes 
that collective ways of organisation are futile and will lead to ecological destruction.  
Monica Chilese discusses the “fount and scourge of ocean life”, describing how 
enclosures must be located within a historical context. She states that “after a long 
period during which human beings lived in equilibrium with nature, capable of using 
its fruits without impoverishing it and without altering its habitats, we are now 
suffering from the illusion that man is the master of creation and not its guardian.”27 
She starkly shows how Hardin’s tragedy of the commons has contributed to the 
demise of the ocean. According to Chilese, “our domination of nature means that the 
cosmos is reduced to a usable object, to the service of a cultural animal that takes the 
liberty to ignore its rules.”28 Both Merchant and Chilese argue that the tragedy from a 
historical perspective is not the communal commons but instead the enclosures and 
erasures of the social, ecological, political and social ecologies that sustained 
communities yet are now plundered and exploited. 
Merchant’s work on Reinventing Eden demonstrates that, today, a lack of 
historical perspective has given rise to approaches that seek to recover narratives – be 
they of restoration or decline.29 The recovery narrative stymies alternatives and the 
necessary intellectual tools for conceiving of another relationship with nature. 
Therefore, it is frequently evident “the mainstream story of the Recovery of Eden 
through modern science, technology and capitalism is perhaps the most powerful 
narrative in Western culture.”30 A key weakness of that narrative is that it puts its 
faith in science and hence holds an unexamined belief in modernity and progress. 
Modern science and technology are portrayed as neutral and a universal remedy to 
solve any problem. Hardin’s tragedy of the commons fits into this narrative. He 
locates his narrative within a linear and positivist storyline, devoid of complexity and 
suggestive of a society where things have clear beginnings and conclusions in which 
private property and market relations are the solution for development problems. 
However, according to Merchant, environmentalist and feminist scholars also 
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reflect the recovery narrative in their analysis; thus it is both mainstream and 
dissident. The recovery narrative used by dissidents is referred to as a counter-
narrative. They describe a decline, rather than a restoration, of nature. An overarching 
argument used is that the environment is plundered and destroyed as the result of 
human expansion and greed. The way back to the pristine wilderness is through an 
environmental movement which calls for ecological justice and sustainability. Within 
a feminist perspective, the decline occurred because female nature was “once revered 
as mother [but is] now scarred, desecrated, and abused, and women [are] the victims 
of patriarchal culture.”31 Within a postcolonial perspective, the decline is a result of 
raiding and occupying indigenous people’s lands. Merchant argues that “even as they 
call for new pathways to a just society, these counter stories of a slide downward (or 
declension) from Eden buy into the overarching, metanarrative of recovery. Both 
storylines, whether upward or downward, compel us to find a new story for the 
twenty-first century.”32 
These counter-narratives, according to Merchant, idealise the past. There is a 
refrain of returning to nature and the past is understood as a place of utopia. She 
further argues that many feminists who adopt the declension narrative stop at a 
gendered analysis. Absent are analyses about how to address racial divisions as well 
as class inequalities that exist in society. Merchant also argues that it is also not clear 
from the environmentalist narrative what conservation would mean and how exactly 
the pristine wilderness would be reclaimed. The declension and restoration 
implications of the recovery narrative result in an impasse. Merchant argues that if 
“played out to its logical conclusion, each narrative negates human life: the 
mainstream story leads to a totally artificial earth; the environmental story leads to a 
depopulated earth.”33  
By using an historical approach, both Merchant and Mansfield are able to 
respond to Hardin’s tragedy of the commons by showing how regulation, governance 
and management of nature were simultaneously part of a larger process which altered 
human relations with one another as well as with nature. 
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2.4 Two logics of society and nature – Princen on efficiency and sufficiency   
The framework of the tragedy of the commons as set out by Hardin is the dominant 
worldview. His work rests on assumptions set out above and challenged by Merchant. 
The foundational work done by Thomas Princen helps us to understand the specific 
logic of society held by Hardin and other neoclassical economists. More so, he 
suggests an alternative logic for society, offering tools and principles to envisage and 
practise a different relationship between society and nature.  
Princen distinguishes between two logics of society. Specifically, he looks at 
the ideas of efficiency and sufficiency. In The Logic of Sufficiency and Treading 
Softly: Paths to Ecological Order, Princen shows how society lives beyond the 
ecological limits for sustainability and uses numerous examples to illustrate 
alternatives to the dominant logic of efficiency that exist and are possible. Efficiency 
is a human concept and thus a result of particular processes and worldview. The 
examples he gives of sufficiency suggest a different way to address the ecological 
limits that confront us today. 
2.4.1 The logic of efficiency 
Outlining various elements of the logic of efficiency, Princen shows how it has 
evolved over time. During the Middle Ages its meaning was understood as 
effectiveness and purpose in accomplishing a task with specific reference to 
mechanical and physical actions.34 Some three centuries later, in the eighteenth 
century, with the invention of the steam engine, rapid advances in theories of science 
and expanding market systems, its meaning changed. These events occurred parallel 
to a shift from a craft-based industry and barter systems of exchange to monetary 
markets for labour, land and capital.35 Efficiency soon became explained by or 
measured with mathematical equations and a conversion occurred  
 
from a qualitative notion to a quantitative one. No longer denoting the accomplishment of a 
worthy task, the tight fit of means and ends, it would now become a quantitative measure of 
how well a task is performed, of how well measurable economic inputs are used to generate 
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measurable economic outputs … how a producer employed raw material, how a consumer 
satisfied demand, and how society generated wealth.36  
 
Rapid industrialisation and the rise of a capitalist economy resulted in rapid 
production, economies of scale and a market of supply and demand. The logic and 
language of efficiency – so many units produced in so many hours, yielding so much 
profit – came to mark this period. Princen argues that “Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations, originally published in 1776, not only captured this move towards market-led 
industrial production, but simultaneously laid a conceptual foundation for a 
rationalised, productive economy.”37 During this period two ideas emerged parallel to 
each other: the all-encompassing invisible hand of the market, and the economic 
mantra of efficiency.38  
At the end of the eighteenth century several challenges confronting a new idea 
of efficiency were overcome. The idea had evolved from effectiveness and purpose in 
completing a task with regards to mechanic and physical use to a specific economic 
meaning. Its new bases were scientific and quantitative.39 It became associated with 
numerical and productive scale. According to Princen, this rapid evolution developed 
alongside two important historical processes at the end of the nineteenth and the start 
of the twentieth centuries. The one was the construction of the idea of the economic 
man. This new man represented wealth, progress, rationality and modernity and was 
determined to cast-off the old, traditional and non-scientific practices.40 The other 
process was the rise of the corporation that sought scale, mass distribution, expansion 
and vast extraction.41 According to Princen, over a short period of time the logic of 
efficiency was completely stripped of its original social meaning and purpose. 
Neoclassical economists sought to create a “value-free, apolitical analysis in the quest 
for scientific and public legitimacy.”42 This was done to foster an idea that “value has 
to somehow be converted into measurable quantity.”43 Princen argues that Smith 
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elevated “efficiency to the status of economic and managerial principle and, 
eventually, to a broad social principle.”44  
Princen shows how time and the notion of making every minute count became 
linked to production, growth and progress.  Today, efficiency is “nearly synonymous 
with ‘productive’ or ‘useful’ even ‘good,’ efficiency has spilled into all realms of life 
… It has become a social goal in its own right, equating with all that is desirable, and 
then used selectively to promote agendas often unrelated to true efficiency gains.”45  
This ascendancy of efficiency above other values is associated with capitalism. 
Underlying this logic of efficiency are practices of wealth accumulation and 
profiteering and an entire set of assumptions about a logic of the economy, the market 
and society. From this logic arises the belief that nature would best be managed by 
market mechanisms. This faith in the logic of efficiency is closely interwoven with 
the idea that a good life is one in which one can consume endlessly.  
It is this logic of efficiency that has underpinned the drive and ethos of 
privatisation, globalisation and the expansion of transnational corporations over many 
decades, all resting on enclosures, extraction and expansion. It requires the constant 
making and selling of goods and services, the search for new markets and the 
commodification of all aspects of life. Obscured and hidden by the language of 
efficiency, neoliberal globalisation and privatisation create never-ending 
overproduction, overconsumption and overexploitation in society. These processes 
create vast amounts of waste and deplete finite and limited resources. The skewed 
distribution and use of these ecological resources amongst and between countries and 
peoples is hidden. So too are unequal benefits from efficiency, privatisation and 
globalisation. This logic of efficiency, in part, contributes to societies with extreme 
income inequality.  
The logic of efficiency conceives of nature only as a natural resource over 
which human beings have command. It works on the assumption that natural 
resources are limitless; where and when limits emerge, technology and science will be 
able to create alternatives. This logic assumes more is best, that boundless growth is 
equivalent to progress and advancement of society. Thus, this logic does not avert 
ecological crisis but instead hastens it.  
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Key for Princen is the necessity to understand that the “age of efficiency” is not 
universal or some perfect age-old notion, but that it is historically specific and 
evolved over time. The logic of efficiency emerged parallel to the rise of 
industrialisation and was influenced fundamentally by three primary institutions, 
namely the factory, the laboratory and the market. The aim of these institutions is to 
generate the highest throughput (amount of material or items passing through a 
system or process) in modern society. The logic of efficiency thus serves a political 
and economic purpose and is linked to a particular worldview. According to Princen, 
efficiency, like the idea of personal self-gain, must be understood from a historical 
perspective.  
By making the logic of efficiency visible, my dissertation questions political, 
economic and social theories and their assumptions about nature. The ascendancy of 
the idea of efficiency, with its social and economic meaning of large quantities at the 
fastest rate and lowest costs, coincides with the conception of nature as passive, other 
and for the advancement of society. It is the constant call by proponents of 
neoliberalism over the past fifty or so years for efficient and sustainable use of natural 
resources that has exacerbated the ill health of the environment. It is now necessary to 
call for an alternative such as the logic of sufficiency within the context of the 
ecological crisis, which can posit a new approach to nature. 
2.4.2  The logic of sufficiency  
Princen argues that we require new concepts for a different society, which are 
premised on the recognition of limited resources and ecological decline. This 
alternative society would not be based on principles of material wealth, profit making 
or the logic of efficiency. He argues that society requires ideas, which call into 
question excessiveness and boundless production.46 Importantly he points, out “that 
what we take for normal is actually excess,” and suggests that we “adopt sufficiency 
(or something like it) as a political tool.”47  
 Princen argues that “we need language that enables living with, not living 
against nature” and he challenges us to imagine and create a different society, which 
would overcome the multiple crises in our current society.48 In particular, he focuses 
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on the intersection of ecological and moral crises. As described above, a dominant 
idea in society is efficiency, which is essential for the current functioning of the 
current paradigm. The idea of progress is equated with growth that posits access, 
mobility and convenience as the highest ideals.  Other important ideas of moderation, 
solidarity and community are subordinated and this is not by chance. Princen asks us 
to examine the new language and concepts that have been created to foster this 
particular worldview.49 He argues that today the “fundamental biophysical shifts 
require fundamental social shifts.”50 In an ecologically constrained society, Princen 
argues that the logic of efficiency needs to be subordinate to new managing principles 
which do not promote more as good, but rather bring into closer focus what is enough. 
He suggests the idea of sufficiency as one such common sense and intuitive principle. 
Similar ideas of being mindful as well as adaptive to ecological limits exist 
historically. 
Princen stressed that “[s]ufficiency principles such as restraint, respite, 
precaution, polluter pays, zero, and reverse onus have the virtue of partially 
resurrecting well established notions such as moderation and thrift, ideas that have 
never completely disappeared.”51 We need all these ideas but they run the risk of 
being displaced because modern society does not reward reduced throughput; it 
demands endless output.52 Modern society demands endless consumption, associating 
wanting, buying and having more with the good life. This good life aspires to the 
notion that money can buy convenience, choice and happiness.  
By looking at various examples in the form of case studies, Princen explains 
how “choice was not one of indulgence versus abstinence or convenience versus 
hardship. From the Pacific Lumber Company, Monhegan Lobstering, and the Toronto 
Island Project, it becomes apparent that enough was a ‘first best’ choice, not second 
best, not a concession, not a sacrifice.”53 He argues how enough, the idea of 
sufficiency, is ecologically rational. He demonstrates how communities can and do 
exercise restraint, follow principles of sufficiency and act collectively and in 
solidarity to ensure nature’s well-being as well as that of the individual and 
community.  
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Princen draws on the principle which takes into account the real limits of the 
environment as well as the real needs - not wants - of people. In so doing, he seeks to 
illustrate that there are alternatives to the over-consumption that is too much for “our 
social fabric or health of our planet.” He argues that  
 
… sufficiency as a principle aimed at ecological overshoot compels decision makers to ask 
when too much resources use or too little regeneration jeopardizes important values such as 
ecological integrity and social cohesion: when material gains now preclude material gains in the 
future; when consumer gratification or investor rewards threatens economic security; when 
benefits internalized depend on costs externalized.54  
 
By so doing, he posits critical questions about what can ensure future ecological well-
being.  
In order to create a different way of relating to natural resources, Princen 
suggests different forms of organisations, as well as new principles and ideas that will 
limit excessive production and consumption. He argues that the old principles at best 
are problematic. These include extracting raw materials rapidly and thoroughly (the 
efficiency principle); converting those materials into products that people will buy 
(the consumer-rule principle); creating markets everywhere (the growth principle); 
disposal of the wastes in the least costly, least visible manner possible (again, the 
efficiency principle, along with the out-of-sight-out-of-mind principle); and doing 
more and more of all of this faster and faster, cheaper and cheaper (the growth, 
efficiency and cheaper-is-better principles).55 They rest on late twentieth-century free 
trade principles of liberalisation, deregulation and multilateralism that replaced the 
mercantile principles of protections and differential trade agreements of the early 
twentieth century.56  
Princen argues that implementing the abovementioned principles has created the 
current ecological crisis. He goes on to say that we need to develop new principles to 
enable a different way of living with nature, that “we need principles that fit the needs 
of the times – namely living on the regenerative capacity of current resources and 
waste sinks … principles which are ‘ecological consonant’.”57 The four principles 
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suggested as alternatives by Princen are the principles of intermittency, sufficiency, 
capping and source and they are intended to limit excess and are based on what 
humanity needs, not wants.  
The intermittency principle is premised on conservation and the idea that we do 
not require energy all the time as if it were unlimited. Similarly, the principle of 
sufficiency forces us to ask ourselves what is enough and what is “too-muchness.” In 
other words, “it is doing well by doing a little less than the most possible,” thus acting 
with restraint and within ecological capacity so that there is enough for later.58 None 
of this implies not having; rather it implies not having something all of the time and 
having sufficient for one’s needs. 
The capping principle is not driven by economic interest but acts to ensure that 
“regenerative capacities” of the ecosystem are maintained.59 Caps on energy, 
production of goods and services, food, consumptions, farming, harvesting etc., are all 
necessary to ensure safety and well-being.60 It is not complicated: a cap is the same 
principle as a speed limit. For instance, we know that driving above the speed limits is 
a hazard to other motorists. It makes no sense that cars should be able to reach speeds 
above 120 km per hour if the maximum speed is below that. Hence, cars should be 
manufactured with a speed limit capacity that can only reach 120 km per hour; more 
than that is too much.  
The source principle ensures that the source is protected against extinction or 
complete depletion of natural resources. Princen’s argument is that if we destroy the 
source such as “a river’s headwaters, a grassland’s soil, a reef’s coral, a forest’s seed 
trees, a fishery’s spawning ground, a grain’s genetic stock, an atmosphere’s chemical 
integrity” then we have lost entire species and will be unable to reproduce what is lost 
for the generations that follow.61 
Princen’s work draws our attention to the specificities of the logic of efficiency, 
which had become prevalent by the end of twentieth century. This logic of efficiency, 
he explains, has become invisible although it drives all aspects of today’s society. It is 
the principles behind the logic of efficiency that contribute to disharmony between 
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society and nature. By making visible the logic of efficiency, Princen helps us 
conceive of a different logic and suggests a way to develop alternative principles, a 
language and a way of being in the world that recognises the importance of a society 
where “enough” is best and first prize. His work shows us an alternative that does not 
call for a return to the past or to nature; instead his examples show how the logic of 
sufficiency is part of the present as well as a transition to a different society. 
The four principles outlined by Princen can be seen as guidelines for individuals 
or communities, but can also be seen as steps toward an alternative relationship 
between nature and society, established through such concrete steps. It does not 
require human absorption into the realm of nature, and is compatible with human use 
of nature for its own needs. The extraction and use of natural resources is guided by 
principles of stewardship, rather than the quest for competitive profit. 
This raises the question of whether Princen’s principles can be realised broadly 
within the context of capitalism. Can you, for example, respect the principle of 
preserving the source and compete successfully in a capitalist economy? In some 
cases it may be possible, but my view is that, on the whole, you cannot. Others have 
made this argument and I will do so here. The point I want to make is that, as with the 
establishment of the dominant relationship of nature and society, the establishment of 
an alternative is a process. We can see Princen’s examples as indicating routes which 
that process can take.  It may be more difficult to see the struggles of landless people 
or fishing communities or mining-affected communities in South Africa in a similar 
light, as parts of a process of establishing that alternative. But that is what is 
attempted in the chapters that follow.  
2.5  Arguments for a different nature before the ecological crisis – Gandhi 
and Schumacher 
Below are two brief examples of critiques of modernity as part of a broad tradition of 
alternatives.  In both examples it would be a mistake to misread their critiques of 
Western civilisation and modernity as suggesting a return to traditional feudalism or 
backwardness or any other part of the past. Rather, both Gandhi and Schumacher 
present us with visions for an alternative society. Gandhi, in his writing, presented us 
with his image of a metaphoric village. Schumacher offered the idea of Buddhist 
economics and the concept of “Right Livelihoods.” Their writings represent the 
emergence of a range of arguments which contained visions of alternatives to 
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modernity and also discussed another conception of nature, work and relations which 
aimed at living a good life based on notions of “enough is as good as a feast”, 
simplicity and reciprocity. Their ideas were presented many years before the current 
ecological crisis was placed on the global agenda. 
In Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj, written in 1909, he launched a critique against 
Western civilisation and specifically called into question the ills and consequences of 
automation, modernisation and urbanisation. Gandhi found it abhorrent that wealth 
and riches were conceived of as civilisation in place of “that mode of conduct which 
points to man the path of duty” and “good conduct.”62 He observed that the ancestors 
“dissuaded us from luxuries and pleasure” and “they saw that our real happiness and 
health consisted in a proper use of our hands and our feet.”63 For Gandhi the process 
that sought to “make bodily welfare the object of life” needed to be challenged and 
exposed. He argued that “thousands of workmen meet together and for the sake of 
maintenance work in factories or mines,” describing “[t]heir condition [as] worse than 
that of beast.”64 He further noted that “[t]hey are obliged to work, at their risk of their 
lives, at most dangerous occupations, for the sake of millionaires.”65  
In an important exchange with Nehru, Gandhi wrote: 
 
If India is to attain true freedom and through India the world also…people will have to live in 
villages, not in towns, in huts, not in palaces … I hold that without truth and non-violence there 
can be nothing but destruction for humanity. We can realise truth and non-violence only in the 
simplicity of village life…. You must not imagine that I am envisaging our village life as it is 
today. The village of my dreams is still in my mind. …My village will contain intelligent human 
beings. They will not live in dirt and darkness as animals. …There will be neither plague, nor 
cholera nor smallpox; no one will be idle, no one will wallow in luxury. Everyone will have to 
contribute his quota of manual labour…. It is possible to envisage railways, post and telegraph 
offices etc.66 
 
The exchange clearly shows that it would be a misreading to understand Gandhi’s 
critique of Western civilisation as a call to return to something long gone or abandon 
the advances made by Western civilisation. Instead he sets forth and makes clear the 
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trappings of Western civilisation and to some extent reveals the contradictions and 
costs of civilisation.  
Terchek argues that Gandhi “launches a broad indictment on modernity and 
modernisation to expose them as constructions that come with heavy and often hidden 
costs.”67 It is the materialism implied in “increased production and technological 
innovation” that are “the emblems of modernity” which, according to Gandhi, breaks 
down community and fractures society, high costs to pay.68 Terchek notes that “the 
modern society that Gandhi surveys has become a place where efficiencies 
overwhelm individuals, the household is under siege, artificialities abound, nothing is 
fixed and social practices and moral principles are increasingly uncomplimentary and 
often contradictory. In such a world, he finds people are lost, and wants to provide 
them with materials that serve as a guide.”69 His approach is not an attempt at a 
blueprint or at providing a definitive alternative, but rather one of reflecting upon and 
revealing the costs of modernity.  
Schumacher suggested an alternative to modernisation that would avoid 
“materialist heedlessness and traditional immobility.”70 His essay on “Buddhist 
Economics,” written in 1966 and later published in 1973 in Small is Beautiful, is 
another example of the approach explored in my dissertation. In his compelling 
argument about “Right Livelihood” he said that 
 
[b]efore they dismiss Buddhist economics as nothing better than a nostalgic dream, they might 
wish to consider whether the path of economic development outlined by modern economics is 
likely to lead them to places where they really want to be … As far as the masses are concerned, 
the results appear to be disastrous – a collapse of the rural economy, a rising tide of 
unemployment in town and country, and the growth of a city proletariat without nourishment for 
either body or soul.71  
 
Buddhist economics places meaningful work at the centre of an alternative 
society aimed to enliven people, build community, instil discipline and build 
character. In so doing, the aim is that we work not to consume excessively, but to earn 
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sufficiently so as to enjoy leisure and creativity. To consume and to merely have more 
is not a good life. Instead a good life is one in which “amazingly small means leading 
to extraordinarily satisfactory results.”72 According to Schumacher, “consumption is 
merely a means to human well-being, the aim should be to obtain the maximum of 
well-being with the minimum of consumption.”73 He added that local products should 
be prioritised over imports and use of resources should be made with mindfulness. 
Specifically, he said that “non-renewable goods must be used only if they are 
indispensable, and then only with the greatest care and most meticulous concern for 
conservation. To use them heedlessly or extravagantly is an act of violence.”74 
By briefly outlining the ideas of Gandhi and Schumacher, which were put 
forward in different historical periods, I am reinforcing my argument about the 
possibility of an alternative relationship to nature and other conceptions of a good life. 
I argue that neither Gandhi’s nor Schumacher’s conceptions of a flourishing society 
are compatible with a logic of efficiency. To advance this argument, I have drawn on 
the work of Carolyn Merchant, showing how using an historical approach unearths 
important dimensions of the ecological crisis and its historical linkages to assist in 
seeing alternatives. I have also drawn on Thomas Princen’s work to show a concrete 
way to reconceptualise how we relate to nature with material effect. The purpose is to 
help shed light, in part, on what obscures alternative thinking with regard to the 
ecological crisis.  
As with Princen, it is possible to raise the question of whether Gandhi’s or 
Schumacher’s principles could be broadly realised within capitalism. Similarly, it is 
not necessary to begin with a complete blueprint for an alternative society, although 
that kind of project has its own place and value. We can see their arguments, instead, 
as steps towards an alternative relationship between nature and society and hence an 
alternative society. They help us see how nature and society mutually constitute each 
other. In that sense, they show that another nature is possible. 
2.6  Making another nature visible 
In referring to this broader tradition of alternatives, I am illustrating ideas about the 
possibility of another nature, a different relationship with nature. To help imagine 
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another relationship with nature, my dissertation sets out to reveal the assumptions 
behind various ecological discourses and policies. Sometimes those who deploy 
discourses and lobby for policies are aware of such assumptions. However, in general, 
most underlying assumptions are adopted unknowingly and remain unexamined by 
the public. When policies are crafted they often maintain existing systems rather than 
effect any meaningful and fundamental changes. The act of making visible is an 
approach intended to reveal and unearth these assumptions and peel away at 
conceptions that are taken as normal and given. It is an approach that aims to 
undermine current systems and bring new possibilities to the fore. In this context, the 
dissertation shows the dominant conception of nature and the assumptions that 
underpin this and the society it produces.   
The act of making visible is my attempt to move beyond critiques, which 
debunk policies but still favour the worldview in which nature is a passive object. I 
draw on a historical perspective to show that there are – and have been –different 
conceptions of the relationship between society and nature over time. Critically, the 
dissertation aims to make visible how nature and society are inextricably linked: they 
are two parts of the same whole, as society affects and is affected by nature. I try to 
show how ideas have real material consequences. For example, the act of “making 
visible” by the scholars I have cited, shows that thinking that the tragedy of the 
commons was as a result of “open access” led to physical enclosures of land and 
privatisation of nature. This changed society dramatically. But to make visible is also 
to show how the material consequences of enclosures led to the widespread inability 
to feed one’s family.  
By exposing the existing assumptions, the dissertation shows how language is 
laden with ideas and values and is not neutral. Evolving new language and 
articulations is critical in a project of changing ideas. Giving fresh meanings or 
reclaiming words like “commons” or conceptions of the “tragedy of the commons” 
can evoke changed ideas and create a basis for imagining alternatives. 
The possibility of another nature in South Africa involves unveiling the deceits 
and hidden assumptions of post-apartheid South African ecological discourse. The 
dissertation shows how liberation ideology adopted various ideals of Western 
civilisation such as modernity, progress, liberal democracy, industrialisation, the 
exploitation of natural resources and economic development, in unexamined ways. By 
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taking on these ideals and incorporating them into ANC-led policy, the new 
dispensation’s purpose for delivery undermined real economic, social and political 
transformation.   
Making visible another relationship to nature means describing and exposing 
how racial dispossession continues in the new dispensation. The dissertation reveals 
how the South African government uses racial rhetoric and the discourse of racial 
redress to obscure its actual reinforcement of historical social relations of exploitation 
and oppression. I describe how the acts of transforming the commons and the 
relationships of communal care into private ownership and market-based relations 
have resulted in racial dispossession. However, I also explain how attempts at 
reclaiming the commons with calls for ownership of and control over them, can still 
result in a continuation of, instead of a break with, harmful modern conceptions of 
nature.  
Lastly, making visible the possibility of another nature and society is done to 
show that the ecological crisis is a crisis of unequal social relations. It depends on the 
devaluation of women’s invisible and poorly paid work, the exploitation of paid 
labour and the continued division between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” It is a 
crisis that depends on the subsidisation of reproductive work done by women and 
productive work done by the working class. It is about capitalist accumulation 
processes and the logics that underpin them. It fundamentally depends on keeping 
these dependencies invisible and hidden. By “making visible” another nature my 
dissertation shows that the ecological crisis is overtly social and political. 
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Chapter Three: Land Racialised – Making Land as Nature Invisible  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter argues that much of the debate on the politics of land in South Africa 
does not foreground a conception of land as part of nature. It furthermore seeks to 
explain the reason for this conceptual shortcoming. The chapter argues that the work 
of Sol Plaatje has left an imprint on how land is conceived of today.1 It traces the way 
his ill-fated demand for land as private property has shaped the post-apartheid land 
policy as well as influenced contemporary calls for the deracialisation of land 
ownership.  
Given the ecological crisis confronting society, the chapter argues it is critical that 
engagements on the politics of land bring to the fore that land as part of nature and 
intrinsic to social relations – not only as a natural resource to dominate, extract and 
control.   Making this visible brings to the fore the social relations that have been 
transformed by the separation of land and people over time. This chapter seeks to 
show that the call for the deracialisation of land ownership will neither automatically 
re-connect people to land, nor will it reconceptualise land beyond private property.  
3.2  The land question at an impasse 
The land question in South Africa is a deeply contentious issue and the existing land 
reform debate continues to stand at an impasse.2  This is despite the important 
symbolic project that deracialisation of land ownership represents in the post-
apartheid period.3  
Since 1994, the approach adopted by the democratically elected government has 
not resolved the land question. If anything, there is a worsening land crisis such that 
Stephen Greenberg has argued that land tenure and security has been the most 
                                                
1 Sol Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa: Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion, iBook 
edition. 
2 By the term “land question” I refer to racially-skewed distribution, use and allocation of land in the country. 
Arguments about the impasse can be found in Fred Hendricks, Lungisile Ntsebeza and Kirk Helliker, “The Land 
Question in South Africa,” in The Promise of Land: Undoing A Century of Dispossession in South Africa 
(Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2013), 1. Also see Ruth Hall, “Introduction,” in Another Countryside? Policy 
Options for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa (Bellville: PLAAS, 2009), 1. 
3 In 1994, 87% of land was owned by white people, and 13% by black people. According to Walker and Dubb, 
“[i]n the early 1990s just under 60 000 white-owned farms accounted for about 70% of the total area of the 




retarded aspect of land policy. According to him, “post-apartheid land reform has 
been reduced to a market-based process of deracialising land ownership, without 
disturbing markets or destabilising the political and social climate.”4 Ruth Hall further 
highlights, “experience to date has shown that land reform has tended to reproduce 
the large-scale model of farming, with similar forms of production pursued.”5 Her 
study concludes that “[i]f land reform is to address the political imperative of 
changing racially skewed patterns of land ownership and the economic imperative of 
reducing poverty, it must both redistribute and maintain or increase production.”6  
The Inyanda Declaration states, “nearly twenty years after the end of apartheid, 
the 1913 Natives’ Land Act continues to haunt the countryside.”7 The declaration 
goes further to note that “the land question, which was so central to the struggle 
against apartheid, remains unresolved. Millions of South Africans continue to be 
dispossessed of their lands, and the rural geography of apartheid (bantustans and 
white South Africa) continues to exist.”8 In order to move beyond the current land 
impasse, The Promise of Land asks, “[w]hat should be done to correct the racist 
injustices of the colonial past in respect of land ownership and access?”9  
According to Hendricks et al., everyone agrees that land reform is needed but 
beyond that is where the challenge lies. They set out five main areas of disagreement 
in the land reform debate. First, “how much land should be transferred to black 
people.” Second, “how quickly should it be done?” Third, should land reform be done 
“via the market based system or expropriation?” Fourth, “whether expropriation 
should be with or without compensation,” and finally, “how this compensation should 
be determined.”10  
There appears however to be no disagreement about how land is conceived of in 
the debate. All the disagreements outlined by Hendricks et al. assume the dominant 
                                                
4 Stephen Greenberg, “The Landless People’s Movement and the Failure of Post-apartheid Land Reform,” case 
study for the University of KwaZulu-Natal project entitled Globalisation, Marginalisation and New Social 
Movements in post-Apartheid South Africa (University of KwaZulu-Natal: Centre for Civil Society and the School 
of Development Studies, 2004), 10. 
5 Ruth Hall, Another Countryside: Policy Options for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa (Cape Town: 
PLAAS, 2009), 55–56. 
6 Hall, Another Countryside, 55–56. 
7 Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE), “Declaration of December 2014” in The National Land 
Movement Launch Report (Mowbray: TCOE, 2015), 52. 
8 TCOE, “Inyanda Declaration,” 52. 
9 Fred Hendricks, Lugisile Ntsebeza and Kirk Helliker, The Promise of Land: Undoing a Century of Dispossession 
in South Africa (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2013), 47. 




conception of land as private property and object, even if there is recognition of 
dispossession and exploitation of land. Much of the literature suggests that a central 
disagreement in the debate about land reform rests upon upholding the rule of law, the 
constitution and in particular, the private property clause.  
According to William Beinart and Peter Delius, “alienation of land from 
Khoisan and Africans to whites resulted from conquests in the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries, as settlers and colonial states expanded their authority into the 
interior of southern Africa.”11 Beinart and Delius argue that “[t]his expansion 
involved both violence and legal measures: annexations, the survey and privatisation 
of land, and the establishment of a new colonial civil authority.”12 Thus, certain 
conceptions of land are imprinted upon the South African landscape due to these 
processes.  
The forced separation of people from land affected both land and people, and 
their relationship. Specifically, private ownership and enclosure of land and commons 
ascribed new value to land tied to material gain, efficiency, individual ownership, 
modernity, civilisation and citizenship. New forms of agricultural production as well 
as changing social relations accompanied these processes on the land. A shift 
occurred from subsistence farming, as the dominant form of agricultural activity, to 
commodity production for the economic market. This has, in turn, undermined over 
time, conceptions of land tied to collectivism, sufficiency, connectivity and solidarity.  
This chapter argues that the deracialisation of land ownership does not 
automatically re-connect people and land, neither does it mean an end to land as 
private property, land exploitation, agricultural extractivism or farm worker 
exploitation and dehumanising conditions on farms. Instead, calls for deracialisation 
of land ownership often augment land as both private property and an economic 
resource in the new dispensation. In this chapter, I suggest that to begin to conceive of 
land beyond private property is to imagine and foster different conceptions of how we 
live with each other. Such a conception assumes that land is an essential part of the 
ecosystem, community and life and thus reasserts land as nature. 
                                                
11 William Beinart and Peter Delius, “The Native Land Act of 1913: A Template But Not a Turning Point” in Land 
Divided Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st Century, ed. B Cousins and C Walker (Auckland 
Park: Jacana Media, 2015), 25. 
12 Beinart and Delius, “Native Land,” 25. 
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The dispossession of land is therefore more than separating people from land or 
taking it away; it is about altering society’s way of conceiving of itself, our 
relationships with each other, and our relationship to and with nature. Specifically, the 
organic relationship between society and nature becomes alien and separate when 
land is primarily seen as separate, objectified and only as a natural resource for 
economic gain. Drawing on Merchant’s argument in the previous chapter, the organic 
worldview comes to be replaced over time with a mechanistic view during the 
multiple and complex processes of the Scientific Revolution, hence today the 
domination over land is seen as normal. However, how nature - land in particular - is 
conceived of today is tied to conceptions of modernity espoused during the Scientific 
Revolution. This conception separates, in practice and theory, land as an intrinsic part 
of nature and ourselves.13 
3.3 Separating land and people 
Scholars such as Daniel Biebuyck, Ben Cousins and WJ du Plessis argue that pre-
colonial African ideas about land were different from those espoused by philosophers 
and writers during the Scientific Revolution, particularly those of John Locke.14 
Specifically, the “concept of ‘ownership’ was limited in pre-colonial South Africa and 
more often embedded in status relationships.”15 According to du Plessis, “[t]he 
relationships between people were more important than an individual’s ability to 
assert his or her interest in property against the world.”16 Significantly it seems that 
“[e]ntitlements to property were more in the form of obligations resulting from family 
relationships than a means to exclude people from the use of certain property.”17 
From this analysis it appears that during the pre-modern period the idea of land as 
private property was not part of the pre-colonial fabric of South Africa, but was 
introduced through colonisation.  
Much of the scholarly work, critical studies and analyses during the apartheid 
period did not necessarily focus on the changing conception of land per se, but were 
aimed at characterising the nature of land with regards to colonisation, the peasantry, 
                                                
13 See Merchant, The Death of Nature, 42–68. 
14 See for instance Ben Cousins, “The Politics of Communal Tenure Reform: A South African Case Study” in The 
Struggle Over Land in Africa, ed. W Anseeuw and C Alden (Cape Town: HSRC, 2010), 110; WJ du Plessis, 
“African Indigenous Land Rights in a Private Ownership Paradigm,” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 14 
(2011): 7, 49, http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v14i7.3. 





capitalism, segregation, labour, class formation, resistance and dispossession.18 These 
analyses help us to understand how the dispossession of land was central to changing 
social relations over the past four centuries, the impact of land dispossession and the 
resulting Bantustans, dislocation of communities, migrant labour practices, as well as 
the spatial geographic segregation of South Africa. This literature fosters an 
appreciation for the implication and significance of separating land from people and 
the resulting legacy of inequality.19 
Current land and agrarian reform discussions in South Africa focus on 
transformation, the right to land and land policy - issues of access, pace of 
redistribution and restitution, productivity, small-scale farmers and the agrarian 
question more broadly.20 The contemporary politics of land debates focus the 
discussion within these confines. There is a limited focus on foregrounding land as 
nature, the bifurcation of society and nature, or the implications of this.21 Land is 
mostly discussed and conceived of as a natural resource to which people have skewed 
access. 
The focus on deracialising land ownership on the basis of capitalism, as 
encapsulated by the “willing seller, willing buyer” (WSWB) post-apartheid state 
policy, obscures a conception of land beyond deracialised private property. It blinds 
policy debates to issues of redistribution, restitution and tenure. The policy focus is 
technical and mainly examines the pace, extent, effectiveness, models and 
                                                
18 See for instance Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (Cape Town: David Phillip, 
1988.); William Beinart, Peter Delius and Stanley Trapido, Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and 
Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850–1930 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986). 
19 See for instance Sampie Terreblanche, History of Inequality in South Africa 1652–2002 (Scottsville: University 
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2002); Hein Marais, South Africa Pushed to the Limit: The Political Economy of Change 
(Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2010). 
20 Fani Ncapayi “Land and Changing Social Relations In South Africa’s Former Reserves: The Case Of 
Luphaphasi In Sakhisizwe Local Municipality, Eastern Cape,” (PhD diss., University of Cape Town, 2013), 162, 
165. 
21 See for example Ben Cousins and Cherryl Walker, Land Divided, Land Restored: Land Reform in South Africa 
for the 21st Century (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2015); Fred T Hendricks, Lungisile Ntsebeza and Kirk 
Helliker, The Promise of Land: Undoing a Century of Dispossession in South Africa (Auckland Park: Jacana 
Media, 2013); Ruth Hall, Another Countryside: Policy Options for the Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa 
(Bellville: PLAAS/UWC, 2009); Lungisile Ntsebeza and Ruth Hall, The Land Question in South Africa: The 
Challenges of Transformation and Redistribution (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007); among others. They do not 
engage in a discussion about land as part of nature in the broad sense. They tend to focus on the politics of land 
from the perspective of policy, access, human rights, injustice, memory, and reconciliation – all of which are 
crucial, but only advance particular aspects of the land question. These discussions appear to neglect the 
imperative that the ecological crisis imposes upon the land debate. Recent engagements by Andrews in the Rural 
Women’s Assembly (RWA) and the People’s Dialogue as well as Greenberg at ACB take into account the 
ecological crisis, climate change in particular. Fani Ncapayi’s study engages with land and the changing social 
relations on the former reserves. 
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appropriateness of land policy. This approach has failed dismally, thus being unable 
to move the land reform debate forward.  
There is some research on land degradation, the effects of climate change on 
land and people, women and land tenure, farmworker rights on the farms, as well as 
the effects of mining on land and water.22 Another focus of research examines the 
detrimental effects on land caused by commercial farming, genetically modified 
organisms (GMO), fertilisers and so on. Implicit in this research is the need to review 
how land is being used in society.  
This chapter does not seek to engage in a discourse analysis on South African 
land policy nor engage in the political economy of land politics in the post-apartheid 
period. Rather it seeks to show how the quest to deracialise land ownership on the 
basis of capitalism came to be the focus of post-apartheid land politics. The aim is to 
show how this particular focus masks how land becomes and continues to be 
separated from nature and society. This particular framing of the land question in 
South Africa originates historically from the work of Sol Plaatje. His critique of the 
horrific effects of the 1913 Natives Land Act was brought alive when he wrote, 
“awaking on Friday morning, June 20, 1913, the South African Native found himself, 
not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his birth.”23 
3.4 Plaatje’s Native Life in South Africa – an ill-fated demand for land as 
private property 
Sol Plaatje’s Native Life in South Africa is one of “the first ‘political’ tracts written by 
an African writer” on the 1913 Land Act.24 The work, published in 1916, addressed to 
the British Crown, requested the overturn of the 1913 Land Act and its accompanying 
Land Commission Report. The objection levelled by Plaatje at the 1913 Land Act was 
that black people were unfairly disadvantaged with the prohibition of owning and 
renting land. Specifically, he argued that it was unfair that black people could not 
                                                
22 Over recent years, specifically leading up to the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP17) in 
Durban, there has been significant engagement by NGOs and organisations such as the Association for Rural 
Advancement; the Trust For Community Outreach and Education; the Southern African Rural Women’s Assembly 
(RWA); GroundWork; Benchmarks; Women Affected by Mining, etc., to mention a few, who work with small-
scale farmers, women on land and communities in rural areas. 
23 Sol Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, iBook edition. 
24 Bhekizizwe Peterson, “Sol Plaatje’s Native Life in South Africa: Melancholy Narratives, Petitioning Selves and 




access and own arable land. He argued that the Crown should protect black-owned 
land and specifically the inheritance owed to black people.  
Plaatje detested and challenged the Act that displaced and dispossessed black 
people of their homes and livelihoods and argued that the Act caused socio-economic 
and cultural destruction. The Act forced people into reserves and imposed anti-
squatting laws that caused black people great losses in land, livestock and agriculture. 
Evictions forced black people to seek independent sources of livelihood and pushed 
them out of subsistence agriculture into mines and highly exploitative waged work. 
He felt that this was unjust and that it made no sense given the vast tracts of arable 
land available to whites and the overcrowding of the locations.  
Prior to colonial rule, no such land law existed; members of the black elite were 
not excluded from land ownership or tenancy prior to the Act. This law stripped 
people of the ability to work the land communally and to sustain themselves as well 
as to continue to maintain aspects of their lives that were deeply connected to and 
rooted in the land. What became apparent to Plaatje was the disastrous effect the Act 
had on black people, creating inequity, injustice and needless suffering. With 
hindsight, we may say that Plaatje was not able to see that land as private property 
would result in processes of large-scale, modern and highly technical commercial 
farming or that over time, it would consequently create such impacts as soil erosion, 
water pollution and high carbon emissions, contributing to the ecological crisis. 
Similarly, we may say that he may not have foreseen proletarisation with its complex 
processes and the impacts it would have on rural communities and social relations. 
What was not visible to Plaatje at the time was that the separation of people from the 
land through private property, ownership and commodification was in itself 
alienation. This is potentially understandable because Plaatje himself was not directly 
dependant on the land and lived at a distance from the mutual relationship between 
land and farmer.  
Plaatje’s study provides a substantial documentation of the realities of the 
period. It shows the hypocrisy and racism inherent in governmental actions at that 
time. Peterson notes that, “the African elite saw the mission of mastering reading and 
writing as involving much more than simply mimicking ‘civilization’ or writing 
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against discrimination or colonialism.”25 In fact the “new African intelligentsia drew 
on their mastery of literacy and African orature in order to claim and defend their 
rights as modern citizens.”26 According to Peterson, it is in this sense that Plaatje 
rejected the Act, as it sought to strip black people of their rights. His study, however, 
was unable to critically engage with settlers’ rights to land and private property per se. 
It could be said that the polemic of the period leads to a historical blind spot, hence 
his reluctant acceptance of British rule. 
Plaatje’s work is powerful and shows a deep understanding of the inner 
workings of the colonial administration, its legal system and how to appeal to the 
sensibilities of the British yet still give weight to the pain, hardship and unfairness of 
the Act upon black people. Plaatje organised against the Land Act and saw it as an 
opportunity to unite all black people, elites, chiefs, peasants and urban workers alike. 
He sought to galvanise support against the Land Act as well as give voice to those 
affected by it, and recognised that “the Land Act threatened the interests and well-
being of virtually every section of the African population. It thus provided an 
opportunity to cement social unity … that the government could not overlook.”27 He 
appealed to the Crown on the following basis: 
(1) The rights of loyal servants and subjects to the Crown were being violated;  
(2) An appeal to Christian beliefs;  
(3) An appeal to the ideals of modernity and civilisation;  
(4) An appeal to the morality and justice of the British parliament.  
With hindsight, we might say that Plaatje did not see questions of alienation as a 
result of the Act and was less able to confront the notion that “capitalism, as a socio-
economic system, is necessarily committed to racism and sexism.”28 For Plaatje, 
freedom and prosperity came with modernity.  
Peter Limb puts forward that, in Plaatje’s attempts “to appeal to the British 
public and government, he clearly identifies with what he sees as the democratic 
aspects of the Imperial mission but protests its exploitative and racist aspects.”29 
Plaatje understood the political task that he was undertaking by writing Native Life 
                                                
25 Peterson, “Sol Plaatje’s Native Life in South Africa,” 80. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Brian Willan, Sol Plaatje, South African Nationalist, 1876–1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), 161. 
28 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 17. 
29 Peter Limb, “Rethinking Sol Plaatje's Attitudes to Class, Empire, and Gender,” Critical Arts: South-North 
Cultural and Media Studies 16 (2002): 28, doi:10.1080/02560240285310031. 
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and wrote that “mine is but a sincere narrative of a melancholy situation, in which, 
with all its shortcomings, I have endeavoured to describe the difficulties of the South 
African Natives under a very strange law, so as most readily to be understood by the 
sympathetic reader.”30  
The inability to question the idea of private property or the dispossession of 
land prior to the Act or dispossession as critical for accumulation reflects 
unquestioned assumptions tied to notions of progress and modernity. It is for this 
reason that an historical overview of land dispossession is absent in Plaatje’s work 
and therefore understandable that he emphasises the 1913 Land Act as the single most 
important piece of legislation outlawing land ownership for black people, which had 
real consequences during the period in which he lived and wrote.  
3.5 1913 Land Act – at the centre of dispossession 
Plaatje’s blind spot continues to linger in the politics of land today. His work is often 
used as a basis to understand the land question in South Africa, placing the 1913 Land 
Act at the centre of dispossession without questioning private property in and of 
itself.31 As the first secretary-general of the ANC, Plaatje’s study laid the foundational 
analysis for, and is the genesis of land demands and land policies. According to 
Beinart and Delius, many of the analytical challenges within the current land debates 
in South Africa stem from Plaatje’s analysis. They argue, however, that the 1913 
Land Act was not a turning point and the Act “itself has been exaggerated as an 
instrument of land dispossession or agrarian transformation.”32 
Beinart and Delius argue that there was much land dispossession prior to the 
Act and that there was limited enforcement of the Act initially.33 Many of the white 
farmers continued to use sharecropping and tenancy on their farms, as they could not 
afford paid labour and were dependent on black farmers. They claim that there were 
never white-only farms, but that the real impact of the Act lay in the fact that it 
legitimised the power of white farmers over black farmers. 
For the purposes of my argument, the important point is that the 1913 Land Act 
sought to solidify both the agricultural and mineral capitalist revolution in South 
Africa and mirrors the consequences of the Scientific Revolution despite occurring 
                                                
30 Plaatje, Native Life, 31. 
31 See comment by Beinart and Delius, “Native Land,” 28. 
32 Beinart and Delius, “Native Land,” 39. 
33 Ibid., 24–25. 
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centuries later. The 1913 Act legitimised control of people over nature and therefore 
conceptualised and legalised the private ownership of land. This process significantly 
altered social relations on the land. Simultaneously, dispossession meant more than an 
accumulation system; it also conceived of land differently than before.  
The potential significance of different emphases with regard to the 1913 Land 
Act is that they neglected to engage with the right to land ownership and private 
property per se – be it by settlers or indigenous peoples. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, it is useful to note that the question of the hypocrisy and racism of the 
British colony is central to Plaatje. It is this injustice that became the preoccupation of 
the early ANC.  
Jacob Dlamini’s work helps to understand why an engagement with private 
property per se cannot be found in the work of Plaatje or others during that period, in 
spite of their sharp critique of the Land Act.34 Dlamini shows how the African elite at 
the time understood their rights as educated black men in colonial society. According 
to Dlamini, “they were among the pioneers of a modernising South Africa. They were 
African, it is true, but they were also modern subjects, who brought with them a 
radical appreciation of landownership.”35 
Drawing on archival material of 1904, Dlamini shows, through an exchange 
which occurs between Godfrey Lagden, the Commissioner of Native Affairs in the 
Transvaal, and a group of eleven “exempted natives,” the context the African elite 
found themselves in.36 According to the law, these black men were exempted from the 
laws which affected black people, they were elite and allowed upward mobility as 
long as they pledged themselves to the Crown.37 Dlamini writes that one of them, 
Tantsi, responds to Lagden after a series of questions regarding their rights to buy 
land, saying, “I think you must sympathise with us who are in a fix. Other people are 
buying land and buying it right away and you say we are to keep quiet and look on.”38 
Tantsi further adds, “[t]he time will come when no native will be able to buy here. 
When we see a chance of buying land we know we cannot reside in the clouds, we 
                                                
34 Jacob Dlamini, “The Land and Its Languages: Edward Tsewu and the Pre-History of the 1913 Land Act,” in 
Land Divided Land Restored: Land reform in South Africa for the 21st century, ed. B. Cousins and C. Walker 
(Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2015), 50–52. 
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must live here on the ground and build our houses.”39  
According to Dlamini, “[i]n the rejoinder we see an engagement with spatial 
and temporal concerns that were, at the heart of the debates about what it meant to be 
modern in southern Africa at the turn of the twentieth century.”40 Specifically, 
Dlamini argues that “[i]t was the here and now of a modernizing and capitalist South 
Africa, in which property ownership was seen, by some, as a passage to 
citizenship.”41 Tantsi, according to Dlamini, “could see the changes taking place all 
around them and they wanted to be an active part of the new world coming into 
being.”42  
Educated at Lovedale and similar missionary schools, these black men fought 
against the 1913 Land Act. The outright legal denial of land to black people was an 
affront. During this period we see the establishment of what would become the 
national liberation movement. Plaatje’s political influence increased along with his 
initial policy formulations on land. These processes culminated in the launch of the 
Freedom Charter in 1955 in Kliptown. It is without a doubt that Plaatje’s work brings 
to the fore the changing relationship and consequence of the 1913 Land Act upon 
black people and the land. It is however, the focus on racism and white supremacy 
that makes invisible the ill-fated demand for land as private property. 
3.6 Inyanda’s new imagination 
This demand for land as private property and for the deracialisation of private 
property continues to this day. The spectrum of those making the demand is diverse 
and extends from different ends of the political poles, from neoliberals and 
nationalists to progressives and radicals.  
The focus on transferring land rights with the view to deracialising private 
property ownership means that the debate has lost sight of an important discussion 
with regard to the type of land production models and structures necessary to sustain 
and restore both society and nature at large. This conceptual inattention has the 
potential to reinforce land as an economic and political instrument, thus obscuring 
conceptions of land within a broader framework and as part of nature. An approach of 
foregrounding land as nature could offer a necessary and important opportunity to 
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move beyond the current ineffectual land policy towards meaningful transformation. 
Some scholarly work refers to the under-utilisation of land post-settlement, but there 
is limited discussion about how and to what extent we need to use land.  
The Inyanda (United) National Land Movement suggests a radical change to the 
politics of land in the county and argues that “the struggle for transformation must be 
based on a new imagination; on the total re-configuration of South Africa that re-
connects the urban and rural areas and breaks down the racialised apartheid 
countryside. This re-configuration must ensure the humanity and dignity of all South 
Africans.”43 This movement envisions that “those who want land for their own 
livelihoods should take priority over those who want land for accumulation and 
profit.”44 Significantly, they call for the “democratisation of seeds, commons and 
water.”45 
This movement begins to challenge aspects of the dominant land model. 
Specifically, it challenges the current policy model where land is seen as a productive 
input and a capital asset and agricultural and land policies are placed within a 
neoliberal market framework. It recognises that one of the primary objectives of the 
current policy is to maintain and increase the productive utility of the land. 
Government has promoted the use of invasive technology to deliver high yields to 
ensure high returns. An implication of the constant use of land through modern 
agricultural methods is that it does not allow the land to rest, thus damaging the 
ecosystem. This approach to the land relies on an inordinate amount of fertiliser, 
which is known to contribute to high carbon emissions. 
The Inyanda declaration “assert[s] the right to defend our methods of 
production, distribution and consumption of food at both national and international 
levels.”46 It argues for “the right to practice agro-ecology as our option for today and 
the future, and demand our government’s support in policy and practice.”47 In 1999 
the GMO law came into effect in the country. Today, yellow and white maize, soya 
and cotton grown in South Africa are mostly GMO.48 The current ecological crisis 
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suggests a review of large-scale monocropping agriculture. The current fragility of the 
ecosystem necessitates that land policy take account of the crisis. 
Merchant and Princen offer useful insights towards a new imagination. Drawing 
on Merchant’s work, imagining a different countryside requires an historical overview 
of how the making of modern South Africa was premised on the Scientific Revolution 
and its legitimation of nature and land as private property. By drawing on Federici, 
the analysis can be advanced through locating the process of accumulation and 
alienation as deeply dependent on social reproduction and exploitation of women in 
particular.49 Such an analysis is necessary if it seeks to go beyond the impasse and 
reimagining of a new society.  
Zo Randriamaro argues that this “hidden crisis: women, social reproduction and 
the political economy of care” needs to be made visible.50 It requires a deeper analysis 
that takes into account the new aspects of social reproduction as primitive 
accumulation. Specifically, she argues that  
 
social reproduction (renewal) of primitive capitalist accumulation has taken the contemporary 
forms of land grabbing and intensification of mineral extraction, and use of migrant labour by 
some transnational corporations to address the difficulties – resulting from the crisis of the 
social reproduction of the labor force – in the availability of local labour force in the extractive 
sectors of mineral-rich countries like South Africa.51 
 
According to Randriamaro, it is necessary that alternatives place unpaid work and 
social reproduction at the centre. 
Merchant and Princen argue for entirely new ways of conceiving the 
relationship between man and nature. Merchant’s ethic of partnership between 
humans and nature and Princen’s contribution on the need for the logic of sufficiency 
over the logic of efficiency imply a new relationship with land. By examining the 
dominant Recovery Narrative embedded in society would be a prerequisite, as would 
be developing a historical perspective. Alternatives, according to Merchant, can “only 
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come through human action.”52 
The current ecological crisis and the lack of any meaningful land solution begin 
to expose some of the inadequacies of existing approaches. Since the new 
dispensation came into being in 1994, we came to see that when land is 
conceptualised and experienced as commodity and private property, the crisis is 
exacerbated. A re-imagining and re-making of how we think of and relate to land, 
outside of the market, offers a new approach towards another countryside and society.  
In the context of extremely high unemployment and high carbon emissions, the 
ecological crisis presents opportunities to consider non-alienating and non-destructive 
methods of work and farming that do not subscribe to the logic of efficiency. Even if 
Inyanda’s new imagination doesn’t entirely recognise these as reasons to adopt 
alternative farming methods, by opening the door to different methods, a process is 
allowed to unfold. Adopting methods that enliven and are non-invasive, such as 
permaculture, agroecology and organic farming, could contribute to the making of a 
new politics around land, as could a review of modern technology and its impact. 
Emboldened by frameworks that go beyond ideas of land productivity and utility and 
towards food sufficiency above food security, we can imagine new possibilities.  
Inyanda’s call for those who till, use and heal the soil to make themselves 
integral to any discussion about land is an attempt to renegotiate the current balance 
of power on the land. Their call is an attempt to move beyond only a critique of the 
current agricultural and land models, premised on a system that exploits those who 
work the soil and sees the land only as a place of extraction, to place those who work 
the land at the centre of these discussions. This, is an important step towards 
rethinking our relationship to the land.  
According to Ray Bush, Janet Bujra and Gary Littlejohn, “[l]and is often a 
commodity and it functions as territory.”53 They note, though, that “[l]and is a means 
of production that is highly contested.”54 A significant addition they make to the land 
discussion is that “[i]n Africa the rhetoric of its abundance needs to be located in 
relation to people who are available, and healthy and able to work it.”55 A discussion 
about land as nature therefore seeks to examine how we work together with the land, 
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as well as how we relate to one another, especially those tilling and nurturing the land. 
This is rarely part of the politics of land debate. 
How do we begin to conceive of a relationship with land that neither alienates 
those who till the soil nor the land itself? Such a conception begins to challenge what 
Bush, Bujra and Littlejohn observe about how land is used. According to them “land 
is both a mechanism to enrich and promote an agenda for capital accumulation.”56 
Moreover, they remind us that work, for those left landless as a result of accumulation 
through displacement and dispossession, is not guaranteed.57 They note that 
“[a]ccumulation by dispossession seems to be a continuous feature of Africa’s uneven 
and combined incorporation into the world economy.”58 If this is the case, then a 
rethink about land within the current framework as well as land politics in general is 
necessary, with land placed within a broader holistic approach. Such an approach 
needs to take into account the social reproductive and undervalued productive work, 
as well as the social, cultural and ecological costs that are (dis)placed upon those in 
the rural areas, and the land itself. 
There can be no question that there is more than sufficient food produced in the 
world. The quantity is ample. The current system is based on the logic of waste and 
over-production. Rarely is there a discussion within the politics of land about the 
logic of sufficiency. Parallel to reconceptualising how we conceive of and value 
work, methods of agriculture and production, is a reconsideration of what counts as 
“enough,” so that every person is fed an adequate amount of healthy food. Such an 
approach could have the potential to ensure that those who till the soil are able to feed 
themselves and their community. 
An enquiry of this nature would ask if current commercial production intends to 
meet the food demands of an entire society without land and ecosystem destruction, 
or if the objective is to produce in abundance, regardless of the burden placed on the 
ecosystem and despite ecological injustice, to ensure infinite consumer choice for a 
relative few. Part of a new approach to land requires a new set of formulations, not 
governed by the logic of efficiency and the market, but instead composed of 
articulations that ensure sufficient produce to provide everyone with safe, inexpensive 
and nutritional food whilst conscious of the contribution of the land and tillers. 
                                                





Reconsidering the dominant agrarian model in South Africa entails rethinking 
the relationship to land; making visible the master narratives of land; understanding 
these within their historical context; and deepening the nature of the land question in 
general, but in South Africa specifically. 
3.7 Walker’s critique of the master narrative of loss and restoration  
Much of the policy focus and scholarly discussion focuses on black people being 
denied the ability to access and purchase land.  
Cherryl Walker directly addresses the narrative of dispossession in Sol Plaatje’s 
analysis, which runs deep in most work on land in South Africa. She argues that there 
is a master narrative of loss and restoration that is at the heart of land reform policy. 
For her, “the master narrative that underpins the project of restitution in South Africa 
has two central themes – the trauma of deep, dislocating loss of land in the past and 
the promise of restorative justice through the return of that land in the future.”59 
Walker outlines the headings of the master narrative as: 
(1) colonial wars of dispossession – before this “African people live in peace and 
harmony with their neighbours, with nature, with the ancestors;” 
(2) apartheid with its relocations and forced removals;  
(3) post-apartheid with little compensation if any;  
(4) “this was all done in order to maintain white supremacy or to advance capital 
accumulation in the hands of the white ruling class.”60 
For Walker, the “simple story of forced removals has proven to be increasingly 
problematic.”61 Careful, however, not to suggest that dispossession is untrue, she says 
that the “political fable” leads to a “hiatus” because the “simple story of forced 
removals leads to a narrative of restitution that is constructed around the equally 
ingenuous idea of reversal.”62 Bureaucracy, internal tensions and infighting, 
according to Walker, have contributed to slow and limited land restitution.63 Walker 
avoids WBWS as a key explanation or reason for the lack of land reform delivery. 
Instead she insists that it is the master narrative seeking to reverse wrongs that is 
“dangerous” and hinders restitution, as “the elements it assembles are incomplete” 
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and “an inadequate guide to the promised land.”64 According to Walker, this master 
narrative “enshrines a collective memory of dispossession that stretched back 
uninterrupted for 350 years … the actual political and social geography of the vast 
region lying to the south of the Limpopo River in the mid-seventeenth century is 
irrelevant.”65 
In questioning the usefulness of the master narrative of loss, dispossession and 
forced removals, Walker challenges a conception of land restitution tied to righting 
racial discrimination of the past. Walker argues that this focus on seeking to undo 
racial discrimination of the past is key to understanding both the impetus behind land 
politics, and what underpins the serious limitations of land restitution. Specifically, 
she argues that the national land fable of the master narrative fails to “deal with 
specifics.”66 Furthermore, it fails to “relate the national project of land restitution to 
other programmes” such as housing and environmental conservation.67 This failure, 
according to Walker, avoids dealing with the “relationship between social redress and 
economic development.”68 In this regard, she argues that at the heart of the land 
reform delivery failure are “ambiguities of the process itself.”69 
Although Walker calls into question the limitations of the master narrative on 
dispossession, she argues that land reform ought to maintain the rule of law and 
democratic processes thus upholding the constitution. This implies that although 
Walker potentially identifies the call for deracialisation of property as ill-fated, she 
does not address the issue of land as private property. Her work therefore does not 
offer a critique of land as private property or of the WSWB government policy.  
Unlike Walker, Fred Hendricks argues that “the land question is racialised.”70 
He draws on the work of Alden and Anseeuw who “delineate three discourses in the 
white settler narrative in post-colonial Africa, namely loss, fear and privilege.”71 They 
further say that “[i]n contrast, the liberation narrative revolves around the discourses 
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of solidarity, national identity and symbolic restitution.”72 This is critical to 
understanding how these narratives inhibit or foster a new imagination. What is 
equally important according to Hendricks is that “land is a finite resource. Therefore, 
in so far as the constitution protects property rights in land, it effectually negates 
claims to land by others.”73  
Murray et al. argue, that it is difficult to see beyond the master narrative of loss 
and restoration as well as the inherited and present realities of a 
 
complex of images of our landscape … South Africa as outpost … ‘promised land’ … 
anthropological ‘homeland’, … hostels, ‘informal settlements’, ‘squatter camps’, hovels of 
wood or corrugated iron, and dormitory townships … mine dumps. Gold. Diamonds. Coal. 
Chrome. … the land of plenty: huge multi-storied mansions, swimming pools, double garages, 
bathroom ‘en suite’, parks, … shopping malls […].74 
 
It is difficult because these landscapes are not mere images. They are lived 
experiences, on the one hand, by a small minority and on the other, by a majority of 
people in South Africa. They are not imagined.  The land of high fences demarcating 
copious hectares—with huge tractors, electric irrigation, wet soil, toxic fertiliser and 
large numbers of alienated workers— is real. So too, is the land of high walls with 
swimming pools and tennis courts and huge houses behind them. This landscape is 
unequal.  
Stephen Greenberg observes that “the population identify themselves politically 
in ways other than as landless.”75 This is the case even though the majority of people 
do not own land and find themselves in insecure and precarious land relations, in both 
urban and rural areas. The land “belongs to someone else.”76 This understanding, 
according to Greenberg, is because “the unifying ideology of black nationalism in the 
struggle against racial oppression overshadowed the more deeply entrenched 
processes of capitalist development that underpinned land dispossession as they 
unfolded concretely.”77 In other words, “[l]and dispossession was viewed through the 
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lenses of racial policies and lack of political democracy.”78 Prior to and after 1994, a 
common identity was forged to claim and struggle for land based upon racial 
dispossession. This racial dispossession was entrenched through processes of 
commodification and commercialisation of land, which maintain the separation of 
people and nature through the constitutional right to private property.  
3.8  Freedom Charter to negotiated settlement 
Geographical segregation and racial land policy is directly associated with the lack of 
political democracy during apartheid. Landlessness for black people in South Africa 
was a manifestation of apartheid. Thus, centring land redress in the Freedom Charter 
in 1955 was a pinnacle for land reform.   
According to Henry Bernstein “land reforms were pursued for different 
purposes, by different social and political forces, through more or less radical means, 
and with various outcomes” in different countries.79 He identifies three significant 
land reform processes. First, “‘modernising’ (nationalist) land reforms, which 
accelerated the pace of capitalist development in agriculture.”80 Second, “the initial 
dispossession and division of large landholding in favour of ‘land to the tiller’ that 
was quickly followed by collectivism under communist regimes,” and third, where 
large commercial estates were expropriated by socialist and nationalist liberation 
struggles and converted into state farms.81 82 
I use Bernstein to help locate the Freedom Charter within this discourse. The 
three types of land processes identified by Bernstein have different emphases. The 
first prioritises changing white settler ownership to black ownership, but maintains 
the social propertied relations on the land – that of owner and farm worker. The 
second type facilitates a different relationship to ownership where those who work the 
land get a say about the use of the land and control thereof, in a collective approach. 
The third changes land from private property to state property. This, however, does 
not imply that the forms of production change. Common to all three of these 
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processes is that land ownership by colonial power altered whilst production for profit 
continued. 
The process of decolonisation and the unfolding African struggles around land 
reform influenced and shaped land politics in South Africa. According to Ntsebeza 
“although most of the mass-based activities of the ANC in the 1950s were in urban 
areas, when protests against Tribal Authorities in the rural areas accelerated, the ANC 
could no longer ignore these areas.”83 The Freedom Charter put forward: 
 
The Land Shall be Shared Among Those Who Work It!  
Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land re-divided 
amongst those who work it to banish famine and land hunger;  
The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors and dams to save the soil 
and assist the tillers;  
Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land;  
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose;  
People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and farm prisons shall be 
abolished.84  
 
This is a powerful vision. The Charter suggests a radical approach to land 
reform with its emphasis on social relations. It sought to change the ownership of land 
from settler to collective occupation. Importantly, the Charter placed land and 
produce within a larger transformative agenda. It seems to indicate some care for the 
soil, but what specifically, is unclear. The call for seeds and implements was, 
however, not tied to a larger critique of industrial agriculture and modernisation. 
Today, elements of this Charter can be found in South African land policy, but 
important aspects have been abandoned. Aspects such as the land being “shared 
among those who work it” and a commitment to “banishing famine and land hunger” 
are absent from the land policy. Deracialising the land remains foregrounded within 
the land policy. In particular, the policy orientation towards facilitating black 
ownership of land is prominent, although limited resources are allocated to the 
process. The land policy takes little, if any, account of rural, urban, social and gender 
differentials within the category of black people, and is firmly based on righting the 
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wrongs of colonialism and apartheid even as it fails to locate them within an 
imperialist or capitalist economic system.  
Conceptions of land, land struggles and land politics over the stretch of these 
fifty years, from the powerful vision of the Freedom Charter to the uprisings in the 
rural areas – in particular the Mpondo revolts of the early 1960s – to the negotiated 
settlement, remain unchanged for the liberation movement at a broad level. While the 
articulation to deracialise land ownership has remained unchanged, the reality of how 
people relate to land has altered. These changes can be attributed to interrelated 
processes such as the rapid progress of industrialisation in South Africa, especially 
during the period of isolation. The policy of the Bantustans and smaller allotments 
created land hunger and soil erosion and a decrease in land fertility. This contributed 
to the “disintegration of their pre-capitalist mode of production in the reserves,” hence 
the changing conception and experience of land and livelihood, especially for migrant 
men. Finally, the competing needs for cheap labour between large-scale farmers, 
extractives and manufacturing during the apartheid period demanded that black 
people be separated from land.85 
3.9 Land, neoliberalism and the global context  
If the Freedom Charter’s land calls were shaped and influenced by the period of 
decolonisation and liberation struggles taking place in Africa, then the period leading 
up to and after the negotiated settlement, the late 1980s and early 1990s, was framed 
by neoliberalism and the global context.  
From the late 1970s, World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
influence found traction in land and agricultural debates globally, and in Africa as 
well. The WB’s “Agriculture: Sector Working Paper” of 1972 and 1975 took up the 
issue of land reform and addressed questions relating to land equity and land access, 
with the specific focus on increasing productivity and output.86 According to the WB, 
“changing the pattern of landownership and redistributing land can contribute to 
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increases in output in some countries.”87 The Bank’s particular concern during this 
period was with economic development, growing rural population size and changing 
technology.88  
According to Borras et al., the major recommendations from the WB working 
papers, are: (1) formal land titling as a precondition for a modern agricultural 
development; (2) abandonment of the communal tenure systems in favour of free-hold 
title and subdivision of the commons; (3) promotion of land markets for more 
efficient land transfers; and (4) support for land redistribution on the grounds of 
efficiency and equity.89 In short, the WB sought to promote an agricultural production 
system premised on private property. According to the WB, a key aspect for 
modernity and development of land was a market-based system. Redistribution and 
efficiency could be attained through the “discipline and regulation” of the market. 
The WB argued for the abandonment of other forms of land ownership and 
relations, in particular communal and state land, and a shift towards individual titles 
and private ownership. It was believed that through this that “equity” and 
redistribution would occur. Yet, this focus stripped away other facets of land and in so 
doing attempted to universalise land as private property, as an object. This position 
assumed that land could be untied from its complex social, political and cultural 
meaning and heritage. This disentanglement and separation of land from being part of 
a whole sought to neutralise and sterilise land thus enabling a distance from a 
conception of land primarily as nature and linked to social relations.  
The WB’s approach to land was further articulated through the IMF/WB 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and 1990s. Due to the 
lending schemes and debt repayment conditionalities, green agricultural revolution 
programmes were imposed upon Third World countries. The market, according to the 
Bretton Wood Institutions, is the most efficient and productive way to ensure optimal 
utility of land and poverty reduction. The key elements of SAPS which related to 
agrarian and land sectors were that “[1] there should be a reduced role of the state in 
production and marketing in the sector; [2] input supply and crop marketing should be 
privatized; [3] subsidies and controls over pricing should be abolished; [4] pan-
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territorial producer pricing structures should be replaced by locally market-clearing 
prices; [5] export crop parastatals should be abolished; and [6] agricultural extension 
and research services should be reduced and privatized.”90 These externally imposed 
conditions undermined and devalued other patterns of land and agricultural relations 
and it became hard for indebted countries to protect and enable independent small-
scale farmers and alternative forms of livelihood that existed parallel to large-scale 
modern agricultural practices in their countries.  
The WB land policy recommendations reflect Hardin’s ideas of the tragedy of 
the commons which argues that the best management of natural resources is by 
promoting private property ownership, as outlined in chapter 2. However, with 
regards to the land sector, Bromley and Cernea “dispel some of the myths, 
confusions, and exaggerations that have gained currency under the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ allegory.”91 They argue that the tragedy is most accurately the “tragedy of 
open access” and found that “resource degradation in the developing countries, while 
incorrectly attributed to ‘common property systems’ intrinsically, actually originates 
in the dissolution of local-level institutional arrangements whose very purpose was to 
give rise to resource use patterns that were sustainable.”92 Bromley and Cernea found 
that the WB invoking Hardin’s tragedy of the commons was a poor choice in the 
context of Africa and hence inappropriate recommendations were made. Their 
findings call into questions the WB land policy recommendations as outlined earlier 
by Borras et al.  
According to Sam Moyo,  
 
land reform discourses are fuelled by the myth that the freehold landholding system and private 
land markets are the more efficient and superior to customary (so-called communal) land tenure 
systems. This myth tends to justify the preservation of the dual tenure system, while incorrectly 
arguing that land reform per se undermines food security and exports, as well as the confidence 
of investors in the economy.93  
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It was, however, within the context of the end of the cold war, neoliberal hegemony 
and WB/IMF SAPs, that the question of land reform came onto the South African 
negotiation agenda. Although the Freedom Charter carried the hope of a different 
vision of the countryside, Bernstein warned, that the “land reforms in the name of 
‘land to the tiller’ seldom led to comprehensive redistribution in terms of who 
received the land, except perhaps in the most dramatic instances of social 
revolution.”94  
South Africa’s “unfinished revolution” quickly abandoned the “land to the 
tiller” clause and adopted WB land reform programmes, as agreed in the sunset 
clauses of the negotiated settlement.95 How did the new dispensation intend to 
deracialise land ownership given that the newly democratically elected government 
adopted and firmly engraved the right to private property in the constitution? How 
would this continue to perpetuate the separation of land from nature?   
3.10 Correcting land after 1994 
3.10.1  ANC policy model  
The 1994 ANC election manifesto states that “South Africa belongs to all who live in 
it … an ANC government will: guarantee women equal rights to land and special 
assistance; assist small farmers to get access to training, credit and markets; 
encourage large-scale farming, and ensure security of tenure and all basic rights for 
farm workers; guarantee victims of forced removals restitution, which should be 
carried out fairly through a Land Claims Court; use state land in the implementation 
of land reform.”96 These promises were important in the making of a new South 
Africa. The conception of land that was formed during the colonial and apartheid 
periods remained unchanged, however. This directly affected the possibilities of the 
post-apartheid land policy.  
The land policy has three main programmes: land restitution, land redistribution 
and land tenure. The programmes are: (1) “restoring land to those unfairly 
dispossessed since 1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws and practices; (2) 
“based on a system of discretionary grants that assist certain categories of people to 
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acquire land in order to create more equitable access to land;” and (3) “intended to 
secure and extend the rights of those who have insecure tenure due to past 
discrimination, weak or unclear legal protection or inadequate systems of land 
administration.”97 
The 1997 White Paper protects existing land rights gained pre-1994 and 
continues to support large-scale commercial farming. The department argued that land 
reform  
 
aims to contribute to economic development, both by giving households the opportunity to 
engage in productive land use and by increasing employment opportunities through encouraging 
greater investment. We envisage … rural landscape consisting of small, medium and large 
farms; one which promotes both equity and efficiency through a combined agrarian and 
industrial strategy in which land reform is a spark to the engine of growth.98  
 
Thus the post-apartheid land policy focused on economic development and growth 
mirroring the WB land policy framework. According to Greenberg, “the 
democratically-elected government sought economic continuity” from the past and 
“land reform became closely tied to productive use and agri-business began to shape 
the agenda more explicitly” even though “land reform was introduced … to rebalance 
highly racially-skewed distribution of access that was a consequence of violent 
dispossession and apartheid.”99 
Although this neoliberal model has been challenged, the land reform model has 
remained more or less unaltered over the past twenty years. Added factors that 
exacerbated land reform during the era after 1994 are the rising debt loads incurred by 
farmers and the withdrawal of interest-rate subsidies due to liberalisation of the 
sector.100 The commercialisation of the sector which were already “anticipated and 
initiated in the final years of apartheid, have continued since 1994,” has led to 
changes and fluctuations in the agricultural commodity markets, numerous mergers 
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and acquisitions in the sector, further land concentration and “volatile and high prices 
of staple foods.”101  These factors further entrench the commodification of land and 
thus reinforcing nature as a source of profit. Wegerif et al. argue that “the last decades 
have seen the deregulation of the agricultural sector with the removal of marketing 
boards, subsidies and almost all tariff protection. This has taken place in an 
increasingly globalised market environment.”102 
The Government’s land policy, whether through its land restitution, 
redistribution or tenure processes, has not addressed in any meaningful way the issue 
of racial injustice. According to Wegerif et al., the key findings from the national 
eviction survey on farm dwellers were that many of these evictions occurred after 
1994, despite the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA).  Many 
farm workers were retrenched due to the agricultural policy adopted.103 Hall argues 
that this national eviction survey illustrates that “racialised land dispossession has not 
been consigned to the past, but continues and has even gathered pace in the 
democratic era.” 104 
Regardless which of the various phases of land policy after 1994 one considers, 
land tenure and security has been the most retarded aspect of land policy and focus. 
The notions of the land belonging “to those who live in it” or “to those who work it” 
cannot be further from the reality in post-apartheid South Africa. Greenberg indicates 
that  
 
the official land reform programme is a perfect example of the central role provided to the 
market in issues of redistribution and redress by the developmental state. The programme is a 
willing seller, willing buyer model meaning that landowners must volunteer to sell their land 
and potential buyers have to pay the market price for land they want … There is certainly no 
attempt or intention to decommodify land.105 
 
One reason for the limited land reform is the focus on transferring land rights to 
deracialise land ownership through the WBWS private property market framework. A 
                                                
101 Henry Bernstein, “Commercial Farming and Agribusiness in South Africa since 1994,” in Land Divided Land 
Restored: Land Reform in South Africa for the 21st Century, ed. B. Cousins and C. Walker (Auckland Park: Jacana 
Media, 2015), 104, 106 – 118. 
102 Wegerif, et al., Still Searching for Security, 7. 
103 Ibid., 30. 
104  Ruth Hall ed., Another Countryside: Policy Options for Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa (Cape 
Town: PLAAS, 2009), 10. 
105 Stephen Greenberg, “Landless People’s Movement,” 5. 
 71 
 
second is the limited focus on alternative land production beyond large-scale 
commercial farming models for food security combined with a lack of vision towards 
food sovereignty. A third is a fixation on ownership models that affirm private 
ownership. A fourth is reinforcing land primarily as an economic and political 
instrument. Alternative approaches can only emerge if land is framed beyond narrow 
natural resource or economic perspectives. This will offer opportunities to move 
beyond the current ineffectual land policy.  
Discussions about how and to what extent we need to use land is limited in the 
South African land policy context. This is in part due to the focus on land ownership. 
Considering why and how we use land is critical for broadening our thinking about it.  
3.10.2  NGOs on small-scale farming and alternatives 
Since the mid-1960s, there has been a shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive 
agriculture in South Africa.106 Agricultural modernisation and technological 
advancement altered the South African landscape. From the 1980s on, there was a 
steady decline in employment in commercial agriculture but also the proliferation of 
agri-business. The post-1994 period intensified and hastened the shifts that began in 
the previous decade. Soon after the new dispensation was established there was 
massive liberalisation and deregulation of the agricultural sector. According to 
Greenberg, these changes left uneven impacts but “farm workers have borne the 
major brunt of agricultural restructuring.”107 Agricultural restructuring saw large-scale 
retrenchments; at the same time, large-scale commercial farming was entrenched as 
the primary model for food security in the post-apartheid period and went 
unchallenged. 
According to Greenberg, the mainstream approach to small-scale farming stems 
mostly from the idea that large-scale commercial farming is in fact “the basis for food 
security.”108 This is the approach of the government. Government policy attempted to 
introduce small-scale farming either as part of its welfare strategy of food gardens or 
as part of niche markets in which it tried to “depoliticise and deracialise the question 
of small-scale agriculture.”109 Given the “political agenda to increase black 
ownership” the key issue “was how the ‘justice’ agenda could be contained within a 
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framework of markets and capitalism.”110 On the other side of the political spectrum, 
there is a perspective that supports small-scale farming as a means to develop food 
sovereignty, democratic food regimes and agro-ecology as alternatives.111 
The current challenges facing emerging and small-scale farmers are due to both 
land reform and agricultural policies. The agricultural policy model that was adopted 
emphasises free trade, no agricultural subsidies and the logic of efficiency and 
competition. Since the 2000s, government extension officers and the department of 
agriculture have pushed small farmers into niche markets and/or forced them to 
compete in the same market as large-scale farmers. They have imposed the use of 
monocropping, GMOs and fertilisers, which have had many negative effects. 
Government has been advised that keeping labour costs low is efficient, thus they 
have kept wages down to boost their so-called “competitive advantage.” This has 
forced small-scale farmers to adopt dominant market labour practices, which are 
exploitative and have created a tension in the land movement. 
Since the mid-2000s, parallel to the government, NGOs have supported small-
scale farmers to take alternative routes to dominant agricultural practices. They 
encourage permaculture, seed banks, intercropping and organic farming methods, so 
as to reduce their carbon footprint and contribute to sustainable farming.112 NGOs not 
working in the land sector but with the climate change sector have started to 
collaborate.113 Some have engaged in campaigns such as “One Million Climate Jobs,” 
others around “No to GMOs,” as well as against big agri-business; all see small-scale 
farming as important alternatives.114 
Many NGOs provide support with fencing, irrigation, boreholes, seed banks, 
nurseries and agricultural training, as this type of assistance from the state is 
minimal.115 Where state support is granted to small-scale farmers, it is often aligned to 
mainstream commercial agricultural practices. Many resource conflicts emerge on the 
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land, as do conflicting agricultural training methods between NGOs and extension 
officers. For instance, NGOs will give open pollenated and hybrid seeds, fencing and 
support for organic farming and practices. The local extension officers dangle annual 
competitions and rewards such as trackers or additional land, but promote mono-
cropping, fertilisers and GMO seeds.116 
Some NGOs specifically focus on land rights and access.117 Many focus on 
HIV/AIDS and organic food garden projects.118 Others focus on farm dwellers and 
security of tenure.119  Many NGOs do not take up the issues of wages or campaigns 
tied to the notion that “those who till the soil should own the land.” Often they either 
support farm workers, campaigns for their rights and land tenure, or they support 
small-scale farmers’ access to markets, land and resources.120  
Few have overtly expressed connections between the nature of the economy, 
consumer patterns and between the inherent nature of current land and agricultural 
policy and larger macro-economic policy, which favours exports and large-scale 
farming. NGOs are often single-issue focused and try to remain project orientated, 
attempting to distance themselves from any overt political articulation. They do this to 
fence their areas of work into sectoral issues, to help beneficiaries through alleviating 
poverty and promoting development. Those NGOs doing policy work mostly make 
recommendations and seek to encourage democracy within the rule of law and 
safeguarding the constitution.  
Since 1994, South Africa farm workers have slowly begun to organise 
themselves independently against neoliberal attacks. Since the formation of the 
Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), farm workers have joined the broad land 
movement. Farm workers have generally focused on their rights, land security and 
evictions. More recently, however, their demands have evolved. Mobilisation and 
solidarity occurred during the farm workers’ strike in 2012. Commercial, Stevedoring, 
Agricultural and Allied Workers Union (CSAAWU), for instance, demand a decent 
wage, an eight-hour working day, equal pay, housing and tenure, as well as access to 
land. They also call for the financial books to be opened to ascertain how truthful 
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commercial farmers are when they claim they cannot afford to pay wages beyond 
R75–R100 a day. These demands represent a challenge to white large-scale farmers as 
well as black small-scale farmers who employ farm workers. For the broader land 
movement these workers’ actions represent an important opportunity to meaningfully 
explore how to move beyond the deracialisation of land ownership. 
Many farm workers have been on the white-owned farms for generations. This 
continues today although much labour restructuring has occurred due to trade 
deregulation and liberalisation, resulting in the casualisation and flexibility of labour. 
Over the past ten years, with the increase of labour brokers, workers find themselves 
in more precarious positions than before. Farmers are taking less responsibility for 
decent wages, benefits and employment security.121 A key feature is that seasonal 
workers are no longer residing on farms but in rural informal settlements, making 
claims to land harder than they already were.  
A significant challenge as regards delivering on deracialising land ownership is 
that South African land reform policy focuses on land redress whilst ignoring the 
issue of agricultural reform. There was limited emphasis on linking land reform and 
agricultural policy post-1994. The post-1994 agricultural model and policy mirrors 
global trends favouring large-scale commercial farming. This places pressure on 
labour intensive farming and thus agricultural employment. This in turn holds to 
ransom the type of land reform possible, as the agricultural policy is aligned to 
austerity and restrictive macro-economic trade policy.  
3.10.3 Inyanda National Land Movement – towards building, creating and 
imagining a new landscape 
In late 2012 and early 2013, South Africa saw an unprecedented farm workers’ strike 
in the Western Cape. Farm workers had enough of their poor and miserable working 
conditions. The strike was intense, with violent attacks upon the farm workers by the 
state and commercial farmers. Many farm workers and leaders who engaged in the 
strike were evicted and fired.  
In June 2013, the People’s Assembly on Land, Race and Nation brought 
together a gathering of community-based organisations, activists, farm worker 
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leaders, researchers and other civil society organisations working in the land sector.122 
The People’s Assembly marked 100 years of the 1913 Land Act. The Assembly 
occurred at a critical juncture in South Africa. The Marikana massacre occurred on 16 
August 2012.123 After the mineworkers’ strike, targeting the platinum mines, came 
waves of farm worker strikes where they demanded a minimum daily wage of R150 
per day, which started in late August 2012 in the Western Cape.  
The Assembly’s way forward was to organise, discuss and clarify with 
individual land organisations “its position on landholding arrangements.” It asked, 
“are we fighting for title deeds (the private ownership of land) or some other kind of 
arrangement and if so what kind of arrangement?”124 A year later the Inyanda 
National Land Movement was launched at the end of 2014.125 At this national 
gathering the 2013 People’s Assembly Declaration was amended and adopted, which 
stated that “the struggle for transformation must be based on a new imagination that is 
based on a total re-configuration of South Africa.”126 They argue that “in the name of 
economic growth, our environment and rich natural resource heritage is being 
severely compromised,” hence the movement seeks to build and create new kinds of 
land arrangements.127 
The declaration frames its demands within the deepening economic and social 
inequalities of the post-apartheid period. Importantly, it envisions a particular form of 
land and agrarian reform. Three aspects of the declaration are significant to emphasise 
for the purposes of this thesis. First, it takes on the historical blind spot of an analysis 
of racial discrimination in the 1913 Native Land Act, forced removals and segregation 
during apartheid. Second, it critiques the post-1994 dispensation and its inadequacies 
in addressing past racial injustices and dispossession. It demands that government 
must scrap “the willing buyer, willing seller” approach to land acquisition. Third, the 
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declaration argues that the current policies favour large-scale commercial farmers, 
agri-farming and agri-business, transnational corporations peddling GMOs, fertilisers 
and pesticides and specifically the monocropping export-led market economy.128 This 
draws attention to the class agenda of the current land reform policy. In response, the 
declaration argues for the subdivision of land. It states that “there must be 
subdivisions of farms so that small farmers can get access to small parcels of land. 
Land reform cannot be about big farms and black commercial farmers: this is a land 
reform that excludes us.”129 
There are two sets of primary demands that emerged after CSAAWU 2012 
strikes: one is encapsulated in the Inyanda Declaration of December 2014, and the 
other is the 23 Farm Worker Demands by CSAAWU in 2014.130 One of the strongest 
demands is farm worker access to land. The statement highlighted that  
 
farm workers want land for themselves, as well as jobs. Our families need to do lots of things to 
survive. We need land to grow food and to earn extra income. Farm workers and dwellers want 
to benefit from land reform, food production and labour rights. We want government to promote 
the building of farm worker co-operatives on farms.131  
 
This is a significant demand. Absent, however, is “the land shall belong to all 
those who work it.” This demand, as discussed earlier, was placed on the country’s 
political agenda. It is an important demand, now more than ever, given deepening 
inequality, exploitation and mass unemployment in South Africa. This demand 
suggests a change to propertied social relations on farms and a halt to the exploitation 
of those who till the soil. Through new forms of collective farming it is possible that 
an end to exploitative labour practices can be planned with new agricultural systems.  
There is, however, a tension in the Inyanda Declaration. It calls for (i) “full 
rights” to own land; (ii) “control over” land and (iii) living in “harmony” with land. 
Making these tensions apparent is important. With regard to the first point, the tension 
exists because dispossession and racial injustice hinges on giving “full rights”, access, 
privilege and ownership to whites and not others. It is within this context that the 
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declaration argues that “we want to have secure and long-term rights to land. We do 
not want short-term leases. If commercial farmers have ownership or long-term rights, 
small-scale farmers also need ownership or long-term rights. Do not give us inferior 
rights.”132 Second, the call addresses the historical denial of women’s access 
(specifically black women) to land tenure due to the patriarchal nature of both the 
traditional authorities and the state. The remedy suggested is that women have an 
equal right to land ownership. Hence, if white men can own land then black women 
should own land too. Lastly, farm workers call for “full rights” because many have 
lived and worked on farms for many generations, yet remain land insecure and have 
experienced evictions, unlike the security the commercial farm owner has.  
It is important to make visible that calling for “full rights” over land is bound to 
an historically unexamined aspect of the agrarian question in South Africa. The 
aspiration of BEE farmers is to emulate large-scale farming, which is highly 
modernised and industrialised. The contestation for a market share and market access 
in a highly undemocratic food system obscures the unequal distribution of food and 
hunger in South Africa. The “successful” farmer is the one who makes huge profits. 
What is hidden is that a huge profit in farming – whether you are a white or black 
farmer – is only made as a result of massive exploitation of labour and land. 
The Inyanda vision states that “comprehensive land and agrarian reform is 
based on ensuring full rights over land for indigenous peoples, rights to their 
territories, fishing communities’ rights to marine resources and pastoralists’ rights to 
grazing and migratory routes. … We should get all the resources that can make the 
land productive.”133 This vision illustrates the potential tensions in a national 
movement made up of livelihood farmers, small-scale farmers, aspirant large-scale 
farmers, farm workers and landless people, all of whom have very different needs 
with regards to the land. Before 1994, 97% of the land was owned by 13% of the 
population, and in the Western Cape, for example, land use, access and distribution 
have remained virtually unchanged. Those needs that stray from the dominant 
narrative are far from being met. 
From the declaration it is clear that the Inyanda National Land Movement 
opposes agri-business and agri-farming. It calls for the democratisation of seed and 
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agro-ecological farming. Notwithstanding “full rights” to as well as over land, this 
makes for a tension in the declaration, as rights over land generally reflects a 
perspective in which society assumes its right to dominate and extract from land for 
their need, regardless of consequence. It is significant that the Inyanda National Land 
Movement decided to consult their constituencies to engage in discussion to review 
the demand to own land. Similarly, it is significant that the movement demands food 
sovereignty and not food security. It suggests that the movement is engaging in 
alternative agricultural models and could potentially be considering the implication of 
the dominant food systems on land as well as on themselves. 
Making visible the relationship between racial dispossession and accumulation 
– two sides of the same coin – is critical to beginning to see land as part of nature and 
not a commodity. In the context of South Africa, it is easy to conflate the right of 
access to land with the right to ownership. Today, the materially resourced people 
own land and the vast majority of working people do not. It is mainly non-white 
people who remain landless in post-apartheid South Africa whilst the historically 
privileged continue to own land. The class relationship to land is hidden in the 
dominant discussion of racialised land. The need to relinquish the right to and demand 
for land ownership, and therefore the right to private property, could become more 
obvious once it is clearer that the concept of land as nature, is a key element of 
reimagining society. 
3.10.4 Land beyond loss, restoration, fear, privilege and inheritance?  
The Inyanda call for the end to GMOs and destructive agricultural practices, for 
example the use of poisonous pesticide, is significant. Similar to organisations such as 
Biowatch, Trust for Community Outreach and Education (TCOE) and the African 
Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), Inyanda regards an end to GMOs and chemical 
pesticides as central to the health and well-being of those who till the soil, the society 
that consumes the produce, and the soil and land itself - thus the environment at large. 
These organisations argue that a decline in highly mechanised agricultural production 
will ensure a decrease in methane and carbon monoxide, therefore lowering the 
carbon footprint of these practices and potentially abating ecological strain. 
TCOE, one of the organisations supporting the Inyanda National Land 
Movement, opposes industrial agriculture because “it failed to fulfil promises to feed 
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the world and end hunger.”134 They argue that “industrial agriculture is associated 
with many of the ‘global crises’ and other problems that impact mostly the poor.” 
They list some of the associated crises such as the food crisis, the ecological crisis, 
traditional seed destruction, climate change, land and water dispossession and the 
undermining of food sovereignty.135  
Princen’s logic of sufficiency implies limits on consumption and excessiveness 
and adopts a needs-based approach. With regard to agriculture, Princen’s ideas would 
imply production in accordance with: what is enough, only what is seasonal and what 
can supply local domestic markets. Producing sufficient and healthy food is people-
intensive. To this end, an adoption of permaculture, agro-ecology and alternative 
farming methods support the logic of sufficiency even if this is not explicitly referred 
to in the Inyanda National Land Movement’s declaration. These methods are clearly 
linked in the declaration to land and soil rehabilitation and sustainable use.  
Masanobu Fukuoka in The One-Straw Revolution suggests an even more radical 
step. He argues for “returning to the source” and “towards a Do-Nothing Farming” 
approach.136 Specifically he proposes a “natural way to [farm],” which according to 
him is “farming as simply as possible within and in cooperation with the natural 
environment, rather than the modern approach of applying complex techniques to re-
make nature entirely for the benefit of human beings.”137 Importantly, it is also about 
making work (farming) “easier instead of harder.”138 However, Fukuoka believes that 
“even ‘returning-to-nature’ and anti-pollution activities, no matter how commendable, 
are not moving towards a genuine solution if they are carried out solely in reaction to 
the overdevelopment of the present age.”139 
Implicit in the aforementioned Inyanda call for changing the size of farms, as 
well as methods of farming, is a change in the social relations on the land. In this 
regard, the call for food sovereignty is fundamentally linked to changing both social 
relations as well as relations between society and nature. The Inyanda Declaration 
calls for a “new imagination” of the countryside – an embryonic and potentially 
different understanding of how we conceive of land. It suggests recognising old 
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conceptions in order to form new conceptions of and relations to land. These new 
conceptions are embedded in a practice of food sufficiency and not efficiency. The 
call suggests a break with the existing productive and propertied social relations. The 
declaration proposes that those who work the land should be recognised, made visible 
and valued as integral to societal well-being.  
Central to this markedly different approach is an end to both private property 
and the false idea of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons. It implies new obligations and 
relations with regard to how land is used and a change in people’s access to land. It 
encourages a recognition and understanding that humans affect and are affected by 
land, which could overcome the preoccupation with subduing land to meet 
consumerist wants. Such an approach recognises the delicate and necessary balance 
and connection between society and land. Those who know the land intimately can 
maintain this balance best.  
3.11 The promise of land 
In 2012, approximately 67% of land was owned by commercial agriculture.140 Land 
remains concentrated in the hands of a relative few. Those who till the soil for a 
meagre wage or no wage at all remain unrecognised and excluded in making 
decisions about the land.  People previously excluded during apartheid are still no 
closer to accessing land than before democracy. Commercial agriculture concentrates 
land in many of the same private hands that were privileged during apartheid. This 
perpetuates and re-enforces enclosures cemented during the colonial and apartheid 
periods. 
The WBWS land policy and the defence of the rule of law with regard to 
property rights specifically maintains and ensures the process of separating 
“producers [from] direct access to the means of their own reproduction.”141 According 
to Wood, prior to capitalism “for millennia, human beings have provided for their 
material needs by working the land” and “the emergence of the market as a 
determinant of social reproduction presupposed its penetration into the production of 
life’s most basic necessity, food.”142 She states that “enclosures meant, more 
particularly, the extinction (with or without a physical fencing of land) of common 
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and customary use-rights on which many people depended for their livelihood.”143 
She highlights that a “capitalist conception of property – property as not only as 
‘private’ but also exclusive, literally excluding other individuals and communities,” 
replaced older conceptions of property as “communal ownership of common 
lands.”144  
Critical for Wood is that we do not lose sight of the effects of the economic 
market and its imperative shaping of land use. She argues that “once market 
imperatives set the terms of social reproduction, all economic actors – both 
appropriators and producers, even if they retain possession, or indeed outright 
ownership, of the means of production – are subject to the demands of the 
competition, increased productivity, capital accumulation, and the intense exploitation 
of labour.”145 The current parameters of land reform – rule of law, the constitution 
and its private property clause – do more than maintain previous racial inequalities. 
They place a premium on owning, accumulating and investing in land, equating land 
to any share listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
Fraser agrees with Wood, asserting that “capitalism overturned” previous 
relationships outside the labour and exchange market when “it enclosed the commons, 
abrogated the customary use rights of the majority and transformed shared resources 
into private property of a small minority.”146 Therefore, she asks, should there not be 
a break from the concept of land as private property?147   
Calls for land reform within the constraints of a private property paradigm with 
assumptions of the logic of efficiency and economic competition seem unlikely to 
challenge the colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid patterns of private property 
ownership. The Inyanda Declaration suggests that land reform calls for the need to 
evaluate and take into account how people live with and use the land. This suggests a 
challenge to the structural and institutional relationships between people, and between 
people and the land.  
It is useful to draw on Fraser who highlights the “break-up of the previous 
social world in which most people, however differently situated, had access to the 
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means of subsistence and means of production; access, in other words, to food, shelter 
and clothing, and to tools, land and work, without having to go through labour 
markets.”148 A critical question is how a call for land reform could regain the access 
Fraser outlines. Can it occur through land markets as suggested with the WSWB 
policy? Should anyone in post-apartheid South Africa own land? 
The current debate conceals the dominant conception of land as highlighted at 
the start of this dissertation. The assumption is that land has always been private 
property. Land is portrayed as a natural resource for extraction, ownership and 
material benefit, and thus an object that society has control over so as to exploit for 
the benefit of mankind’s development. This, however, is far from historically 
accurate. Wood argues that capitalism is naturalised so as “to disguise its 
distinctiveness as a historically specific social form, with a beginning and (no doubt) 
an end.”149 She turns on its head the idea that capitalism “was born not in the city but 
in the countryside, in a very specific place, and very late in human history.”150 
Capitalism in the countryside “required not a simple extension or expansion of barter 
and exchange but a complete transformation in the most basic human relations and 
practices, a rupture in age-old patterns of human interaction with nature in the 
production of life’s most basic necessities.”151 
For Hendricks, Ntsebeza and Helliker the land question in South Africa “will 
not be resolved by monetary compensation” or “piecemeal transfer of poor-quality 
land from whites to black” or “settled by the formalisation of procedures for evictions 
of farm workers”, nor “will it be resolved by the upgrading of shacks in urban 
slums.”152 They argue that “the ongoing racialised inequalities in land, inherited from 
colonial dispossession, act as a spatial barrier to imagining a unitary nation in 
contemporary South Africa.”153 Land reform is beyond technical policy fixes; “an 
entirely different approach is required if democracy is to survive in South Africa.”154 
This is a break from the current scholarly approaches, which tend to focus on policy 
and stumbling blocks in current tired and ineffectual land reform processes. This 
dissertation argues that private property land ownership is an inadequate means to 
                                                
148 Fraser, “Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode,” 57. 
149 Wood, “Agrarian Origins,” 1. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., 2. 
152 Hendricks, Ntsebeza and Helliker, Promise of Land, 341. 
153 Ibid., 36. 
154 Ibid., 341. 
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address racial land dispossession of the past. Moreover, it cannot address the issue of 
redistribution, recognition or representation.155 
Hendricks et al. argue that it is through grassroots organisations that land can be 
reimagined. For them “the role of social movements is absolutely critical, these 
struggles from below hold the promise of affording ordinary people the chance to 
participate in the making of their own futures.”156 Of equal importance for the 
promise of land is a need to understand apartheid and capitalism as two sides to the 
same coin – racial oppression was critical for capitalist exploitation and accumulation 
of land, capital and labour. Hendricks et al. bring to our attention the inadequacies of 
the “South African historiographies” which “deal in the binaries of peasant and 
proletariat” leaving out “the masses of people who exist on the margins of society” 
who “fall squarely under the overwhelming dominance of the capitalist system.”157  
A critical contribution of The Promise of Land is that it engages directly with 
the key issues around the politics of land. This affords one an opportunity to consider 
what radical land transformation or revolution could mean for social relations in 
South Africa. For the purpose of this dissertation, this endeavour enables us to link 
changed social relations to new relations with land and nature.  
The promise and struggle for land represents the potential of a transformed 
society. At one level, this seeks a redress of racial injustice caused by past 
dispossession. At a different level, the important contribution of The Promise of Land 
is that it locates the significance and importance of land reform beyond deracialisation 
of land ownership. Hendricks et al. argue that in the context of urbanisation, 
proletarianisation, mass unemployment and poverty, the need for land and agrarian 
reform in South Africa is vital “in the struggle for livelihoods, sovereignty and full 
citizenship.”158 
The contemporary struggle for land brings into sharp focus the continued 
unequal spatial geography as well as the deepening economic and social inequality 
that resulted from apartheid capitalist policies as well the neoliberal policies of today. 
The promise of, and struggle for land is an alternative to the existing status quo. The 
                                                
155 I have borrowed Nancy Fraser’s use of redistribution so as to reflect that land remains concentrated; recognition 
(she speaks of unpaid care work) in that those who work the land are not seen; representation (she speaks to 
identity politics) in that black people still largely left out of the frame. For a full account, see Nancy Fraser, 
“Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History,” New Left Review 56 (2009). 
156 Hendricks, Ntsebeza and Helliker, Promise of Land, 342. 
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land question is central as “people have en masse been dispossessed and disconnected 
from the land, a huge portion have not been absorbed into gainful employment in 
urban (or rural) areas. They are trapped in activity and unemployment largely because 
territorial segregation was part of the process of primitive accumulation.”159 
Over the past few years and in particular since 2012, farm workers have waged 
an offensive against commercial farmers. Underpaid, invisible and marginalised 
workers are organising for better working conditions. They have demanded an end to 
labour brokers who undermine their negotiating capacity and legal rights. They 
demand a decent wage and equal wages for women and men. They demand from 
government decent housing, secure tenure and land for their livelihood. Farm workers 
have blockaded roads, set vineyards alight and have fought back to defend themselves 
against the brutality, racism, exploitation and violence they experience daily. They 
resist because they have no other options. What would the promise of land be for the 
farm workers who till the soil, produce the food and tend to the land?  
Wood claims that “the most basic difference between all pre-capitalist societies 
and capitalism” is that “it has nothing to do with whether production is urban or rural 
and everything to do with the particular property relations between producers and 
appropriators, whether in industry or agriculture. Only in capitalism is the dominant 
mode of surplus appropriation based on the dispossession of the direct producers 
whose surplus labour is appropriated by purely ‘economic’ means.”160 The farm 
workers’ strikes and small-scale farmers’ demands for land place property relations at 
the centre of the land debate. But they also ask critical questions about how we relate 
to each other and to land.  
Thus, the power of the Inyanda Declaration and their movement is that they are 
organising everyone working the land. By breaking the silence and silos of struggle 
organisations they have begun to challenge existing social relations. This movement 
has huge challenges and contradictions to confront. Outlining the contradictions 
brings them closer to a different relationship to the land, to themselves and to one 
another. The farm workers find themselves on black-owned and white-owned farms; 
the landless find themselves struggling for land in urban and rural areas regardless of 
which party runs the municipality; small-scale farmers slowly begin to see the 
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contradiction of the demand for access to markets and at the same time trying to retain 
agro-ecological methods. Together, however, in building a platform in which each 
experience is explored and affirmed, the demands made are not the lowest common 
denominator but rather one with an emancipatory project.  
The power of the farm workers’ strikes and their centrality in the movement 
forces the question of reproductive and productive work towards the centre. The 
power of subsistence farmers, who are mainly women, demanding land from the 
traditional authorities, makes visible the naturalisation of care work, thereby 
challenging the system of patriarchy and capitalism on the land. Their demands are a 
direct challenge to the unequal, unpaid and invisible work that feeds the family and 
the community through tilling the soil.  
The call for deracialisation of land ownership is an inadequate call. Tracing the 
call historically and locating its footprint is a necessary step to begin to construct a 
new call, which explicitly connects people and land, in which land as part of nature is 
foregrounded. In so doing, the chapter bring to the fore how the shift from communal 
land and farms to large-scale commercial agriculture not only displaced people but 
turned the land into factories run with low paid labour. This process undermined 
egalitarian and communal ways of working and living with the land. This chapter 
furthermore showed that the call to deracialise land ownership obscures these 
dramatic shifts that occurred. Farming that was once respectful of nature’s cycles has 
been transformed. Colonial and apartheid commercial farming fostered the 
domination over land and alienating farming practices. Mechanisation, subsidies and 
the agricultural revolution led by the apartheid regime, and driven by the South 
African mineral-energy complex, has left its mark on people and land. Neoliberal 
post-apartheid land policy maintains a private property land ownership regime, thus 




Chapter Four: The Many Traumas of Mining in South Africa – The Limits of 
Capitalist Exploitation of Nature  
4.1 Introduction: The challenge of mineral exploitation today 
The chapter traces the changing conception of minerals in history, locating the 
mineral revolution in the making of South Africa capitalism. In so doing, the chapter 
shows how assumptions regarding economic gains come to trump alternative 
conceptions of nature, people and work. This chapter examines earlier ideas in 
numerous State policy documents as well as other key documents on the question of 
mineral wealth serving the people as a whole, creating jobs and improving living 
conditions.  
In the process it becomes apparent that the alleged new mining jobs and 
improved living conditions based on mineral extraction rest upon one of the most 
ecologically destructive practices in the world.1 This is a serious dilemma that is 
neglected or often hidden in the debate on mining-for-development.  
The chapter asks: “Is there an alternative to mining?” Or “is there a way to 
talk honestly about the effects of mining?” The aim of the chapter is to show that 
mining is based on the objectification of minerals and metals (nature), and in its 
process simultaneously objectifies mineworkers and mining-affected communities.  
4.2 Mining, a necessary evil for industrialisation – who bears the cost? 
Extraction of minerals through surface or deep mining is generally understood as 






                                                
1 New mining investment has not seen permanent job creation. The data shows that between 1990 and 2014 the 
sector had shed 284 000 jobs. See Quantec data, accessed September 22, 2016. http://www.quantec.co.za/. 
2 See Eduardo Gudynas, “The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in 
Relation to Current South American Progressivism,” America’s Programme Report (Washington: Centre for 
International Policy, 21 January 2010, 1, 10-11). He argues that extractivism continues to be promoted as the 
“motor of economic growth,” regardless of the reality and implications by governments as well as progressives. 
 87 
 
Yet, over recent decades, it has become evident that mining creates ecological hazards 
and endangers the lives of mineworkers and mining-affected communities.3 These 
ecological hazards and dangers extend to society at large due to the high carbon 
emissions, acid drainage, as well as water and air pollution that accompany mining 
processes. Many scholars, mining-affected communities and public sector actors 
commenting on mineral extraction convey to varying extents that the costs of mining 
are a necessary evil for economic growth and development.4 Given the current 
ecological crisis and the broad global consensus on the need to radically decrease 
carbon emissions, the predominant conception of mineral extraction as a necessary 
evil cannot go unexamined. Since 2007, prominent reports by the Bench Marks 
Foundation, which reveal the horrendous living conditions (socially, economically 
and environmentally) of mining-affected communities,  demand that critical questions 
are asked.5 Their reports show the lack of transformation, as well as the devastating 
social and environmental impact mining has on mining-affected communities and 
mineworkers.  
Over the past five years, one case in particular has been in the media spotlight, 
forcing South Africa to pay attention to mining. The Marikana massacre, mentioned  
in Chapter 3, highlights the depth and extent to which the mining companies and state 
                                                
3 See Alberto Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractivism: Two Sides of the Same Curse,” in Beyond Development 
from Latin America, ed. M. Lang and D. Mokrani (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2013), 69–70; for South 
Africa see David Hallowes and Victor Munnik, Peak Poison: The Elite Energy Crisis and Environmental Justice 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press/Ground Work Report, 2007), 138–143, 148–161. For an extensive 
illustration of the waste and destruction of mining in South Africa, also see David Hallowes, Toxic Futures: South 
Africa in the Crisis of Energy, Environment and Capital (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Press/GroundWork, 2011), 108-131. More recent accounts can be found in Amandla! 47: Amandla! 
Correspondent, “Coal is Key to Resolving the Drought – Not Wet Wipes”; Samantha Hargreaves, “Women 
Defending Water, Land and Life in Northern KwaZulu-Natal”; Bench Marks Community Monitors, “Mining 
Destruction and the Fight for Change”; Gugu Nkabinde and Meshack Mbangula, “They take the Gold and Leave 
us Slime Dams and Health Problems”; Meshack Mbangula, “The People Are Writing Their Own Mining Charter”; 
Amandla! 46: Amandla! Correspondent, “Amadiba Crisis Committee: The struggle continues”; Amandla! 45: 
Local Correspondent, “Stop Mining before It Starts: Amadiba struggle continues despite assassination.” 
4 For a global viewpoint that expresses this sentiment, see Ugo Bardi, Extracted: How the Quest for Mineral 
Wealth Is Plundering the Planet: A Report to the Club of Rome (USA: Chelsea Green, 2014). 
In South Africa, an example to be discussed later in the chapter is the Mining-Environment-Community Alliance 
(MECA), which consists of 70 organisations. “It is a coalition of civil society, community organisations, academic 
institutions and law clinics concerned about the impacts of mining on the environment and on the communities 
that rely on those natural resources. MECA works to implement a Civil Society Legal Strategy to Promote 
Environmental Compliance, Transparency and Accountability in Mining”. Last accessed September, 20 2016, 
http://biodiversityadvisor.sanbi.org/industry-and-conservation/conservation-and-mining/connect-2/mining-
environment-and-community-alliance-meca/. 
5 See the Bench Marks Foundation, “Policy Gap 1: A review of the corporate responsibility programme of the 
platinum mining industry in the North West Province” (Johannesburg: Bench Marks Foundation, 2007); 
 “Policy Gap 6, Communities in the Platinum Minefields: A Review of Platinum Mining in the Bojanala District of 
the North West Province: A Participatory Research Action Approach” (Johannesburg: Bench Marks Foundation, 
August 2012); and “Policy Gap 7, Coping with Unsustainability: Lonmin 2003–2012 Report” (Johannesburg: 




collude to silence resistance through any means necessary, be it murder, violence, 
victimisation or arrests. During the massacre, the plight of mineworkers and mining-
affected communities came to the fore. The super-exploitative conditions told a 
particular story of accumulation and the inhumanity of extractive industries. The 
reports and media footage showed how mining-affected communities live in 
subhuman conditions, and how the mines dump waste, create air and water pollution 
and externalise ecological and social costs onto surrounding communities.  
Due to the Marikana massacre and numerous other mining cases and reports in 
South Africa, there are now demands being made with regards to mining and the 
environment.6 I outline three broad demands here: 
 
1) Mineworkers demand a decent living wage, job creation and beneficiation, 
improved working and living conditions, as well as health and safety around 
the mines.7  
2) Mining-affected communities demand to be consulted and to have a share 
in the gains of mineral extraction be it employment, development such as 
housing, infrastructure and an end to human rights violation in these areas.8 
They furthermore demand acknowledgement and compensation for the social 
and environmental effects of mining in their communities, and call upon 
companies and the state to mitigate environmental impact.  
3) Environmental groups demand an end to fossil fuel mining.9  
 
These demands reflect that the vast gains and exorbitant profits resulting from 
extraction and exploitation of minerals benefit a relative few at the expense of many 
                                                
6 Prior to the recent cases there have been campaigns and mobilisations in South Africa around the events of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the Alternative Mining Indaba since 2009, 
and COP 17, 2011 in Durban on climate change and fossils fuels, all of which have garnered greater awareness of 
the impact of mining on the climate. 
7 These are demands of the association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU). In 2014 I joined a 
group of Austrian visitors from Dreikonigsaktion (DKA) on a field trip to Witbank coal mining area, AMCU and 
MACUA. Prior to heading to the field we had a meeting with AMCU president Joseph Mathunjwa in which he 
highlighted these as AMCU demands.  
8 Mines and Communities (MAC), “South Africa: People’s Mining Charter,” June 26, 2016. Accessed on July 14, 
2016, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=13434. 
9 See calls by organisations such as GroundWorks, EarthLife, WoMin. Other campaigns such as Fossil Free South 
Africa calls for financial disinvestment. Carbon Tax campaigns and OneMillionJobs are lobby groups placing 
pressure on mines to reduce their carbon footprint. 
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people’s homes, communities, health, livelihoods, land, water and air.10 The Bench 
Marks Foundation reports claim that the mining companies aim to maintain 
production and profits, and take negligible responsibility for the negative impact of 
mining. When confronted by the mining-affected communities, the mining companies 
argue that their corporate social responsibility and sustainability programmes are in 
place.  
The National Development Plan (NDP), to be discussed in section 4.5.2 of this 
chapter, clearly sees mining as a key employer, a means of creating revenue and an 
industry central to the State’s economic transformation model. Labour seeks to 
maintain and expand employment in an historically employment-creating sector and 
calls for job protection, greater investment and production.11 In the case of 
government and mineworkers’ unions, reports in the media in 2015 reflect that “the 
parties … formally signed off on 10 joint interventions, ranging from joint initiatives 
to promote South African minerals, to agreements to enhance productivity and an 
agreement that, when mines were intended to be mothballed or sold, saving jobs 
would be prioritised.”12 At the centre of the unions’ concerns are workers’ jobs.  
The demands by civil society groups are centred on social and economic 
justice. This could be most clearly seen at the Alternative Mining Indaba, which 
rallied people together under the banner of “mak[ing] natural resources work for the 
people, leaving no one behind.”13 According to the Mining-Environment-Community 
Alliance (MECA),  
 
the focus of our concern and endeavours is not to oppose mining, but to ensure that adequate 
assessment and mitigation of detrimental impacts take place within reasonable timeframes 
before prospecting and mining are commenced, followed by predictable compliance 
monitoring of requirements set, and strong enforcement action taken when non-compliance is 
                                                
10 AIDC “Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal Juror Report on Transnational Corporations in Southern Africa,” accessed 
September 20, 2016, http://aidc.org.za/permanent-peoples-tribunal-jurors-report/. 
11 Natasha Marrian “New Deal Aims to Stem Mine Job Cuts,” Mail & Guardian, August 27, 2015, accessed 
January 27, 2016, http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2015/08/27/new-deal-aims-to-stem-mine-job-cuts. 
12 Karl Gernetzky, “Mining Industry Unions and Government Agree on Plan to Stem Job-losses,” Mail & 
Guardian, August 31, 2015, accessed January 27, 2016, 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2015/08/31/mining-industry-unions-and-government-agree-on-plan-to-
stem-job-losses. 
13 Itai Masuku and Johnlyn Tromp, “Official Report of the Alternative Mining Indaba 2015” (Cape Town: 
Economic Justice Network of FOCCISA). 
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found. This is the only way to ensure responsible environmental practices at mines, in the 
interest of workers, communities and the country.14  
 
The position of government, the unions and many of the mining-affected 
community alliances, as will be outlined later in this chapter, reflect an unexamined 
understanding of the assumed economic growth, development and transformation that 
mining promises. The South African government’s mineral policy, according to the 
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, “had to take account of the 
international nature of the mining industry in order to ensure the continuing prosperity 
of our own mines.”15 In part, the approach and policy adopted in the new dispensation 
is a product of a global discourse on mining that is linked to the general history of 
minerals.  
4.3 Minerals in history  
During antiquity, minerals and metals in the depths of the earth were believed to hold 
special powers and were seen as part of nature. According to Ugo Bardi, metals were 
part of Gaia’s gifts and “in those ancient times, many believed that immense powers 
resided there – like the power of a volcano embodied by Greek Chimera, a mythical 
fire-breathing monster.”16 Minerals were thought of as active subjects; they were seen 
as an extension of plant roots and were regarded as a lower form of living matter 
similar to root vegetables and the veins of the earth. It was argued that minerals were 
intentionally hidden from sight and should stay untouched.  
The mining of gold and iron in early history was associated with “human 
corruption and avarice” and “the worst crime against mankind [was] committed by 
him who was the first to put a ring upon his fingers.”17 Some argued that “extracting 
iron was the source of human cruelty in the form of war, murder and robbery.”18 This 
viewpoint reflected the disdain for extraction during an older period. Minerals such as 
gold, amber and jade were also prized for their rareness and were thought to have 
magical powers. Thus, during this early period the extraction of minerals was 
contested and not seen as necessary or natural. There were moral and normative 
                                                
14 See Centre for Environmental Rights, accessed Sept 20, 2016, http://cer.org.za/programmes/mining. 
15 Department of Minerals and Energy, “White Paper: A Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa,” October 
1998, 3. 
16 Bardi, Extracted, 1. 
17 Merchant, Death of Nature, 30–31. 
18 Ibid., 31. 
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constraints to mining and the associated damage to Mother Nature. Over time, 
however, arguments were slowly shaped to justify mineral extraction.19 Antiquity, and 
to a large extent the modern period, regarded minerals as infinite, which they were, 
relative to the technology used. Some argued that their abundance was proof that they 
ought to be extracted and used. Today, however, with vast levels of extraction and 
technological advances, it is known that minerals are finite and non-renewable.20  
Georgius Agricola, published De Re Metallica in 1556, which defends the 
right to extract minerals from the belly of the earth. According to Agricola, “there has 
always been the greatest disagreement amongst men concerning metals and mining, 
some praising, others utterly condemning them.”21 His work refutes claims made by 
detractors to mining – be it with regard to nature’s destruction, the utility of minerals, 
the dangers for miners, or the wickedness of those who mine – regarding taking what 
is not offered by the earth.  
De Re Metallica, written at the period of early European industry, had 
significant impact on the relationship between mining and society. Agricola’s work 
conceives of minerals and metals as objects and as a natural resource. This new 
conception transformed the view of minerals from a predominately organic to a 
scientific one. According to Bardi, De Re Metallica, “was a milestone in the science 
of mineralogy, and put to rest forever the idea that minerals were living creatures.”22 
Agricola’s work “expanded upon by the early pioneers of modern geology like 
Nicolas Steno, Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, William Hutton, and many others” 
and in so doing represents a scientific argument and rationale for mining.23 His work 
was an attempt to legitimise the extraction and exploitation of minerals and metals. 
The work of Merchant importantly reminds us: 
 
If the new values connected to mining were positive, and mining was viewed as a means to 
improve human condition, as they were with Agricola, and later with Bacon, then the 
comparison could be turned upside down. Sanctioning mining sanctioned the rape or 
commercial exploration of the earth – a clear illustration of how constraints can change to 
                                                
19 Ibid., 30–41. 
20 Current mineral resource depletion and availability figures show that extraction of minerals increased 
exponentially from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries, then again from the mid-20th century and 
continue in an upward trend.  
21 Georgius Agricola, De Re Metallica [1556], trans. H Clark Hoover and L Henry Hoover (London: The Mining 
Magazine, 1912), 4. 




sanctions through the demise of frameworks and their associated values as the needs, wants 
and purposes of society change. The organic framework, in which the Mother Earth image 
was a moral restraint against mining, was literally undermined by the new commercial 
activity.24  
 
Mining of minerals and metals became tied to a particular system of production and 
new economy; it was critical to creating and sustaining a new industry - the 
production and supply of goods and services. Mining further became linked to the 
technology, science, economy and a new body politic of the period – the scientific 
and modern world. The social, economic and environmental forces and interrelated 
changes at work shaped ideas around mining in the seventeenth century that are still 
evident today. At the centre of these shifts towards capitalism and industrialisation 
was the transformation of human labour, as well as metals and minerals, into private 
property—objects to be bought and sold at the market. This process of objectification 
and alienation were interwoven with the introduction of waged work and private 
property claims of both land and the earth below it.  
Naomi Klein indicates that extractivism is “a nonreciprocal, dominance-based 
relationship with the earth.”25 It is about power over nature, as Merchant would 
articulate it. Klein argues that extractivism is  
 
the reduction of life into objects for the use of others, giving them no integrity or value of 
their own—turning living complex ecosystems into ‘natural resources’ … the reduction of 
human beings either into labour to be brutally extracted, pushed beyond limits … In an 
extractivist economy, the interconnections among these various objectified components of life 
are ignored; the consequences of severing them are of no concern.26  
 
This is a sharp observation and brings to the fore the dehumanisation and 
objectification of people associated with mining.  
Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization explains that historically, mining 
was not seen as a human art but rather as a form of punishment. “During the whole of 
antiquity it was meant to be burdensome [hence] no one entered the mine in civilized 
                                                
24 Merchant, Death of Nature, 41. 
25 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs Climate (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 169. 
26 Klein, This Changes Everything, 169. 
 93 
 
states until relatively modern times except as a prisoner of war, a criminal or a 
slave.”27 Mining was conceived of as barbaric and only deemed fit for the soulless.  
His work shows that unlike other industries, mining made limited technical progress 
until the fifteenth century. Mumford argued that “before new industrial process could 
take hold on a great scale, a reorientation of wishes, habits, ideas and goals were 
necessary.”28 Agricola’s work is one such attempt to reorient any misgivings towards 
mining. From about the sixteenth century on “mining sets the pattern for capitalist 
exploitation.”29 According to Mumford, “no other industry was as closely bound up 
with modern capitalism as mining.”30 He argued that unlike any previous mode of 
production, “the routine of the mine involves an unflinching assault upon the physical 
environment: every stage in it is a magnification of power.”31 
4.4 Mining in the development of South African capitalism 
In the case of South Africa, the centrality of mining in the development of modern 
capitalism was paramount. Jade Davenport writes that “the mineral revolution enabled 
the introduction of an aggressively organized and racially dominated form of 
industrial capitalism, an economic system that dominated the South African socio-
political and fiscal area for more than a century.”32 It was the discovery of diamonds 
and gold in 1867 and 1886 respectively in the North, beyond the Cape Colony and 
outside the authority of the British Empire, which hastened its expansion into and 
annexation of South Africa. This mineral revolution of the 1870s shaped much of 
modern South Africa.33 Martin Legassick wrote that “full-blooded capitalism 
developed late in South Africa in comparison with Europe and the US. The real 
impact of capitalism came only with the discovery of gold and diamonds, in the 
mineral revolution at the end of the nineteenth century, as the world economy was 
undergoing the transition to imperialism.”34  
The Cape Colony’s Native Law enabled expansion and appropriation of land 
for mineral access. This law was propelled by the imperialist project of the period as 
                                                
27 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 67. 
28 Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 3. 
29 Ibid., 74. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Jade Davenport, Digging Deep: A History of Mining in South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2014), 2. 
33 The expansion of the British empire into Africa, led by Cecil Rhodes’s vision, has left its lasting mark on the 
landscape of South Africa, from the unification of the Republic of South African to the creation of an industrial 
state. 
34 Martin Legassick, Towards Socialist Democracy (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. 2007), 441. 
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well as the discovery of gold and diamonds. It was this that motivated the Rhodes 
administration to annex the Northern Cape. Less than ten years thereafter the Glen 
Grey Act was passed in 1894, which “denied the votes to African[s] … restricted the 
size of African-owned freeholds, restricted inheritance rights and imposed a head tax 
– all measures to ensure labour migration.”35 Rhodes started the process of 
amalgamation of small claim holders and “sought oligopolistic control of the 
mines.”36  
Legassick noted that the “mines required large amounts of cheap labour. They 
used the pre-existing structures of colonialism and racism, and transformed them into 
structures of segregation to generate this supply as cheap black migrant labour … The 
ideology and structures of segregation prepared the way for the ideology and 
structures of apartheid.”37 Supporting this point about pre-existing structures, Klein 
argues that “extractivism ran rampant under colonialism” as mining “was intimately 
tied up with imperialism … bound up with notions of racial superiority, because in 
order to have sacrifice zones, you need to have people and cultures who count so little 
that they are considered deserving of the sacrifice.”38  
After South African unification and the establishment of mining monopolies, 
mining took on a particular economic industrial approach. This extraction laid the 
foundation for South Africa’s mineral energy accumulation strategy as well as its 
particular form of racially skewed wealth inequality. Jan Glazewski says that 
“[m]ining has historically been the mainstay of the South African economy and has 
shaped both its social and environmental fabric. The urban and industrial landscape 
has been dramatically influenced according to the location of minerals.”39 The 
mineral revolution in South Africa was key to the modernisation of the country. Rapid 
infrastructural development and accompanying technologies had to keep abreast with 
the mineral revolutions. The development of mining in South Africa propelled the 
development of new mining towns and cities, urbanisation, new forms of 
organisations and migrant labour influxes into these new towns and cities. Of equal 
significance is how mining was intimately linked to the development of new 
                                                
35 Robert I. Rotberg, The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2002), 
xxxiv. 
36 Rotberg, The Founder, xxx. 
37 Legassick, Towards Socialist Democracy, 441. 
38 Klein, This Changes Everything, 170. 
39 Jan Glazewski, The Environmental Law in South Africa (Durban: Butterworths/Lexus Nexus, 2000), 455. 
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industries, manufacturing, capital and the financial sector.40 The very creation of the 
South African apartheid industrial state rested upon the process of mineral extraction. 
The work of Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee has shown how the mineral-
energy complex is at the centre of South Africa’s economy and how inextricably 
linked the mineral-energy and financial systems are to wealth and power 
concentration.41 Legassick noted that “according to Fine and Rustomjee … since 1945 
industrialisation was based on forward linkages from mining and energy (for 
example, electricity from coal) into such sectors as steel and chemicals, rather than 
backwards from consumer goods.”42 Others such as Patrick Bond and Hein Marais 
show how the mineral-energy complex has played a central role in the South African 
transition and its limits.43  
The mineral revolution and mining was seen as the driving force behind 
industrialisation and was the backbone of the South Africa capitalist economy. The 
economy was firmly held by white monopoly capital. It stands to reason then, that 
policy discussions about wealth distribution, inequality and transformation would 
focus attention on this sector.  
4.5 Creating mineral wealth to serve the people  
4.5.1 The Freedom Charter, Ready to Govern, the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act [No. 28 of 2002] (MPRDA) and Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) 
The ANC’s Ready to Govern document was the basis for policies in the new 
dispensation.44 It draws on the national liberation movement’s Freedom Charter. 
Section 9, titled Mining and Energy Policy, sets out that  
 
[t]he mineral wealth beneath the soil is the national heritage of all South Africans, including 
future generations. As a diminishing resource it should be used with due regard to socio-
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economic needs and environmental conservation. The ANC will, in consultation with unions 
and employers, introduce a mining strategy, which will involve the introduction of a new 
system of taxation, financing, mineral rights and leasing. The strategy will require the 
normalisation of miners’ living and working conditions, with full trade union rights and an 
end to private security forces on the mines. In addition, the strategy will, where appropriate, 
involve public ownership and joint ventures.45 
 
As a precursor to the mineral and mining policy, the democratic state 
acknowledged that minerals are not infinite and are, in fact, diminishing in quantity. It 
took a sustainability approach, arguing the importance of balancing future 
generations’ needs against current socio-economic and environmental considerations. 
Yet, a bigger consideration was that the state saw mining as a key driver to meet 
society’s needs and address the legacy of apartheid’s skewed racial development. 
They sought to do this within a market-based framework.  
 The MPRDA and subsequent amendments legislate over the vast natural 
mineral resources of the country. The Act reflects the developmental agenda of the 
country and states that it has “to make provision for equitable access to and 
sustainable development of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.”46 The Act legislates that the State is the 
custodian of mineral rights and oversees the leasing of these rights.  
The objectives of the broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter for 
the South African mining and mineral industry are “to promote employment and 
advance the social and economic welfare of mine communities and major sending 
areas; to promote beneficiation of the South Africa’s mineral commodities; and 
promote sustainable development and growth of the mining industry.”47 Putting an 
end to single-man hostel dwellings, poor living conditions, the apartheid colour bar 
and segregation in mines is necessary, but side-steps hard questions and honest 
discussions about what “mining for development” means in the context of the current 
ecological crisis and acknowledging climate change destruction related to mining.  
In post-apartheid policy the new discussions on minerals and mining sought to 
replace the archaic and discriminatory legislation of the past. The first mineral 
                                                
45 African National Congress, “Ready to Govern,” Section 9. 
46 Republic of South Africa, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act [No. 28 of 2002]. 
47 Republic of South Africa, “The Broad-based Socio-economic Empowerment Charter for the South African 
Mining and Mineral Industry” (South Africa: Department of Mineral Resources, September, 2010), 1. 
 97 
 
legislation was the Mines and Works Act 12 of 1911, followed by the Mines and 
Works Act 27 of 1956, which effectively instantiated the “colour bar” on the mines 
with regards to jobs and placed restrictions on ownership and control of the mines.48 
The Minerals Act 50 in 1991 replaced this earlier legislation. Post-apartheid 
legislation is led by the MPRDA of 2002; related legislature includes: the Mining 
Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967, the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996, the 
National Water Act 36 of 1998, the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 
1998 and the National Heritage Resources Act 36 of 1999. The later Acts reflect the 
social gains won by anti-apartheid constituencies, especially related to worker and 
environment safety.49 
The MPRDA of 2002 legislates that all minerals belong to the nation as 
articulated in early liberation documents, specifically the Freedom Charter. The 
objectives set out by the Act are “(a) to recognise the internationally accepted right of 
the State to exercise sovereignty over all the mineral and petroleum resources within 
the Republic; and (b) to give effect to the principle of the State’s custodianship of the 
nation’s mineral and petroleum resources.”50 The MPRDA draws on not only an 
intergenerational discourse but also an ecological discourse of custodianship and 
sovereignty. This particular framing evokes a sense of righting the injustices of the 
past. The mineral resources are to be governed and stewardship taken on by a 
democratically elected state. But what does this effectively mean? Is the state the 
custodian for world markets or mining companies? Does BEE mean redistribution to 
a new elite or for the general good?  
As custodian, the state decides who are the necessary stakeholders. The 1998 
White Paper on minerals and mining policy reflects the various stakeholder interests 
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and consultations, which the “Ready to Govern” document referred to. The mining 
industry was seen as the primary stakeholder and the state would assure market-based 
and stable macroeconomic policy, creating an ideal business climate and an 
environment conducive for mineral development. The second stakeholders were the 
mining sector unions, whose concerns are outlined under the section titled “People 
Issues” and predominately relate to health and safety, housing, migrant labour and 
downscaling. A third was the environmental lobby, which placed pressure on the state 
to ensure its custodian role and the implementation of environmental laws, norms and 
standards.  
The state was a key stakeholder and driver, seeking to garner authority over 
the previous whites-only sector, to collect revenue and transform its political clout 
over an historically powerful sector. It sought to do this through establishing new 
governance structures as well as acting as a custodian and arbitrator of the nation’s 
natural resources. It further saw its role to transform the sector, with a specific 
understanding that the problems in the mining sector were mainly due to racial 
inequity that had been established in the past.  
In seeking to address this inequality, the MPRDA fostered black economic 
empowerment in the belief that this could mend the historically apartheid-led mining 
sector.51 It drew on various BEE models such as equity ratios and quotas, mining 
allocation rights, preferential financial and leading schemes and so on. For redress in 
the mining sector, the Act “dispensed with the notion of mineral rights or rights to 
minerals which before 1 May 2004 were held by private persons.”52 In so doing, the 
MPRDA sought to change ownership distribution, seeking to give advantage to the 
previously disenfranchised.  
Gavin Capps argues that the MPRDA of 2002 has not lived up to its 
promises.53 He claims that deracialisation of the mineral sector and nationalising 
minerals rights has not translated into social transformation or redistribution but 
instead was “designed to accelerate capital accumulation.”54 In other words, the 
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deracialisation of mineral licenses or mine ownership has not altered or improved the 
socio-economic conditions of those previously disadvantaged. He argues that the 
Minerals Development Bill (MDB), which later became the MPDRA, was a policy in 
which the “state’s influence within the mining industry would be ‘confined to orderly 
regulation and the encouragement of equal opportunities for all citizens in mineral 
development.’”55 
The MPDRA, Mining Charter and BEE policies have created a small black 
mining elite, which continues to mushroom with seemingly little regard for mining-
affected communities, workers and their environment. The Mining Charter notes that 
“it is government’s stated policy that whilst playing a facilitating role in the 
transformation of the ownership profile of the mining industry it will allow the market 
to play a key role in achieving this end and it is not the government's intention to 
nationalise the mining industry.”56 This thus begs the question of whether and how 
the deracialisation of the mining sector improves the living and socio-economic 
conditions of mineworkers and mining communities. 
4.5.2 The National Development Plan  
The National Development Plan 2030 (NDP), published in 2012, advances various 
articulations of how the ANC-led state views concerns for the environment and 
development related to minerals and mining. The 2011 state-commissioned diagnostic 
report says that the “economy is unsustainably resource intensive” and that the 
country “is not only a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions – it is also particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change on health, livelihoods, water and food, 
with a disproportionate impact on the poor, especially women and children.”57 The 
chief concern of the NDP, despite the diagnostic report, is that “too few people work” 
and therefore argues for economic growth as the key means to development.58  
The NDP aims to use South Africa’s so-called comparative advantage of 
minerals and mining, to grow the economy. According to the NDP, to grow the 
economy they propose “increasing exports, focusing on those areas where South 
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Africa already has endowments and comparative advantage, such as mining, 
construction, mid-skill manufacturing, agriculture and agro-processing, higher 
education, tourism and business services.”59 
Although “South Africa holds large global shares in platinum group metals, 
gold, diamonds, manganese, coal, iron ore and uranium” the NDP states that “over the 
past decade, domestic mining has failed to match the global growth trend in mineral 
exports due to poor infrastructure, alongside regulatory and policy frameworks that 
hinder investment.”60 The NDP argues that South Africa should capitalise on the 
commodities demand. To do so, measures should be taken to improve infrastructure 
and stability to attract investors, and “this will enable the mining sector to deploy the 
skills, resources, know-how and capital that are available, and allow government to 
raise much more tax revenue than it does at present.”61 
At the core of this plan is a neoliberal approach to development, where the 
state sees economic growth as having a trickle-down effect, thus enabling it to 
distance itself from earlier notions of redistribution and equitable use of natural 
resources and endowments. The role of the state is now to ensure that nothing hinders 
“doing business” in South Africa. At best, the state will introduce “policy instruments 
to encourage the private sector to change ownership patterns includ[ing] voluntary 
scorecards, procurement regulations, licensing arrangements (such as in 
telecommunications and mining) and development finance.”62 This is in keeping with 
the narrow BEE transformation approach of the state.  
It is unclear exactly how the NDP intends to meaningfully reduce the 
unsustainable resource economy when it appears that the economy will continue to 
reinforce its mineral-energy fossil fuel industrialisation approach. The NDP notes that 
“research suggests that it is possible to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
electricity production and still grow the minerals and mineral processing sectors.”63 It 
is, however, clear that the NDP continues on an old growth path of comparative 
advantage and extractivism while it tinkers around the ecological crisis.  
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4.6 Mineral and mining policy embedded within a global discourse of 
sustainable development 
To view the South African mineral and mining policy outside a global frame would 
miss the overlapping and inherited global discourse of sustainable development and 
minerals as a natural resource. This discourse influenced the MPRDA, although the 
South African mineral and mining policy takes on its own particular permutations in 
seeking racial redress.  
4.6.1 Inter-generational and intra-generational equity 
The state, private sector actors and civil society embrace the language of sustainable 
development, which adopts an ecological discourse of inter- and intra-generational 
equity. Already as early as 1972, the Stockholm declaration stated that “the natural 
resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially 
representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of 
present and future generations through careful planning or management, as 
appropriate.”64 The idea of ensuring “equity” of natural resources between and within 
generations is a hallmark of this discourse.  
In 1987, the United Nations report, “Our Common Future,” used and 
sharpened the intergenerational discourse. This report states that “many present 
efforts to guard and maintain human progress, to meet human needs, and to realize 
human ambitions are simply unsustainable …They draw too heavily, too quickly, on 
already overdrawn environmental resource accounts to be affordable far into the 
future without bankrupting those accounts.”65 The report went on to say that “[t]hey 
may show profit on the balance sheets of our generation, but our children will inherit 
the losses. We borrow environmental capital from future generations with no 
intention or prospect of repaying.”66 To this end, they further added: “humanity has 
the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.”67  
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Dorceta Taylor writes that the intergenerational discourse predates the United 
Nations Declarations and Summits. She refers to this framing of ecological injustice 
as the “inequities of intergenerational and intragenerational resource consumption” 
and states that it can be traced back to the start of environmental discourse.68 It has 
been deployed effectively ever since. She outlines how, from 1906, John Muir and 
Gifford Pinchot used intergenerational injustice arguments.69 Muir, for instance, 
argued that the current generation had to be mindful of future generations.70 Pinchot 
challenged this, according to Taylor, and “considered the rights of current generations 
to be paramount in resource decision making.”71 He argued that it was unjust to 
preserve resources for future generations at the expense of current generations.72 
This generational discourse is embedded within the mineral and metals 
framework. The MPRDA negotiates an imperative of this generation to act in the 
interests of future generations. It is obliged to extract now to promote current 
development but not at the expense of future generations. The injustice is framed as 
the current generation should not deprive the next generation of resources or mineral 
wealth. But it also constrains the right of the current generation to access resources, 
given the legacy of apartheid.  
There are three interrelated assumptions, which are necessary to problematise 
in relation to how the generational discourse is employed in this context of minerals 
and metals policy. First, is the assumption that the current generation has to a large 
extent created and contributed to the current ecological crisis. Second, is the 
assumption that this generation knows what is best for the next generation. Now, 
presumably, they are able to act (where before they were unable to) in the interest of 
future generations. Third, is the assumption that this generation has the tools to 
overcome its own inadequacies without any historical trace of how it has come to 
inhabit the current ecological crisis.   
The solution to the ecological crisis should be seen as the coming together of 
past, present and future generations, as it requires new ways of being, acting and 
thinking, not for tomorrow, but for now. The idea of inter-generational equity and the 
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mantra of the sustainable development discourse, with its constant reference to “doing 
right” for future generations, obscures not “doing right” for the current generation – 
the women and men who are made invisible and who experience the consequences of 
ecological degradation daily.  
The intergenerational discourse uses a strategy of infinite referral. This allows 
for a sustainable development project, premised on the logic of efficiency, to go 
undetected. It evokes concerns and notions of justice for future generations but it does 
not allow for collective action today in meaningful, concrete ways, for example, to 
enforce measures to decrease global warming.  
4.6.2 Converging economic and environmental values 
Key to the sustainability approach, is an assumption that economic and environmental 
values can converge based on an understanding that “of all things in the world, people 
are the most precious” and in this regard, “there are broad vistas for the enhancement 
of environmental quality and the creation of a good life … For the purpose of 
attaining freedom in the world of nature, man must use knowledge to build, in 
collaboration with nature, a better environment.”73 The sustainable development 
approach sees better living conditions as only commensurate with growth.  
 In 1992, the Rio Earth Summit agreed on the main analysis of the 1987 report, 
“Our Common Future.” This was significant because it was a global 
acknowledgement of the constraints placed on the planet, and represented a victory 
for the environmental movement. Ten years later, in 2002, the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) attempted to re-ignite commitments to the core 
principles of facilitating harmony between values of economic growth and 
environmental protection. The critiques and evidence levelled at two such 
contradictory and divergent principles could not be accommodated. Instead, the 
WSSD side stepped the contradictions and sought to acknowledge the huge strides 
made in development and improvements in countries of the global North after the end 
of the World War II. Despite the gains of these advancements in technology, science 
and economic growth in the global North, however, the world has experienced 
increases in poverty, widening gaps of inequality between the countries of the North 
and South, environmental degradation and ecological stress. The WSSD analysis 
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hides the fact that the gains and economic growth in the global North after World War 
II have been based on the plunder of nature and the super-exploitation of the South. 
The WSSD fostered a discourse of sustainable development, which 
encouraged Third World countries to follow the development model of the North. If 
these countries replicate the gains of the global North, then the global South, it is 
alleged, can catch up and narrow the poverty gap. Industrialised countries need to 
manage resource use in order to allow developing countries to meet the needs of their 
societies, as well as ensure future generations a healthy environment. David 
Carruthers writes that “sustainable development now stands as the dominant discourse 
on the environment-development problematic” because it promises to “defuse 
longstanding tensions between environmental protection and economic growth, [as] 
nearly everyone favors it, including individuals, firms, national and local 
governments, militaries, and the gamut of non-state actors.”74 
With sustainable development as a broad, all-inclusive and non-prescriptive 
principle, countries around the world have embraced the ecological discourse of 
economic growth with environmental protection, thus uncritically reinforcing the 
current economic development model.75 Governments, North and South, their 
institutions, international agencies, policies and guidelines seek socio-economic-
political-environmental compacts with various stakeholders. In so doing, James 
Meadowcroft argues that the concept of sustainable development is “intimating both 
change and continuity, it urges the abandonment of inequitable and environmentally 
unsound practices while avoiding any suggestion of direct assault on established 
centres of political and economic power.”76 An account of the past 40 years, shows an 
intensification of the commodification and privatisation of nature, extorted through 
austere neoliberal policies. The most vivid examples of nature being sold off and 
commodified are seen through the World Trade Organisations (WTO) trade and trade-
related agreements.  
John Dryzek and David Schlosberg write that sustainable development is an 
approach based on a belief that “economic growth and environmental protection can 
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be brought together in productive harmony on a global scale.”77 They further add that 
a “commitment to redistribution from the rich to the poor now and in the future is 
thrown in for good measure, though this redistribution should not prove especially 
painful for the rich.”78 Dryzek and Schlosberg suggest a falsehood inherent in the 
sustainable development approach as well as a misreading of the causes of the current 
strain on the environment. The sustainable development framework works within the 
current system that has contributed much to ecological destruction. How then, as an 
approach, would it be able to offer any genuine transformation?  
If sustainable development works to maintain the current economic system, 
then it is important to recognise that the system of capitalism imposes certain limits.79 
Wood asks, “what kinds of oppression does capitalism require, and what kinds of 
emancipation can it tolerate?”80 According to her, the system is self-reliant on an 
“expansionary, competitive and exploitative logic of capitalist accumulation.”81 She 
argues that capitalism cannot  
 
avoid ecological devastation. It may be able to accommodate some degree of ecological care, 
especially when the technology of environmental protection is itself profitably marketable. 
But the essential irrationality of the drive for capital accumulation, which subordinates 
everything to the requirements of the self-expansion of capital and so-called growth, is 
unavoidably hostile to ecological balance.82 
 
4.7 Nationalisation of mineral wealth  
Calls for nationalisation or people-centred mining or to “make natural resources work 
for the people” are seen as alternatives to the dominant approach to mining.83 
Historically, nationalisation has been presented as an alternative to extractivism. The 
alternative is to prioritise state sovereignty and local people over transnational 
corporations. Eduardo Gudynas says that “beyond the ownership of the resources, the 
rules and operations of productive processes that focus on competitiveness, 
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efficiency, maximising of profits and externalising impacts are the same as before.”84 
In the late eighties and through the nineties these calls were echoed in people-centred 
development demands. In the early 2000s they were part of the broader calls of the 
anti-privatisation and anti-globalisation movements. Alberto Acosta points out that 
“the extractivist mode of accumulation seems to be at the heart of the production 
policies of both neoliberal and progressive governments.”85 
Today, calls for nationalisation of mines can be heard from the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF). At the Alternative Mining Indaba (AMI), a civil society 
event, the overarching theme was “make natural resources work for the people.” 
Articulations for a more people-centred mining approach are prevalent within groups 
who are challenging mining corporations for compliance, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and social economic justice.  
The Bench Marks Foundation’s report “Coping with Unsustainability” says 
that the Lonmin mining company did not meet the minimum standards of CSR, 
outlined in the King Reports.86 The report states that “Lonmin fails to live up to its 
own sustainability goals. If it is true that it performs better or much better than most 
of its mining company peers, which we have no reason to question, its failure 
indicates that South African mining in general is not sustainable.”87 Bench Marks 
shows the lack of positive social and environmental progress over a ten-year reporting 
period. The report concludes, “Lonmin Plc has won awards for its environmental and 
socio-economic performance. The company says it is ‘best in class’ in sustainability. 
But it is running an unsustainable project. If Lonmin is ‘best in class’, platinum 
mining in South Africa is not environmentally, socially or politically sustainable.”88 
The Maximising the developmental impact of the people’s mineral assets: State 
Intervention in the Minerals Sector (SIMS) policy discussion document 
commissioned by the ANC is an attempt to engage with a call for nationalisation of 
the mines and mining compliance. This is where the ANC Youth League placed 
nationalisation on the national political agenda in 2009. The ANC SIMS resolution 
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argued that the development state “… must ensure that our national resource 
endowments, including land, water, minerals and marine resources, are exploited to 
effectively maximise the growth, development and employment potential embedded 
in such national assets, and not purely for profit maximisation.”89  
The ANC SIMS position is mining-for-development. It is therefore not about 
any principled position against mining; rather it is about ensuring economic growth. 
The Economic Freedom Front (EFF) policy on nationalisation of minerals and metals 
is less vague. It puts forward that “owing to the character of the South African 
economy and the aspirations of the people for economic freedom, state ownership and 
control of strategic sectors of the economy should be the foundation for sustainable 
economic transformation in South Africa.”90 At the heart of the EFF’s proposed 
economic transformation call is that “[t]he transfer of wealth from the minority should 
fundamentally focus on the commanding heights of the economy. This should include 
minerals, metals, banks, energy production …”91 
The EFF says that private companies are short changing the poor, the 
communities around the mines and the country in which mining occurs because the 
revenue leaves the country. The problem lies not with extraction and mining per se, 
but rather with the fact that only a few people benefit. The problem is the lack of 
distribution and the inequitable share of the profits. Many people should benefit and it 
is unfair that the lion’s share of wealth is disproportionately claimed by the already 
wealthy. One aspect of the EFF’s and ANC Youth League’s calls for nationalisation 
appears concerned with challenging South African white monopoly capital.  
The EFF’s call for “economic freedom in our lifetime” is an important aspect 
of an emancipatory project. Their call for nationalisation is tied to this, but their 
policy on minerals and mining does not fully account for the fallout of extractivism 
and the destructive nature of mining on people and nature. Nationalisation of mines 
do not take into account the ecological, social, health and long-term economic fallouts 
of mining.  Samantha Hargreaves argues that resource nationalisation can also be 
referred to as neo-extractivism, which is  
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the growth of laws and policies that strengthen the role of the state in the exploitation and 
ownership of natural resources, presented by the South African state, global and regional 
institutions such as United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, and the African Development Bank, and global initiatives such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the African Progressive Panel, and 
international non-governmental organisations, such as Oxfam, as a reform trajectory that can 
support the state’s national development agenda, offer greater safeguards to the environment 
and benefit local communities.92 
 
It is important to ask if economic freedom is equivalent to other freedoms. 
Does economic freedom equal emancipation from other oppressions and 
exploitations?  
At the current juncture, given our understanding of the multiple crises and 
specifically, the extent and depth of the ecological crisis, we must pause and evaluate 
whether nationalisation and calls for people-centred mining – serving the interests of 
industrialisation and development – can still be considered adequate alternatives. Are 
calls for mineral and metals extraction, as central to a development plan, job creation 
and social service delivery, a viable vehicle for an emancipatory project? 
Progressive organisations take a people-centred approach to natural resources, 
which is primarily a social and economic account of extraction and its impact.93 The 
approach argues that minerals and metals are public goods as opposed to private 
goods and, therefore, should not be sold as a commodity for private enrichment. 
Reclaiming minerals and metals as part of the global commons and social goods is 
important and begins to break down the alienation espoused when assigning minerals 
and metals as commodities.  
At a broad level this is significant in a society where profits trump community 
well-being. This is an emphasis on equitable sharing of mineral and metal gains. The 
challenge however, is that extraction per se is not being challenged but rather issues 
of distribution. A broader account of the ecological crisis and the mining problematic 
is required. Distributional questions neglect the ecological havoc created by extraction 
on both the natural environment and mine-affected communities.  
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Calls to “make natural resources work for the people” or “nationalise the 
mines” continue to prioritise extraction over both people and nature. These calls 
falsely assume that the only route to jobs is through extractivism and industrial 
development. It is these very mining jobs that perpetuate alienation. Is it possible to 
conceive of livelihoods, not jobs, as essential to an emancipatory project? In other 
words, could we imagine work that is not the subjugation of selling one’s labour to a 
boss on the market, but rather that which “overcomes ego-centeredness,” “utilises and 
develops [one’s] faculties,” and “join[s one] with other people in a common task, to 
bring forth goods and services needed for a becoming existence.”94 Could we 
incorporate the daily, unwaged work that so many do into a livelihood where what 
they do is acknowledged work, made visible and not diminished as less valuable?  
Calls for nationalisation assume that the problem in mining lies with the 
governance of mineral resources. It does not address as problematic the ownership 
over natural resources by many or the few. The prism of sustainable development 
hides this problem when it suggests that a balance can be created between extraction, 
economic development and environmental protection. This is perpetuated on multiple 
fronts, including  civil society groups. According to Farai Maguwu and Christelle 
Terreblanche, there was an open acknowledgement at the 7th Alternative Mining 
Indaba (AMI) in 2016 that “mining is harmful. Nevertheless, all argued that mining 
must continue and can be reined in: Mining is good for Africa because Africa needs 
development and must grow.”95 This discourse needs to be disrupted, as it closes off 
other possibilities and alternatives. Equally problematic is that it rests on an idea that 
we need to produce more commodities. 
The AMI 2016 communiqué, which is a far less bold statement than that made 
by the EFF and does not call for nationalisation, states that it is “desirous to serve as a 
link for dialogue between communities, business and government.”96 It furthermore 
calls “upon African governments, the United Nations, African Union, international 
financial institutions, transnational mining corporations and other corporate mining 
entities, [and] fellow civil society organisations to join hands with us in pursuing 
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justice in the exploitation of minerals and the benefits accruing therefrom.”97 The 
AMI call is reflective of how embedded a mining-fossil fuel development-industrial-
complex is, but it also curtails and undermines alternatives to mining such as “Leave 
the Oil in the Soil, the Coal in the Hole, and the Fracking Shale Gas under the 
grass.”98 Unfortunately, the AMI call is dangerous in the way it reinforces the ruse 
built on the jargon of sustainable development.  
The AMI dialogue is only possible because of a mutual pursuit “in the 
exploitation of minerals.” Beyond this mutual pursuit there is no equal ground, given 
the vastly differential power relations and interests of the groups being called upon to 
enter the dialogue. Equally problematic is the likening of governments and 
transnational corporations to each other. This points to another deceit perpetuated by 
mineral and metal extraction – mining corporations are not necessarily in the same 
place of origin as the mineral or metals extracted. Unlike minerals and metals and 
states, which have specific locations and borders, mining companies tend to be 
transnational and the parent company is often located in the North. States are meant to 
be accountable, transparent and governed by forms of democratic principles. This is 
not the case for transnational corporations. The power and status afforded to private 
mining companies is at least one valid reason to consider transforming them into 
public or state institutions through nationalisation.  
It is in this regard, that distribution and re-distribution issues could potentially 
be tackled with nationalisation or people-centred mining. This, however, does not 
tackle the deceit hidden by all forms of mining – be it small-scale, artisanal, female, 
national, private, joint, or BEE. That deceit is the normative stance that makes 
extraction permissible. In other words, “mining is harmful but necessary and 
essential.” This stance is held despite the evidence of the negative social, economic, 
political and ecological impact.99 Moreover, it is held despite the sub-human 
conditions that miners have to work in, within the extreme heat and darkness of the 
bowels and veins of the earth. This is where no human can or should live and where 
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night and day are one – to be a miner is almost to be a “prisoner of war, a criminal or 
a slave.”100 
Lipschitz’s Beyond the Curse, published by the IMF, is illustrative of the 
international discourse of minerals as natural resources. This discourse holds that 
minerals have the potential to transform societies and, in particular, well-endowed 
developing countries. Like AMI, the IMF seeks to “reap the benefits of resource 
wealth while avoiding the pitfalls” and importantly “to safeguard intergenerational 
equity.”101 The IMF discourse appears to have similar overtones as the discourse on 
nationalisation, in that both assume minerals and metals are key economic drivers. 
Beyond the Curse, however, favours management of minerals being in the hands of 
the private sector, such as transnational corporations, and discourages a 
nationalisation approach.  
4.8 The negotiated settlement as a mining settlement?   
Moeletsi Mbeki’s account of the negotiated settlement is in many ways a reflection of 
how the assumptions of mining-for-development extended into the negotiated 
settlement and into policy and public discourse. It offers us an understanding of how 
economic transformation in the mining sector is conceived of broadly in South Africa 
and sheds light on what “making mineral wealth work for the people” means in the 
context of the negotiated settlement.  
Economic transformation in South Africa, as outlined by Mbeki, is 
“parliamentary democracy + globalisation + BEE.”102 Critical in the equation is that 
BEE “entails wealth redistribution from economic oligarchs to the black upper middle 
class,” and, in exchange for parliamentary democracy, the country had to agree to 
economic globalisation.103 The economic oligarchs struck this deal so as to ensure a 
continued stream of cheap labour to work on the mines, as was the case during 
apartheid.104 
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Mbeki locates the mineral-energy complex (MEC) as central to the South 
African economic and political model. Drawing on Fine, as well as Marais and 
Terreblanche, Mbeki reasserts the particular nature of South African capitalism and 
how apartheid was central to ensuring cheap labour for the mineral and energy 
complex. He argues that the “primary objective of the economic oligarch was to 
ensure the preservation of the MEC.”105 His analysis that “South Africa is well 
endowed with natural resources, especially minerals and metals …[which] has created 
a unique form of capitalism … dominated by the extraction of minerals from the 
ground; their processing into metals through the use of electrical power and 
chemicals; and their sale to the rest of the world,” is a widely held view and evident in 
the government policy on mineral resources.106 Similar is the view that “minerals are 
a blessing to South Africa … they have helped kick-start a process of capital 
accumulation through attracting foreign direct investors and promoting the 
construction of physical infrastructure.”107 The endowment is a unique form of capital 
accumulation capacity and he posits the political economy of mineral extraction as the 
panacea for economic development woes in post-apartheid South Africa.  
Mbeki acknowledges the weaknesses such as “wastage of non-renewable 
assets, dependence on import technology and capital, and overexposure to volatile 
world markets” as well as the MEC’s “dependence on abundant, cheap, unskilled 
labour.”108 In his assessment, however, these weaknesses seem not to outweigh the 
gains. For him, the weaknesses are acceptable and acknowledged evils. His account of 
mining-for-development foregrounds accumulation and recognises that profits are 
made through the exploitation of cheap labour. The blessings of extraction and the 
unfortunate consequences for the worker and the environment are necessary costs for 
economic development for the greater good. 
Mbeki asserts that the form of liberal democracy negotiated in South Africa is 
based on maintaining the extraction of minerals and metals. However, he does not 
expose the collusion between capital (be it controlled or “footloose and fancy free,” 
national or transnational) and the state and economic and political elite, designed to 
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safeguard a system that elevates capital and the market above nature, community and 
people.   
South Africa’s negotiated settlement, its form of liberal democracy and its 
transformation project, all aim to ensure and facilitate a functioning and protected 
MEC and its subsidiary as the central means for capitalist accumulation.  
Mbeki’s portrayal of transformation in South Africa, as well as its 
consequences, shows us that any challenge to mining will put pressure on the elite and 
the state. In making this visible, as well as making clear the nature of South African 
democracy and transformation and its negotiated settlement, it exposes the inherent 
limitations of the post-apartheid environmental policies, the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources and Development Act, and attempts to tinker with the system. In this 
account of the negotiated settlement, we are able to see how the dominant relationship 
between society and nature is extended and consolidated through the process of the 
South African negotiated settlement. 
4.9 Is there an alternative to the illusion and deceits of mining?  
4.9.1 Broad focus of the mining discussion 
Global engagements and articulations on alternatives to mining are limited. There are 
even fewer spaces in South Africa where alternatives to mining are being discussed or 
where recognition of the deceits and illusions that mining produces are registered. In 
my concluding chapter, I will discuss one such case. It would however be a 
misreading to understand the call for alternatives to mining means an end to mining, 
as “basic or minimal mining would be necessary.”109 Central to the lack of 
engagement by the South African state with alternatives to mining, unions and civil 
society organisations, is their preoccupation with a particular industrial development 
path.  
 The South African state relies heavily on resource extraction and its mineral-
energy complex to spur so-called economic growth; it has done so both in the past and 
in the post-apartheid period. The state believes this will yield jobs or at the very least 
prevent further retrenchments. Unions, who although knowledgeable about, and 
engaged in climate change debates, hold a similar sentiment and are trapped by a 
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preoccupation of jobs, in a system that is in deep crisis.110 The unions maintain and 
strengthen social compacts with the state and business to prevent mining corporations 
from job-shedding at all costs. Media reports in 2015, for example, reflected that “the 
parties … formally signed off on 10 joint interventions, ranging from joint initiatives 
to promote South African minerals, to agreements to enhance productivity and an 
agreement that, when mines were intended to be mothballed or sold, saving jobs 
would be prioritised.”111 A key concern of the unions is workers’ jobs. This is the case 
even when the short-term costs are significant, and the long-term costs detrimental to 
mineworkers, mine-affected communities and nature. 
During the apartheid period, much scholarly and research work about mining 
centred on labour markets, workers’ histories and the proletarianisation of migrants 
and its impact.112 Other areas of focus have been on land dispossession, the creation 
of a black labour pool, migrant labour, trade unionism, capitalism and racism.113 
Trade unions were central in raising these issues and many progressive researchers 
and academics have focused much of their energy on mineworkers, unions and the 
appalling apartheid living conditions and exploitation. 
Since the transition to democracy, the discussions in the public domain on 
mining, largely driven by the ANC government, have focused on mining rights, titles 
and state custodianship. In particular, there has been an emphasis on deracialisation of 
the mining sector, specifically regarding mining rights and company ownership, as 
expressed through the BEE agenda.114 Trade unions, such as the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(AMCU), have focused on wage negotiations as well as creating health and safety 
regulations that protect mineworkers.  
The environmental fallout of mining, such as contamination of water causing 
acid mine drainage affecting quality of water, not to mention the huge water excesses, 
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air pollution, climate change as well as community exposure to toxins and pollution, 
has been a key concern of environmental organisations and NGOs working on 
extractives.115 These are critical issues. Mining-affected communities have focused on 
the lack of socio-economic benefits, as well as health and particularly HIV/AIDS 
related issues.116 Scholarly work tends to focus on communal rights, governance, 
traditional communities’ rights in mining areas and royalties. The related issues of 
land and mining specific to restitution and communal land have been areas of study, 
as are analyses of mining policy such as the MPRDA.117 NGOs’ main research focus 
has been human rights and mining. They have zoomed in on issues pertaining to 
accountability, transparency and CSR.118 Others focus on legal rights and governance 
issues of custodianship and environmental rights as set out in the constitution.119 
Some take up issues reflecting the violation of community rights by mining 
companies.  
AMI processes reflect these trends. One focus is on community monitoring 
with the intent to ensure environmental fallout and issues are addressed. This involves 
monitoring capacity, assessment tools, compliance of mining regulation and 
legislative and regulatory processes. Other focal points are artisanal and small-scale 
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mining, land, extractive industries and women. Another focus is on decriminalisation 
and vulnerability. The recent killing of anti-mining activists has become more 
prominent in South Africans’ awareness and will soon become a key focus area of the 
human rights work being done with regards to mining.120 Other focal points over the 
years at the AMI have been setting up commissions to investigate the establishments 
of markets; mainstreaming gender; and formation of guilds and associations. Mining, 
health and labour research mainly focuses on compliance and mitigating the most 
negative effects of mining.  
An area of NGO focus, which is also featured in political parties’ agendas 
with regards to mining, is on mining revenue governance. Here, the focus is on 
taxation and illicit financial flows.121 Other lead research centres focus on barriers to 
mining for new entrants to the sector. Most research engagement here is on technical 
policy solutions, capacity building and making mining “work” as best it can for 
people. In many instances, this perspective is driven by the “acceptance of mining as 
a predetermined development path.”122  
A key continuity of the mining discussion, from the apartheid period into the 
transition to democracy and the post-apartheid period, is its framing within economic 
imperatives, industrialisation, modernisation and the continued bifurcation of nature 
and society. This places enormous limits on rethinking mining in society. Issues of 
redress and equity for mining-affected communities are paramount in the new South 
Africa. This has been framed through the discourse of black economic empowerment, 
equal opportunity and equal access.  
Questions regarding the necessity of mining, or the necessary levels of 
extraction as well as the cost of mining on the environment, community and society, 
are mostly absent from the discussion. When these questions are considered, they are 
framed within an economic cost-benefit analysis, thus prioritising an economic 
perspective as well as reinforcing the logic of efficiency. 
Conceiving of mining, not in terms of “boundless production” but rather 
through a sufficiency lens, has not featured in the South African mining discourse. 
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Mining is still conceived of as central to South Africa’s economic and development 
transformation path and makes excessive consumption the priority and norm. If we 
take mining as a necessary aspect of an industrialised society and recognise its 
negative and devastating impacts, it need not preclude that profit-making and 
unlimited extraction are prerequisites.  
We could consider a different approach, one that is based on sufficiency as 
outlined by Princen in Chapter 2. In this regard, Princen’s principles of intermittency, 
sufficiency, capping and source are means to ensure that we mine for need and not 
want. In so doing, we could rebalance the ecological system.  
4.9.2 Deceits of mining and the illusion that mining is the solution 
The model of industrial development based on extractivism, which promises growth, 
jobs, disposable income, modernisation and catching up with and mirroring the North 
and the latest technologies, hides the social, ecological and political costs. 
Simultaneously, promoters of this model create an illusion that they are able to deliver 
on these promises. When the promises are not delivered on, they blame it on 
corruption, or institutional and capacity problems. Often the hidden story of Northern 
countries’ industrialisation is that it was and remains based on the exploitation of, and 
dependence on, the de-industrialisation of countries in the South.  
 Models of industrialisation based on extractivism as well as neo-extractivism, 
as outlined in Acosta’s work, are dependent on logics of efficiency, enclaves, 
Ricardian rents, waste, consumerism, excessive profits, distorted resource allocation, 
clientalism and “de-nationalisation of the economy.”123 These logics further facilitate 
“the concentration and centralisation of income and wealth” as well as the 
consolidation of political power in the hands of a few in a way that is often 
characterised by state authoritarianism.124 In addition, Acosta explains that this model 
“deterritorialises” the state. By this he means that “the state takes a relatively hands-
off attitude to oil and mining enclaves, leaving the responsibility for addressing social 
demands … in the hands of the companies. … in practice, these regions are often left 
outside the remit of national laws altogether.”125 
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The myth and illusion perpetuated by many governments, transnational 
corporations, global institutions, international NGOs and trade unions alike, is that 
mining is necessary and the best means to prosperity, development and jobs; it must 
be debunked. By the IMF’s own account, countries richly endowed with minerals and 
metals show high inequality and unemployment, especially when they are extractive-
dependent economies. It is an illusion that mining can create decent work. The very 
nature of extraction is violent. It is violent against the mineworkers, nature and 
mining communities. The social and environmental violence and destruction that 
mining creates is far from prosperous.126 
 The focus of unions on saving mining jobs must be interrogated.127 The social 
compact protects and shields mining corporations from the antagonism of workers 
and communities. Lest we forget that mining corporations are driven by a profit 
motive, consider that the share profit over the past three decades has increased 
dramatically, whereas wages have remained stagnant.128 The wage differential within 
companies has increased sharply, and the wages of the lowest wage earner and CEO 
reflects the deepening inequality. The recent study from AIDC on Lonmin Plc shows 
price-fixing, transfer-pricing and illicit transfer of funds. Mining companies have no 
interest in equitable redistribution to communities they affect. Nor do they wish to 
contribute revenue to the state or pay workers decent wages and provide decent 
housing.129 The Marikana strike and wage negotiations in 2013 shows evidence of one 
mining corporation, as an example, stockpiling and going to great lengths to avoid 
“externalities” and costs.  
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 It is important to locate the ideas of various trade unions that seek to freeze 
and save mining jobs within a broader history. Trade unions in South Africa have had 
a long and close relationship with the national liberation movement, and therefore 
embody many of the ideas and perspectives of the ruling party. In particular, they tend 
to adopt the language and discourse of the Freedom Charter. In this regard, they have 
built their analysis on the postcolonial project of industrialisation, beneficiation of 
extractives, diversification and job creation.130  
 With the rolling back of import substitution and protections in the late 1980s, 
the opening up of the South African economy, and in particular trade and financial 
liberation, South Africa has seen the decimation of manufacturing and secondary 
sector jobs. Unions have lost memberships due to retrenchment, increased 
unemployment and the precarious nature of work in the period of globalisation. The 
close relationship to the tripartite alliance, the rhetoric of the national democratic 
revolution and BEE, combined with the dominant discourse of economic growth and 
sustainable development, has weakened the unions. Today, they are less responsive to 
the needs of the working class in general. The bureaucratisation of unions has created 
greater social distance between the base and leadership.  
At the broader civil society level, there is a critique levelled at mining 
corporations. One that has been put forward is a socio-economic and environmental 
justice and rights-based critique. Mining is harmful - NGOs, research and progressive 
rights-based legal institutes and civil society groups state this forcefully. The solution 
they offer, however, seems not to be “Leave the Oil in the Soil, the Coal in the Hole, 
and the Fracking Shale Gas under the grass.”131 There are few such calls. Instead, they 
maintain a similar approach to that of the state and unions. The mining-for-
development paradigm appears hegemonic. When and where mine-affected 
community groups state clearly “no to mining,” their voices are drowned out with 
calls to “make natural resources work for the people.” The case of the Amadiba 
community, discussed in the concluding chapter, is one such example.   
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 According to Naomi Klein, although many unions and social movements fight 
for social economic justice and against many forms of class oppression and 
dominance, they still demand and defend “dirty” coal mining jobs or call for 
“progressive support for government intervention in the market.”132 Klein argues that 
those on the left reinforce extractivism for industrialisation despite “voices … that 
identified the parallels between economic model’s abuse of the natural world and its 
abuse of human beings.”133 Here she mentions Karl Marx’s work, on the “natural laws 
of life itself.”134 She further notes that “feminist scholars have long recognised that 
patriarchy’s war against women’s bodies and against the body of the earth were 
connected to the essential, corrosive separation between mind and body – and 
between body and earth – from which both the Scientific Revolution and Industrial 
Revolution sprang.”135 
4.9.3 No more coal mining  
Where coal has been extracted for many years and the effects of environmental ill-
health are visible, both in water and air pollution or through disease, communities in 
KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Mpumalanga say “no more mining.” Unions, 
government and business alike are challenged by this call given that “[m]ining is one 
of South Africa’s biggest industries. The country is one of the world’s biggest coal 
producers, and a leading producer of a wide range of metals.”136 These mine-affected 
communities want to put an end to coal mining both in their own and in neighbouring 
areas. Mining-affected communities seek “legal protection to areas in which mining 
would be too harmful,” and specifically wish to “giv[e] priority to strategic water 
source areas.”137 
Recently, Mining-Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA) and the 
Mining and Environmental Justice Community Network of South Africa (MEJCON-
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134 Ibid. 
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Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 61–115, is also important in this regard. 
136 Centre for Environmental Rights, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, GroundWork, South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance, Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance, Highveld Environmental Justice Network and 
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SA) with the Legal Resources Centre, the Bench Marks Foundation, the Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies, and the Centre for Environmental Rights, made extensive 
submissions to the South African Human Rights Commission’s National Investigative 
Hearing on the underlying socio-economic challenges in mining-affected 
communities in South Africa.138 The numerous accounts by mine-affected 
communities make it clear that they do not benefit from the mining. They show that 
those who are paid to work in the mines or subsidise the mine – the social 
reproduction work in the nearby communities or from the sending areas – carry the 
effects of mining-for-capitalist development. The picture they paint is bleak. The 
costs are borne by miners, members of mining communities’ health and surrounding 
ecosystems.139  
According to a South African NGOs Joint Stakeholder Submission to the 
United Nations Universal Periodical Review 27th Session “[m]ining causes substantial 
environmental and social harm in South Africa. It depletes water supplies, pollutes the 
air, soil and water, and destroys ecosystems. Mining also destroys arable land, leading 
to a decline in food security.”140 This comprehensive submission affirms the 
preliminary findings of the Permanent People’s Tribunal on Transnational 
Corporations in Southern Africa in August 2016.141 The submission furthermore 
states that “[t]he environmental and human damage done by mining and by burning 
coal violates the human rights of hundreds of communities across South Africa.”142  
Struggles being waged by these mining-affected communities call for “NO mining” 
and demand immediate improvements of regulations and standards, as well as 
mitigation mechanisms. The submission urges  
 
the Human Rights Council to recommend that South Africa take immediate steps to protect 
the rights of mining-affected communities, including … guaranteeing access to information 
and meaningful public participation in decision-making concerning mining approvals and 
regulation; effectively enforcing environmental laws relevant to mining, and providing an 
effective process to challenge proposed mines.143  
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Destruction of the Highveld Part 1: Digging Coal” (Pietermaritzburg: GroundWork, 2016), accessed November 9, 
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They recommend that additional steps require “coal-fired power plants to comply 
with domestic emissions standards; and protecting advocates for community and 
environmental protection from harassment and violence.”144 The submission further 
demands that such steps should be taken as mining “cause[s] substantial harm to the 
environment on which communities depend.”145  
When reading the submission, one can see clearly the human rights injustices 
and violations. Making these visible is necessary but it is equally necessary to bring to 
the fore the type of social relations that exist. It is important to identify who is 
violating whom, how lack of regulations permit this and the extent of the impunity. 
But critically rethinking the mining-for-capitalist-development paradigm is essential. 
This involves ecological-social thinking. How do we live better with one another and 
nature? It asks us to consider metal-waste recovery and recycling. It asks us to use 
and rely on less. It requires us to live simply. It asks us to question how industrialised 
countries and national local elites drain resources. It asks us to live in community 
within the ecological constraints and with each other. It asks us to evaluate if 
ecological-social living is possible within a highly commodified society, where all 
social relations are market exchange relations.  
If we apply human rights standards to mining, with its many facets, would the 
exploitation of nature – human and non-human – end? The human rights approach, 
perhaps without intending to, does not make fully expose the mining-for-capitalist-
development paradigm, which is inherently mining-for-profits-and-destruction. This 
prioritises mining-for-want over mining-for-need – these approaches are driven by 
two fundamentally distinct worldviews. The one requires and depends on the 
separation of nature and society and renders nature as a passive object.146 The other 
seeks ecological-social relations where relations are defined outside economic market 
relations.  
The human rights violations surrounding mining and coal-fired power in 
South Africa is dire. Over the past few years there has been growing solidarity 
between communities. Recently campaigns and mobilisations have emerged around 
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Just Transitions and Life After Coal.147 This, however, still remains in enclaves and 
pockets but is slowly growing in momentum and in the public arena. The campaigns 
focus predominantly on human rights and the indignity and tragedy of the fallout of 
mining, loss of life and assassination. It is not always clear if those in solidarity share 
the same views of the community who see mining-for-capitalist-development as 
fundamentally flawed.  
In the most recent report by GroundWork, they point out the flaws of mining 
as well as any promise of sustainable mining. They caution strongly against proposing 
that sustainable mining is possible. The report highlights that  
 
[c]ommunities are rising against coal. There are many spontaneous outbursts against existing 
mines with communities locking mine gates and refusing them the right to continue mining. 
The rebellions against mining in Arbor, in Carolina and in Belfast are not isolated instances. 
In the words of a song often heard at meetings of HEJN [Highveld Environmental Justice 
Network]: “asifune agenda ya macapitalist” (we don’t want the capitalists’ agenda).148 
4.9.4 Interconnectedness of the destruction of mineral extraction and the 
exploitation of work  
Many emancipatory projects have often neglected discussions about nature, women, 
race and sexuality. Instead, they have focused on economic exploitation, production 
and the working class as a homogenous group. This, however, should not be seen 
necessarily as inadequacies of an emancipatory project per se, but rather as reflective 
of the ideas, context, period, positionality and preoccupation of the specific struggles 
at hand. The current ecological crisis affords us an important moment to expand the 
emancipatory project and re-evaluate, enhance and change demands as well as deepen 
new questions and connections. In this regard, it is important to take into account 
Acosta’s argument that “[w]hile greater state control of these extractivist activities is 
important, it is not sufficient …When all is said and done, neoextractivism maintains 
and reproduces key elements of the extractivism that dates back to colonial times.”149 
According to Samantha Hargreaves, a “post-extractivist future will need to do 
away with processes and practices that involve the exploitation, appropriation and 
                                                
147 Hallowes and Munnik, “The Destruction of the Highveld,” 195–196. Also see John Karl Filitz, “Mining for 
Development? A Socio-ecological Study on the Witbank coalfield,” (MA thesis, UKZN, 2011). 
148 Hallowes and Munnik, “Destruction of the Highveld,” 195. 
149 Acosta, “Extractivism and Neoextractivism,” 73. 
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commercialisation of nature.”150 She argues that this future “does not preclude the 
extractivism of natural resources.”151 Instead it “presses for a different orientation—
for extractivism that is considered ‘indispensable’ to be decided by local and regional 
interests (as opposed to global corporations).”152 Specifically, she says that there 
ought to be “a preference for low-intensity and smaller-scale projects …for decisions 
to be informed by a desire to preserve ecosystems and reduce carbon emissions, and 
community participation and social control/ownership.”153 
In addressing the concerns raised by unions as well as other progressives 
about job losses in the mining sector, it is essential to make the illusions and deceits 
visible to begin to construct elements towards an alternative.154 How do we bring to 
the fore the interconnection between extraction of minerals and the exploitation of 
workers? In other words, how do we begin to see that ownership and control over 
nature, both human and non-human, is part of the same mode of production?  
 One way, is to ask first and foremost: could we mine based on a logic of 
sufficiency, instead of a logic of efficiency?155 Secondly, bring an end to the deceit 
that mineral extraction is the only path to development. Thirdly, demystify the notion 
that mineral extraction is an intrinsic right, and finally, develop alternatives and 
practices which strengthen a “just transition.”156  
Many progressives, Klein argues, are “born and raised inside the system, [and] 
though we may well see the dead-end flaws of its central logic, it can remain intensely 
difficult to see a way out.”157 “And how could it be otherwise?” she adds, given that 
“post-enlightenment Western culture does not offer a road map for how to live that is 
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not based on an extractivist, nonreciprocal relationship with nature.”158 Perhaps this is 
so, but the works of Merchant help us to see that this non-reciprocal relationship with 
nature is historically produced—in other words, not inevitable. Her works shows us 
exactly how the domination over nature and women occurs, as a result of a very 
specific set of interrelated ideas and practices.159 Similarly, the work of Princen offers 
us a road map out of the dead-end, drawing on historical ideas of the logic of 
sufficiency. Moreover, we are able to draw on both the historical work on Western 
culture before the seventeenth century, the “enclosures” and the separation between 
society and nature, as well as other non-Western traditions.160  
4.10  Women’s solidarity against the traumas of mining  
In 2011, at the COP17 process in Durban, Southern African women from mining-
affected communities, rural communities and groups organised around environmental 
issues came together under the unifying banner of the Southern Africa Rural 
Women’s Assembly. They made a call to end mining, specifically coal mining.161 
They argued that mining is destructive, causes pollution, creates ill health and 
dispossesses women of their land and livelihoods. These women did not call for jobs 
but rather an end to destructive processes that prevent them from creating and 
maintaining sustainable livelihoods.162 They demanded land and water. They 
demanded an end to GMOs, monocropping and pesticides. They also demanded an 
end to land and ocean grabs for mining and agro-fuels.163  
These rural and landless women have been consistent in their demands about 
and analysis of the destructive nature of mining, the impact of climate change on their 
livelihoods and the need to imagine a different society - one in which both women 
and nature are freed. They organise and build solidarity between their communities 
and shared struggles. Many of their struggles are around making women’s work 
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visible, fighting to be heard and organising resistance against the tribal authorities, 
ward councils, government, mining companies, seed companies, commercial farmers 
and so on. A key demand is land for livelihood and food sovereignty. They make 
ecological and gender justice central processes to building an emancipatory project. 
The seeds of an eco-feminist critique are being watered and nurtured; with each act of 
solidarity they develop and deepen their analysis.164 They do not have a blueprint of 
“the alternative” and correctly do not see this as a necessity, but as they struggle for 
their freedom, they are building the road of alternatives and simultaneously working 
to free nature and humanity.165  
Perhaps because they are rural and working class women, and seen as 
vulnerable and marginal, many of their critical calls are drowned out by the dominant 
civil society donor agencies, environmental organisations and university-led research 
institutes. Much can be learnt from these groups of powerful women who directly 
bear the brunt of climate change injustice and the multipronged consequences of the 
ecological crisis. Their struggles bring to the fore the illusions and false claims of 
sustainable extractivism.166 They give first-hand accounts of the disharmony between 
the social, economic and environment consequences that are created by a mining-for-
development paradigm, and they provide alternatives for society.167 
To a large extent, the various COP processes demonstrate that there is no 
genuine plan to roll back carbon emission and attempt to decrease rising temperatures 
on the planet, by the state or by industry. The RWA, WoMin, Amadiba Crisis 
Committee (ACC) and MACAU among others, challenge the deceit and the untruths 
of the national and global propaganda. Many of the women confront daily the 
consequences of drought and high temperatures – their livelihoods as small-scale 
farmers are directly under threat. They tell of state officials and mining companies 
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around them doing business as usual.168 Rural and urban working class women, 
especially those in mining-affected communities increasingly carry a heavier burden 
as the social, economic, ecological, racial, gendered, bodied, sexual and hetero-
normative inequalities widen and persist in South Africa.  
The very act of extraction is an act of alienation and objectification. If this 
extraction is central to the process of making metals and minerals objects, then the act 
of mining as waged work is paramount to embedding and reinforcing metals and 
minerals as “things”. Mining as wage-work is therefore instrumental to alienation and 
the deceit of jobs through mining. This wage-work occurs presumably at the point of 
production. It is by exploiting the waged worker that profits are made, or so we are 
told. But are his wages enough to reproduce himself and the household he is part of? 
Is the profit only due to the exploitation of the mineworker at the point of production?  
This wage he uses to buy other things to survive: food, clothes, shelter, 
airtime, beer, education for his kids, transport to get to work, etc. But this wage is not 
enough to buy all the goods and services that he requires to live and fully reproduce 
himself – making food, washing clothes, or cleaning the place where he sleeps - let 
alone enough to fulfil his obligations towards his sending area, such as caring for his 
children, tending to the fields, repairing the hut, looking after his parents and 
extended family and so on. These goods and services are made invisible, bundled off 
into obligations and made the responsibility of women. The social reproductive work 
is done and fully subsidised by women and children. It is not paid for by the wage.  
The social reproduction work, done mainly by women beyond the gateways of 
the mining company – in the community and home – predominately unpaid, 
unacknowledged and invisible, is a key aspect of work in mining-affected 
communities.169 This work is understood as the work that “town women or country 
wives” do to “take care of their families.”170 It is their supposed “duty” and role as 
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mother, wife, sister, girlfriend, girl-child etc., to care. Over time, this division of 
labour has become naturalised and expected. More dangerously, it is referred to “as a 
labour of love.”171 It is unpaid work and done for men. The work of Federici shows 
that we need to “expand the Marxian analysis of unwaged labor beyond the confines 
of the factory and, therefore, to see the home and housework as the foundation of the 
factory system, rather than its ‘other.’”172 
Alternatives to extractivism need to include the reconceptualisation of work and 
associated valued work: who defines what work matters and should be paid? 
Specifically, it requires notions of purposeful and meaningful work, which does not 
alienate and objectify but instead reconnects people and their labour to nature and to 
one another. It is necessary to move beyond normalising the kinds of wage-labour in 
mining that have been historically only fit for “a prisoner of war, a criminal or a 
slave.”173 As argued by Amaranta Herrero and Louis Lemkow, it is necessary to point 
out the “environmentally blind discourse” which creates “the idealization of the 
miner.”174  
                                                                                                                                      
by the unions. In the REC, this kick-started a process of discussion about women’s demands around reproductive 
work. What would happen, and what sort of solidarity could be called upon, if the women of Marikana demanded 
a living wage for the social reproductive work they did? This conversation and analysis continues within the 
organisation and is an important political process. 
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Chapter Five: Fishing – Turning Communities into Factories  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter argues that fish are under threat, as many fish stocks are depleted and 
overexploited.  It shows that the state goes to great lengths to have control over fish 
stocks, and dominates the marine commons through its policies.  Yet the very nature 
of fish makes for a somewhat different relationship than that which humans have with 
land or minerals and metals. Unlike land or mineral and metals, fish is food. The 
mobility of fish as well as human beings’ dependence on the ability of fish to 
reproduce, makes control over fish different.  
The historical governance of ocean resources by coastal communities and small-
scale fishers was undermined and replaced to favour modern practices. Today in 
South Africa, we bear witness to the far-reaching effects of the interrelated dynamics 
of shifting political and economic interests, the consequences of the Scientific 
Revolution and its conception of nature and industrialisation, as well as the 
commodification of fish and technological advancement, on fish and the marine 
commons. 
What fish were and are today is discussed in this chapter. The chapter argues 
that fish as nature, life, food and community has become transformed over time into a 
commodity and object due to the changing conception of nature.  
5.2 Transforming the fishing commons  
The ocean makes up over two thirds of the earth’s surface and is integral to the health 
of the entire ecological system. Marine life and fish in particular, play a significant 
role in sustaining human life. Rachel Carson’s The Sea Around Us shows how we are 
connected to the sea and fish and to this day “[carry] in our veins a salty stream in 
which the elements sodium, potassium and calcium are combined in almost the same 
proportions as in sea water.”1 Carson’s account of how “the lands rose and [as] the 
seas receded a strange fish-like creature emerged on the land” and “the stream of life 
poured on. New forms evolved, some old ones declined and disappeared,” is 
                                                




suggestive of our intimate and ancient relationship with the sea, and fish in 
particular.2 
For millions, this relationship is under constant threat. Fish and land, unlike 
minerals and metals, are central parts of South African coastal communities’ cultural 
and social history. The transformation of the conception of fish is “closely entwined 
with the history of land occupation, use and control” but has a different history than 
that of minerals and metals in South Africa although it is tied up in the mineral 
revolution and the process of industrialisation of the country.3  
Carson puts forward that “in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, under the 
stimulus of fierce competition for the wealth of the East Indies, the finest charts were 
prepared by private enterprise. The East India companies employed their own 
hydrographers, prepared secret atlases, and generally guarded their knowledge of the 
sailing passages to the East as one of the most precious secrets of their trade.”4 In this 
passage we see how the command and control over ocean routes was critical to 
imperial expansion. The expansion was tied to an emerging mechanistic view of 
nature, which today is dominant.5  
As a result of the imperial expansion that started in the seventeenth century, 
fishing in South Africa gradually transformed and altered as it became commercial 
and industrial. Commodification of fish has placed pressure on coastal communities 
to alter how they relate to fish and the marine commons. Where commercialisation of 
fishing occurred on the West Coast, for example, factories quickly arose. As a result 
many of the fishing communities that made their livelihood and ensured their 
independence from the colonial authorities through fishing were excluded from the 
ocean and forced into factories.  
5.3  Fishing historically  
For communities living alongside coasts and rivers, fishing has inevitably been part of 
community livelihoods, food sovereignty and a way of life for centuries. Historically, 
coastal and ocean commons were shared, formed an essential part of communal life 
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and were central to community governance. Marine commons were seen as part of a 
collective heritage to be cared for and revered. These commons were essential to the 
cultural, social and political systems of the community. Yet, as illustrated through 
Merchant’s work discussed in Chapter 1, we come to understand that during the 
seventeenth century the balance between livelihoods, food sovereignty and ecology 
began to shift with the emergence of enclosures, industrialisation and modern 
economic life.   
Rögnvaldur Hannesson argues that “the oceans are, or were, the last commons. 
No single state used to have jurisdiction at sea outside a narrow belt, which as late as 
the middle of the twentieth century was only 3 nautical miles wide.”6 Communities at 
the waterside, who were regulated by communal rights and collective needs, came 
under pressure due to commercial fishing practices. Where once a society had most 
likely been governed by respect for the oceans, its cosmology and gods, these beliefs 
became ridiculed.7 Rule by the tide, moon and the community was slowly replaced by 
a different worldview, today considered as modern. Historically, fishing had a social 
component and was considered an all-encompassing activity for those living near 
rivers and oceans. It was part of a cultural way of living and identity for communities 
who sustained their existence alongside these coasts.8  
With the process of industrialisation, with its changed social relations and in 
particular new technology such as cold storage, fishnets and eventually radar 
detection, the scale of fishing changed.9 Little fishing boats and line fishing gave way 
to the predominance of huge privately owned trawlers. Fishing gradually changed 
from subsistence and small-scale to industrial and commercial. Another major shift 
occurred: where once fishers cast their lines in the early morning or paddled out on 
small boats in collectives, they became labourers on trawlers. The large-scale and 
global exploitation of marine resources became possible with deep-sea fishing. The 
scale, depth and extent of what could be caught altered dramatically. These 
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technologies transformed fishing communities and the oceans. The customary curing 
and drying of fish altered. Using trawlers meant that fish could be bought frozen, 
vacuum packed and canned.  
With colonialism, industrialisation and modernisation, fish as in the case of 
land, came to be seen as a natural resource to be harvested and exploited for economic 
gain, separating it from its social and historical embeddedness in the community. 
With these changes unfolding in fisheries, concerns were raised in the 1960s with 
regard to the governance, regulation and management of the ocean commons. To this 
day, Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” has a firm influence over the approach to 
ocean commons.10 Hardin, as outlined in detail in Chapter 2, argued that the ruin of 
the commons was as a result of “open access” and that “the oceans of the world 
continue to suffer from the survival of the philosophy of the commons.”11 This 
orthodox economic logic fostered the conception of fish mainly as an economic good 
and commodity.  
Today, fish is bought as industrial raw material, protein feed for animals, a 
commodity share as well as a product prepared—fresh, frozen, smoked and cured—
for export to foreign markets. The commodification of fish and the expansion of 
commercial fisheries drove overfishing, overexploitation and consequent depletion of 
fish stocks in the seas.12 As these processes unfolded and took hold, limited 
consideration of the consequences was accounted for, as the processes occurred 
within a framework driven by a belief that the economic good, as defined by 
corporate profit, was the answer for society.  
These processes and the transformed conception of fish make the consequences 
of commercial fishing, stock depletion and the new scale of human consumption of 
fish less obvious. Likewise, changes to small coastal fishing communities were 
ignored and these communities passed off as outdated and traditional. In contrast, 
commercial fishing was modern, scientific and represented progress.  
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5.4  Fishing in South Africa  
In South Africa, fishing activities predate the colonial period. The Khoisan used tidal 
pools to catch fish and shellfish on the eastern coast and the well-known 
“strandlopers” (roughly translated as “beach combers”) lived off coastal harvests prior 
to the arrival of the Dutch settlers in the seventeenth century.13 Settler diaries 
document instances of strandlopers using lines and spears to fish.14 Fishing 
communities on the West Coast of the Cape were established by the seventeenth 
century.15 These fisher folk used small boats in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries to live off the sea and through fishing maintained a significant measure of 
independence from colonial rule.16 Jackie Sunde notes that fishing was “one of the 
few options available to freed slaves following the emancipation of slavery.”17  
Sunde, drawing on the works of van Sittert, Dennis and Williams, argues that 
“archival research and oral histories indicate that these small-scale fishing 
communities in the Western Cape evolved distinctive customary fishing practices and 
associated cultural identities.”18 Sunde’s study argues that along the Eastern Cape 
coast, there was and is alternative governance of the coast and marine life. She 
contrasts colonial and Western governance of fisheries and the ocean to indigenous 
governance, showing how in the Cape, “where the local fishers became subject to the 
reach of the various colonial authorities as early as 1652, the majority of the coastal 
dwellers along the eastern seaboard of the country continued to access and use marine 
resources in accordance with African customary systems.”19 Drawing on the work of 
Hammond-Tooke and Hunter, Sunde argues that “although primarily herders and 
pastoralists, there is evidence that the tribes that settled in the coastal region … have 
used marine resources for a range of uses as far back as living memory extends.”20 
For two centuries after colonial arrival, subsistence and small-scale fishers 
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beyond the reach of the colonial administration continued to relate to nature 
(specifically forests and fish) as they had before.21 According to Sunde, from the 
1930s, “the State embarked on a determined path towards shifting the locus of 
governance firmly in its favour. In terms of the Sea Shore Act of 1935, the authority 
to manage fisheries shifted from the provinces to the State, thus attempting to gain a 
measure of control over the lucrative and rapidly expanding commercial fishing 
sector, located along the Western seaboard.”22 As a result of these regulations, van 
Sittert argues that subsistence and artisanal fishers were forced into commercial 
industrial fisheries.23 
Sunde argues that although the abovementioned regulations “placed increasing 
restrictions on subsistence and artisanal fishers and brought them under the control of 
the industrial sector, steadily eroding the customary access and use rights of local 
fishers,” these regulations did not have much bearing on the Eastern Cape.24 
Furthermore, Sunde argues, during apartheid areas outside the designated Marine 
Protected Areas (MPA) remained unaffected by colonial and apartheid marine 
regulations, such that “in the Eastern Cape the local fisheries beyond the borders of 
the marine reserves remained relatively uncommercialised and did not attract the 
attention of policy makers and law enforcement.”25 
The historical dominance of state-supported commercial fisheries meant that 
small-scale fishers have fought to be recognised in the new dispensation.26 Due to 
resistance and organisation over the past twenty years, subsistence and small-scale 
fishers are now legally recognised in marine policy.27 The work of Sunde and Isaacs 
brings to light the extent to which government stalled and frustrated small-scale 
fishers, but also how NGOs drew on both a human rights-based framework as well as 
customary law to affirm and secure the rights of fisher folk in post-apartheid South 
Africa.  
According to Sunde,  
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at the time that the Policy on Small-scale Fisheries was gazetted in June 2012, communities 
along the coast in the Northern and Western Cape provinces had begun asserting their 
customary rights … notwithstanding the fact that their customary systems of marine resource 
use and governance had been greatly undermined by the imposition of apartheid management 
policies over the past 60 years.28  
 
It is clear that today and in the past, as pointed out by van Sittert below, South 
Africa’s commercial fisheries are dominant and supported by state institutions and 
resources.  
Lance van Sittert demarcates three distinct discourses within South African 
fisheries as pre-war, inter-war and post-war.29 The pre-war period (1890–1918) 
adopted a colonial discourse focused on securing imperial dominance. It focused both 
on mapping sea routes and developing marine science to overturn local folk systems. 
The focus during the inter-war period (1918–1939) was to bureaucratise marine 
science. At the same time, local white fisheries were encouraged, with a view to 
industrialisation. State policies were put in place to establish a fishing-for-growth 
paradigm. This particular process of industrialisation undermined longstanding pre-
colonial community-ocean relations as well as traditional subsistence coastal fishing 
communities and their way of life on the West and East Coast.30  
The inter-war discourse “posited free market competition as natural and 
progressive, leading inexorably to a more efficient state of production.”31 Free market 
policies caused tight competition between inshore fishers and deep-sea fishers. During 
this period, according to van Sittert, the Pact government was concerned about 
impoverished fisherman and poor white-ism. As a result, the State intervened in the 
fishing industry. As early as the 1930s there were already concerns about overfishing, 
but attempts to introduce conservation laws were met with “stiff resistance from 
trawling, crayfish canning and inshore fishing industries.”32  
The post-war discourse shifted from free market to state support. This was an 
interventionist approach and the state actively took control of the marine commons. 
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Van Sittert argues that the pre-war marine discourse was “recast [from its] biological 
model of the marine environment and human-animal interactions in strictly economic 
terms, as a national resource threatened with destruction by unbridled competition in 
an industry whose sole aim was to maximize earnings.”33 To this end, “state 
intervention to avert a tragedy of the commons” was called upon.34 Accordingly the 
State issued rights in line with Hardin’s call to save the commons.35  
The delineation of the discourses into these three different periods helps us to 
understand the shifts that took place. Importantly, it also shows us the various 
political, economic, social and environmental influences that affect how fish has come 
to be seen by the state. Of equal significance, is to observe that the accompanying 
forms of indigenous marine governance were ignored, obliterated or denied. Sunde’s 
work clearly suggests distinctive African customary processes and relationships to 
fishing and marine commons which predate the colonial period, much like land but 
unlike minerals and metals. The period after apartheid, as will be outlined below, has 
taken on distinct but similar features to the apartheid period. Issues pertaining to 
sustainable development, small-scale fisher rights, feeding the nation and aquaculture 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
5.5 Creating national sea borders  
Historically, “the oceans had long been subject to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine —
a principle put forth in the seventeenth century essentially limiting national rights and 
jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation’s 
coastline.”36 Oceans were governed for a long time by the idea that “the remainder of 
the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belong to none.”37 This meant that before 
1948, international trawlers had unlimited access to South African oceans and fish 
stocks. These foreign trawlers extracted huge quantities of fish from the deep seas and 
coastlines of South Africa. The vastness of the oceans surrounding South Africa made 
it difficult to control and implement measures to police both oceans and shores. 
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Hannesson explains that from the 1970s onwards, control expanded from 3 to 
200 nautical miles wide and national borders in the oceans emerged as a means for 
“states with rich fisheries off their shores to extend their jurisdiction over these areas 
and to clear away foreign fleets.”38 The 200-mile expansion occurred within a context 
of economic interest in oil and trade routes. The expansion was primarily for 
economic zones to enforce the dominance of national fleets. 
The economic zones emerged after World War II, when US president Truman 
“proclaimed that resources on and underneath the seabed on the continental shelf of 
the USA were the property of its government.”39 The United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) which was held between 1958 and 1982, was driven 
by a combination of factors. These factors included new technological advances in 
fishing gear and storage as well as advancement in the whale-fat extraction process. 
Another was the identification of oil as a key source of energy. This required drilling 
deep within ocean shelves. A further factor was the emergence of mineral seabed 
mining. 
The most comprehensive marine enclosures were put in place between 1973 and 
1982. This was driven by globalisation and neoliberal policies. During the convening 
of the third UNCLOS, the issues subject to discussion were expanded to include 
seabed mining, fisheries, pollution, navigation, research and delimitation of the 
continental shelf. The Law of the Seas concluded with coastal states gaining the 200-
mile limit to their ocean borders, thus serving their national interests. The 
superpowers won access allowing them to navigate the deep seas primarily for 
security and oil. The developing countries gained the right to develop their seabeds 
for mining minerals. These legislative gains shed light on the economic and political 
governance of the marine commons.  
UNCLOS was relatively silent about maintaining and safeguarding the 
ecological well-being of the marine commons after more than 30 years of discussion 
to secure legal agreements. It reinforced the idea that “open access” was bad for the 
marine commons. Specific concerns regarding the protection of the marine commons 
and guarding against fish stock depletion or the decimation of small-scale fisher 
communities are limited in these laws.   
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Today, the demarcation, patrol and protection of the marine commons is 
institutionalised worldwide. This state of affairs is part of the larger global shift 
towards national market protection of political and economic interests. Fish and 
fisheries have undergone major transformations through industrialisation and have 
become a mega-industry, as will be outlined further in this chapter. The national 
protection of natural marine fishery resources by states is perceived as critical to 
national growth and development. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forests’ (DAFF) 2014 Report on the status of South African marine commons 
indicates that the industry is worth 6–7 billion rand per annum.  
UNCLOS was signed by South Africa in 1997 and forms the basis of the 
Marine Living Resources Act [No. 18 of 1998] (MLRA) and maritime zones.40 Part of 
the UNCLOS agreement obliges coastal states to allow foreign fleets into their seas 
and economic exclusive zones (EEZ) if they are not able to exploit fully the Total 
Allocation Catch (TAC).41 Emma Witbooi problematises this, arguing that “while 
access agreements generate valuable foreign currency for these coastal states, 
substantial European Union (EU) subsidisation enables the EU fleets to fish profitably 
in the coastal states’ waters despite the fact that many of the target species are over-
exploited.”42 The EU trade regimes encourage their constituent countries to exploit 
the marine commons of developing countries because the EU offers high subsidies to 
their fleets.  
In the case of South Africa, Witbooi argues that “government has been more 
inclined, in capital- and labour-intensive sectors, to pursue the route of internal 
restructuring of incumbent rights holders, with a view to ensuring stability in the 
industry.”43 This tendency of the South African government makes the balance of 
transformation and genuine sustainability “under certain circumstances … 
irreconcilable.”44 
5.6 Fishing in a global context 
Although fish are mobile, swimming and breeding in specific currents, they are 
generally found in more or less particular geographical areas. Different fish species 
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are native to particular regions of the world, making some species more vulnerable to 
exploitation than others. The cold Benguela Current is nutrient-rich and yields large 
quantities of wild fish, which are sought-after in overseas markets. The EEZ seek to 
ensure that national flagged trawlers generate profit for commercial fisheries as well 
as for the state. The Cape Agulhas area has a particular ecosystem that is ideal for 
shellfish, abalone and squid, for example, where overexploitation and depletion occur 
in the service of international export markets. Marine borders secure greater access 
for exploitation by large-scale national fisheries. The intention is to limit exploitation 
by foreign vessels. The EEZ does not mitigate the impact of overfishing on the 
ecosystem but rather aims to allocate rights. Marine borders are an extension of 
privatising the land, similar to the seventeenth-century land enclosures that enabled 
the commodification of fish.  
According to the WB 2014 Global Partnership for Oceans (GPO), “better 
management of the goods and services of the oceans” is critical to “ensuring the 
oceans’ health.”45 This dominant global framework maintains and fosters a belief that 
with improved institutional mechanisms and an increase in capital investments (such 
as national borders, total catch allocations, security of tenure – all in line with 
UNCLOS) challenges in fishing will be overcome. According to the GPO, its 
objective is to “reduce the open access nature of fisheries by creating responsible 
tenure arrangements, including secure access rights for fishers and incentives for them 
to hold a stake in the health of the fisheries.”46 In so doing, this partnership argues 
that it will “contribute hundreds of billions of dollars annually to the global 
economy,” and will provide “essential environmental services, including climate 
regulation.”47 
The WB states that the “GPO will work exclusively to empower local ocean 
users – the owners of this public resource – to take a long-term stake in the health of 
those resources and will help them to reap the benefits from them.”48 Seth Macinko 
insists that small-scale fishers stay alert and be aware of “any strategically benign 
rhetoric” such as “rights based fishing,” “the Tragedy of the Commons,” “too many 
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boats chasing too few fish,” “fisheries as investable opportunities,” “using market-
based instruments to create incentives,” and “creating incentives to promote 
stewardship.”49 According to Macinko, from the outset, the orthodox argument with 
regard to fishing has been that open access is the problem. To that end, the logic is 
diagnosis and prescription, and rests on the “premise that private property creates the 
incentive for wise resource management.”50 The empirical claim is that “there are no 
private property rights in fisheries” and therefore “fisheries management is a mess.”51 
This logic concludes that “this situation requires private property.”52  
Macinko uses the example of Ragnar Arnason’s work to illustrate the logic set 
out above. Arnason’s diagnosis is that “fisheries, as so many other natural resource 
extraction activities, are among the economic activities where property rights are 
poorly defined or even non-existent. This generally results in huge inefficiencies, 
frequently referred to as the fisheries problem.”53 According to Macinko, Arnason 
offers the following as the prescription: “it follows immediately that the fisheries 
problem would disappear if only the appropriate property rights could be defined, 
imposed and enforced.”54 Macinko argues that there is a determined push to privatise 
the marine commons. 
Moenieba Isaacs reminds us of McCay’s argument that “Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs) create commodities out of the right to catch wild fish and shellfish, and 
they bring market forces to the allocative task.”55 Contextualising this, Isaacs notes 
that “ITQs were introduced in the late 1980s in South Africa as well as the rest of the 
world, although they were part of a long history of enclosing the fisheries commons 
and a process of deepening the role of the market – a response to Hardin’s (1968) 
tragedy of the commons.”56 
At different historical moments, freedom of the seas and, later, Hardin’s 
“tragedy of the commons” were presented as dominant narratives. These dominant 
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narratives by “fisheries economists Gordon, Scott and later Arnason” aim to restrict 
marine access.57 They were deployed as if fact, and had direct influence on the marine 
commons and our relationship with it. Isaacs outlines that the “key attributes of this 
system are privatisation of resources, huge profit margins, maximising efficiency and 
downscaling.”58 According to Isaacs it should become clear that specific interests 
have influenced the dominant narrative.59 These dominant worldviews render 
invisible the alternative historical worldviews of community and the marine 
commons.  
Merchant’s historical conception of the tragedy of the commons as well as her 
analysis of the unfolding processes of science, political, cultural, social and economic 
ideas of the Scientific Revolution shed light on how the marine commons are 
conceived of today and the historical roots of this view. The slow transformation of 
how fish affects and is affected by these societal changes is evident from the depletion 
of stocks and the poor state of the marine commons. This is clear at both global and 
national levels. Profit making transforms fish into an object, product and commodity. 
This transformation makes invisible the embedded historical, cultural and social place 
of fish within society. Furthermore, it hides the alternatives that can provide new 
ways of being with fish, fisher communities and fishers beyond what is offered by 
factories, supermarkets and the economic logic of capital. In the case of South Africa, 
this transformation in respect of fish was fostered early on by the state, where it 
prioritised commercial fisheries over small-scale fishing. 
5.7  The Marine Living Resources Act – conserving to exploit 
The ITQ system was introduced in 1988 with the promulgation of the Sea Fishery Act 
[No. 12 of 1988]. This system promoted a wealth-based approach to allocate the 
rights to fish. Isaacs points out that “the rights to exploit marine resources prior to the 
1994 elections were concentrated solely in the hands of white-owned commercial 
enterprises, resulting in legislation which excluded artisanal, subsistence and small-
scale fishers.”60 The post-apartheid expectation was for transformation, redress and 
inclusion. Unfortunately, the new ANC government maintained the ITQ system and 
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thus reinforced a wealth-based instead of redistributive approach. Isaacs argues that 
“the new fisheries policy overlooked the progressive intentions put forward in the 
RDP, in favour of neo-liberal policy prescriptions.”61 At the same time, as processes 
of globalisation unfolded, there was global recognition of the need for state 
stewardship of the environment due to the increasing environmental limits and 
pressures related to the issue of climate change.62  
The Marine Living Resources Act [No. 18 of 1998] (MLRA) emerged with 
competing objectives. One objective is to protect and claim stewardship of marine 
commons. Another is to exploit the marine commons, presumably to ensure growth 
and development, within a globalising world. Within this framework, the state has to 
serve the interests of its citizens, protect the environment for the common good and 
simultaneously serve the interests of local and multinational capital. 
The South African government adopted sustainable development as its approach 
to balance the environment with economic growth and social transformation. This 
approach is aligned with Agenda 21, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, as well as the Kyoto Protocol of 2002. The MLRA states that its 
aims are to ensure the “long-term sustainable utilisation of marine living resources 
and the orderly access to exploitation, utilisation and protection of certain marine 
living resources” and “exercise of control over marine living resources in a fair and 
equitable manner to the benefit of all the citizens of South Africa.”63 
Stewardship, according to the MLRA, can be translated in three ways. Firstly, it 
facilitates an equitable and fair quota system. This implies that the policy needs to 
ensure that previously historically disadvantaged communities are incorporated into 
the system. Secondly, the policy must conserve the environment. It seeks to do so 
through the allocations of ITQ permits, demarcating marine protected areas as well as 
introducing time-restricted and seasonal fishing zones. Thirdly, the minister, director 
general, transformation council and control officers must implement the MRLA as 
well as police and safeguard the marine commons. The MLRA legislates over ITQs 
and thus primarily echoes Hardin’s conceptual framework of the tragedy of the 
commons and its management prescription.  
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We can infer from the MRLA that stewardship is control over the marine 
commons by the state on behalf of different stakeholders. These stakeholders are not 
homogenous and have different and competing interests. Dr Kim Prochazka, director 
of research of the fisheries branch of Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (DAFF), argues that fisheries science “is not to promote the ‘side’ of fish, 
but to ensure that fishers are able to catch fish sustainably (and preferably to catch 
more fish over time).”64  
The idea that the MLRA is custodian over the marine commons needs to be 
unpacked. With regards to its stewardship, one has to ask if the ministry takes into 
account that the various stakeholders do not hold the same and equal power. The 
concerns of small-scale fishers, fishing communities and marine life and fish in 
particular, were not of interest before 1994. The recognition of small-scale fisheries 
was won through organisation and struggle and it took some twenty years to 
materialise after the new dispensation.  Prochazka’s comment above is evidence of 
the deeply embedded seventeenth-century separation of nature and society 
conception. The guardianship of fish by the DAFF reflects the prioritisation of an 
economic logic above fish and the social needs of small-scale fishers or small-scale 
and coastal communities. When stewardship is framed to ensure economic growth, it 
serves particular economically driven interests over both nature and society.  
The MLRA argues that it seeks to balance the economy, society and 
environment. This balance is necessary, according to the MLRA, in order to ensure 
both society’s and nature’s well-being. However, according to the DAFF, “in line 
with international trends, the department recognises fisheries as an economic activity 
rather than a purely environmental or biodiversity matter.”65 
Branch and Clark propose that the MLRA must be seen as a tripod.66 They 
argue that each leg represents the important economic, political and scientific spheres 
of policy. The economic sphere presumably ensures stability in society. This sphere 
comprises labour, commercial fisheries and related industries. Specifically, it is 
concerned with the duration and transfer of fishing rights. The political sphere 
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presumably ensures racial equity. Here, reference is to matters pertaining to 
reallocation, transformation, ownership and co-management. Science presumably 
ensures sustainability, which is determined by modelling the yield catch effort of 
fishing, as well as controls and monitoring ecosystems. DAFF argues that the 
equilibrium needs to prioritise the development needs of society given its apartheid 
legacy, but no one sphere ought to undermine the centrality of economic growth, 
which presumably will yield development and prosperity.67 
The MLRA perspective is to conserve marine resources in order to exploit, so as 
to ensure economic development and growth. Since 1994 there have been numerous 
permutations of the economic model, but there is a clear and strong alignment with a 
global neoliberal paradigm.68 The trajectory for the commercial fisheries industry is to 
expand and deepen the sector. It seeks to secure a larger share of the global blue 
market economy. The DTI aims to grow the fisheries industry into a competitive 
global exporter. The allure of global markets, foreign earnings and the promise of jobs 
are key drivers for the state. The neoliberal fisheries approach has met with resistance 
from organised fishing communities, fishers, unions, progressive NGOs working on 
trade and social justice issues and environmental organisations.69 
DAFF conceives of the marine commons as a natural resource and fish as a key 
commodity in the larger fisheries industry, with various levels of beneficiation. 
Currently the commercial fisheries industry employs 43 458 people and there are 
some 40 fishing communities in South Africa whose economic well-being depends on 
fishing and marine resources.70 The industry represents 0.5% of the gross domestic 
product.71 According to the PLAAS Rural Report in 2015, “a survey in 2000 
estimated that there were about 30 000 subsistence fishers and about 28 000 
households that depended on harvesting near-shore marine resources. The latest 
                                                
67 See MLRA [No. 18 of 1998]. 
68 Bond, Elite Transition, 50–52; Marais, Pushed to the Limit, 87–93. 
69 “No new round! Turn Around!” Third World Network Declaration signed by numerous African NGOs, Unions, 
Movements and NGOs including many SA organisations such as FAWU, COSATU, Masifundise, EMG, AIDC, 
TAC etc., in 1999 in response to South African government’s engagement in the WTO third ministerial round. See 
Isaacs, “Understanding the Social Processes and the Politics of Implementing a New Fisheries Policy, the Marine 
Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, in South Africa” (PhD diss., University of the Western Cape, 2003); and Sunde 
specifically on fisher resistance. 
70 World Wildlife Fund South Africa, “South African Fisheries: The Real Facts and Trends,” last modified 
November 2, 2011, http://www.wwf.org.za/?4900/fisheriesfactstrends. 
71 World Wildlife Fund South Africa, “South African Fisheries.” 
 145 
 
estimated total number of small-scale and subsistence fishers in South Africa is about 
8 078.”72  
From recent discussions, there have emerged numerous initiatives to further 
enhance and facilitate growth in the marine resource sector. Internationally, these are 
the Blue Ribbon Report on Investment, and the World Bank Global Partnership on 
Oceans. Locally, “The Home of Engineered Efficiency” presentation shows how 
government, policy and infrastructure are ready for investment in aquaculture.73 Both 
the global and local initiatives seek to conserve, so as to exploit, and are based on the 
further privatisation of the marine commons.  
Another example can be seen in the recent dispute with regard to Marine 
Protected Areas (MPA). Edna Molewa, the Minister of Environmental Affairs, listed 
22 new protected marine areas. The commercial fisheries industry opposed the MPA 
identified.74 Francois Kuttel, the CEO of the Oceana Group, “welcomed in principle 
the MPA” but argued that they must be “applied cautiously to prevent job losses.”75 
Bobby Jordan, a journalist, raised the point that “the move to protect marine 
biodiversity coincides with another government initiative to open up 150 000 square 
meters of seabed for mineral exploration.”76 This illustrates the tensions within 
existing policy. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Minister, Senzeni Zokwana, 
“expressed concerns about the effects these areas are likely to have on subsistence 
fishermen.”77 Both ministries indirectly reflect the lack of a holistic approach with 
regard to the marine commons.  
The current fisheries model and the new strategies to exploit the marine 
commons in the name of fishing-for-development and growth, have continued to 
exacerbate apartheid-era ecological degradation rather than having addressed or 
stopped it. The experience of bona fide small-scale fishers through the ITQ system of 
the MLRA has not improved, but has instead deteriorated. Policy that presumably 
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sought to transform the industry, recognise subsistence fishers and grant rights to 
previously disadvantaged groups, has failed to do so. According to Hara and Raakjer, 
“the MLRA is the primary vehicle for transformation of the sector. The three primary 
mechanisms can be distinguished: redistribution of fishing rights, restructuring of 
ownership and management of fishing enterprises and a revamp of the industry’s 
grievances in line with the new political order.”78 Isaacs shows how state capture is 
rampant in the industry, leaving many bona fide fishers without quotas, livelihoods 
and food security. She argues that although small-scale fishers are now recognised, 
the experience of bona fide fishers and others historically linked to fishing is being 
ignored though BEE processes and quotas.79  
Reports indicate that stocks are depleting and measures are urgently required to 
remedy the situation for the marine commons. According to Pitcher and Cheung, 
global warming, acidifying seas, pollution and reduction in ocean production and 
biodiversity are some of the many challenges faced by marine organisms.80 They ask: 
“we have drawn heavily from our oceans to feed millions [of people], but have we 
done irreversible harm to the biodiversity of our seas?”81 This critical question eludes 
DAFF. Unfortunately, approaches adopted by the various ministries reflect an 
environmental discourse of sustainable development, which promotes a green 
economy favouring market-based solutions. A limit of a sustainable development 
model premised on economic growth as a central pillar conceives of nature mainly as 
a natural resource for extraction. When such a model is reinforced through a 
neoliberal macroeconomic policy it further commercialises and privatises nature, thus 
undermining environmental protection.  
The recent Operation Phakisa proposal, which seeks to “[unlock] the economic 
potential of South Africa’s oceans,” demonstrates this approach in the case of 
fisheries most aptly.82 
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5.8 South Africa’s blue economy – problematising the golden mean 
Operation Phakisa was initiated in 2012 and spearheaded by the department of 
environmental affairs. It is a programme aimed at generating R177 billion from the 
exploitation of the ocean resources. 83According to Sipho Kings, prior to Operation 
Phakisa, there was no holistic plan to manage the oceans and various departments 
held competing interests in overseeing and regulating the oceans.84 These interests 
ranged from trade and economic growth, to social development and livelihoods for 
small-scale fisheries, to water, pollution and environment for the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, as well as concerns pertaining to marine life and biodiversity.  
According to Kings, “renewable ocean resources are already collapsing,” and 
“there is little leeway for making mistakes.”85 This is underscored by Nadine 
Strydom, who notes that “wherever there is pressure to make money off the ocean, we 
need to make sure we are sensitive to the renewability of resources.”86 She argues that 
there are limited resources due to the excessive harvesting.87 In particular she stresses 
that “any Phakisa initiative has to be managed to ensure economic decisions are not 
made instead of environmentally-sound thinking.”88 
DAFF’s approach towards ocean resources in Operation Phakisa is a focus on 
marine manufacturing, marine transport, offshore oil and gas, marine protection and 
governance and aquaculture. These areas are part of the state’s industrial plan to 
speed up the use of marine resources for economic growth. Fish and marine life, 
specifically their renewability and yield, are seen as a means for economic growth, 
development and racial redress. Kings’ article highlights the contradictions between 
“speeding up” industrialisation of ocean resources and Strydom’s warnings about the 
state of fish stocks. Operation Phakisa makes little mention of small-scale fishermen, 
fishing communities or their livelihoods. They however seek communities’ buy-in for 
Marine Protected Areas and mention that poachers require alternative avenues for 
livelihood. Furthermore, they highlight that the government ought to take into account 
small-scale fisheries policy.  
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DAFF sees the economy as the most important factor driving the use of the 
marine commons. It for this reason, that Operation Phakisa puts forward that the 
unlocking of the potential of the ocean is critical for economic growth. Accordingly, 
the objective of Operation Phakisa is to ensure that any and all obstacles are 
overcome so as to facilitate the development of the marine economy. Operation 
Phakisa is developed in line with the key objective of the national strategy for 
sustainable development to create a green economy. Moreover, it was initiated 
because environmental conservation through the National Environment Management 
Act (NEMA) [No. 107 of 1998], amended in 2008, and other policies do not 
“sufficiently enable the ocean economy.”89 The creation of new jobs as a rationale can 
be found throughout the promotion of a blue economy. The irony, as highlighted by 
Isaacs, is that so many jobs and livelihoods have already been destroyed as a result of 
government BEE allocation to non-bona fide small-scale fishermen. Many of the BEE 
allocations have gone to new black entrants who have never fished before.  
Concurrent to Operation Phakisa, government launched a Green Paper on the 
National Environmental Management of the Oceans of 2012 (NEMO). According to 
Jan Glazewski, a better title would be “Green Paper on Ocean Governance,” because 
“it is arguable that it is not the marine environment that has to be ‘managed’ but 
rather the people and legal personae who use ocean space and extract its abundant 
resources that need management.”90 The NEMO seeks to collect data and develop 
knowledge for decision-making purposes, so as to ensure better environmental 
management. According to NEMO it seeks to “maintain ocean environmental 
integrity.”91  
Glazewski stresses that the Green Paper is welcome, but  
 
it is not clear what the ultimate objective of this Green Paper is. Is it to improve cooperative 
governance in the ocean space, to draft new legislation in the form of an ocean governance act, 
or both? There is a need for a chief agency involved in ocean affairs to play a median role 
between long-term sustainable economic development and custodianship or stewardship in 
                                                
89 Republic of South Africa, “Operation Phakisa,” 31. Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
“National Environmental Management Act,” (Pretoria: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 1998). 
90 Jan Glazewski, “Ocean Governance: A First Step,” S Afr J Sci.109 (2013): 2, accessed March 17, 2016, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/ sajs.2013/a011. 
91 “Green Paper: The South African Policy on Ocean Environmental Management,” Government Gazette 568, no. 
35783 (2012): 13-15. 
 149 
 
managing South Africa’s oceans (we need to find the ‘Golden Mean’). In the preamble to the 
White Paper there is a need to recognise this tension between conservation and exploitation.92  
 
Why does this tension exist? Can the tension be overcome? Operation Phakisa 
identifies preventing the “over-exploitation of resources living and non-living” as its 
key priority. It then seems to undermine this when it also argues that it must “unlock 
obstacles for an ocean economy.”93 Unpacking and problematising the Golden Mean 
is at the heart of an important and necessary conversation about the urgency and 
seriousness of the ecological crisis in South Africa and the renewability of fish in 
particular. While recognition of the tension between conservation and exploitation 
might be regarded as a first step, much more is required for a meaningful engagement 
and rethink with regards to fish, its renewability, fishing communities and the 
demands that the ecological crisis places on us as a society.  
Racial redress and transformation has not occurred through the ITQ system and 
the approach adopted by the post-apartheid State has not improved the health of the 
ocean or fish, the fishing communities or small-scale fisheries. The state 
acknowledges the overexploitation but thinks it is able to avert further depletion. It 
thus seeks to avert the crisis by implementing a misguided policy that seeks to unlock 
the oceans’ economy through fish farming, better policing and surveillance, improved 
governance, scientific knowledge and collation of data. This is the promotion of a 
green economy, which aims to enhance the tonnage of fish for those who can afford 
it. This choice deepens the ecological crisis.  
5.9 Fish – from food source to commodity 
According to DAFF, the “fisheries sector is worth around R6 billion per annum and 
directly employs some 27 000 people in the commercial sector. Thousands more and 
their families depend on these resources for food and the basic needs of life.”94 WWF 
South Africa’s Sustainable Seafood Initiative (Sassi) states that “we consume 312 
million kilograms of fish each year, with half of that being locally caught. Seventy 
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percent of that tonnage is hake and sardines.”95 Locally and globally, fisheries form a 
mega industry with reach far beyond feeding bellies and filling plates.  
Fish is both caught in the wild and farmed for commercial sale. The scale of 
fisheries has expanded rapidly and dramatically at both global and local level over the 
past five to six decades. The extent of the commodification of fish has meant that 
since the 1980s catches have not increased, and over “the past 10 years, fisheries 
worldwide have been generally reported as being in an extremely poor state, with 
almost no improvement in sight.”96 Overfishing and depletion of spawn stocks is well 
acknowledged and undisputed.97  
Fish was not always a commodity. Fish was an integral part of a larger 
relationship of peoples to the oceans and seas. Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Monica 
Chilese stress that “oceans represent not only food but medicines, raw materials, 
climate environment, biodiversity and culture.” For them, the “polyvalence of the 
vital functions that the oceans represent” is not to be overlooked.98 In South Africa, 
fish has been a means of sustenance and independence, as well as a way of life and 
community for those who depended on the ocean.  
Evidence suggests that coastal fishing was not part of the modernisation and 
industrial processes during the early period of agriculture, or later with the discovery 
of diamonds and gold in South Africa.99 The first fishing regulation was issued in 
1657 and it prohibited the sale of fish. Interestingly, Jan van Riebeeck allowed 
“freemen to fish but ‘not for the sake of selling’ in order ‘that agriculture may not 
suffer.’”100 Hence agriculture, during this early period, had a monopoly on paid 
labour.  
Sunde argues that a market soon developed on the Cape coast, accompanied by 
stricter fishing regulation.101 These developments had little bearing on the fish and 
peoples existing beyond the direct arm of colonial rule. Those on the Cape coast, 
however, felt the brunt of these regulations. Isaacs notes that a century later, the 
“British occupation of the Cape in 1795 lifted the previous strict control on fishing 
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rights, and a commercial fishing industry was opened in 1801 …. After 1856, 
privatization of the southern shores allowed merchants to control and organize the 
shipment of dried snoek from South Africa to Mauritius.”102 Snoek became part of the 
looting of the spice route journey, and like slaves and other objects, was taken back to 
Europe.103 Van Sittert argues that this pre-war period was primarily concerned with 
securing its imperial sea routes rather than commercial fisheries, hence the fish still 
remain somewhat “free” and uncommodified. 
Van Sittert dislodges the narrative of marine science and commercial fisheries 
as unified since its conception. He exposes this history as “a convenient myth.”104 
Debunking the myth is important, because van Sittert reminds us of the past in order 
not to repeat previous fisheries’ regime reforms, which, according to him, are a 
product of a capitalist system and less about racism per se.105 The shift from 
feudalism to capitalism transformed fish as food and sustenance to a commodity for 
sale.  
Sunde’s account of fish as uncommodified, reflects an historical relationship 
within the community.106 It shows a very different relationship between the marine 
commons as nature and the community. Her focus on marine governance seeks to 
develop contemporary customary law for small-scale fisheries. In doing so, her work 
brings to the fore an alternative relationship between community and marine 
commons, which foregrounds a particular cosmology as well as cultural, social and 
material significance. Simultaneously, the reliance on traditional relationships 
embedded in the social fabric of fishing communities outside the reach of colonial 
rule did not dissipate overnight, as reflected also in Isaacs’ work. Elements remain 
within the informal small-scale fisheries communities on the Cape Coast. Both 
Sunde’s and Isaacs’ work signals the important role of fish as food within a broader 
intrinsic web of community and solidarity, livelihood and subsistence. Fish, in many 
respects, is part of local communities.  
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The rapid industrialisation of mining, as described in Chapter 4, led to migrant 
compounds and, soon thereafter, mining towns. “Fishing was marginal to an economy 
built on mining and agriculture” but with time, people in the interior of the country 
working in and around mines required sources of food that were affordable and 
nutritional.107 Fish met this need and as a result, fisheries particularly on the West 
Coast, developed. This started in earnest after the unification of South Africa in 1910 
and later from around 1933, when the state paid particular attention to the fishing 
sector. During World War II, the need to feed soldiers drove the global demand for 
canned fish and in particular the harvesting of crayfish, stockfish and later pelagic 
fish.108 The mineral-rich West Coast was well stocked and a prime target for inshore 
and deep-sea fishing. Deep-sea trawling far outstripped and put pressure on in-shore 
fishers and self-supporting fishers at the time.109 The extent of this pressure could be 
seen in fish dumping in order to maintain high prices, making fish prices unaffordable 
for locals. Here we begin to see how fisheries become profit-driven. Fish as food is 
transformed into fish as commodity. The primary purpose of feeding society is lost 
from focus.  
Sardines have been canned locally since the 1940s. This has had a significant 
bearing on the exploitation of fish, such that there was a period of sardine stock 
depletion. At first, white locals secured the reserved “skilled” jobs in the emerging 
modern factories. Later, indigenous and coastal artisanal fisher folk and communities 
were inadvertently forced into factories. This undoubtedly altered the relationship of 
people settled on the Cape’s coasts with the ocean, fish and land. Today, sardines are 
the largest volume of fish landed and second to hake in sales, with a total of six 
canneries in South Africa.110 According to the WWF, “R4.4 billion [of] fish were 
landed in 2009 and this is equivalent to 583 000 tonnes of fish. In the impoverished 
Eastern Cape region, R500 million in foreign revenue is generated in the squid fishery 
every year; making it one of the country’s most valuable fisheries.”111  
The commodification of fish as well as the accompanying expansion of fisheries 
is, however, not unique to South Africa, but in line with the global expansion of 
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fisheries that took place in the 1980s.112 By the eighties, South Africa was ranked 
fifteenth out of twenty countries for most depleted fish stock, due to cod-like hake and 
pelagic exploitation in the South African exclusive economic zones. In the seventies, 
Namibian stocks, which were under South African control at the time, were depleted. 
In the sixties, the Cameroon-Angola marine commons were net exporters servicing 
Northern markets. Today they are net importers in highly undernourished societies.113  
The work by Isaacs with regard to snoek on the Cape Coast outlines an 
important counter-narrative of the historical and contemporary role of fish. It traces a 
transcultural and transcontinental food heritage brought by Indonesian slaves who 
“considered [snoek] as a delicacy” to its embedded historical socio-cultural-material 
generational roots within the lives of Cape locals today. Integral to her study is the 
way in which Isaacs demonstrates the significance of snoek as an important food 
source for locals.114 The work is important because it not only holds potential lessons 
for the significance of small-scale fishers in the community, but also shows how 
small-scale fishers are excluded from the dominant fisheries policy. Forty per cent of 
snoek is caught on handlines by small-scale local fisheries for direct informal sale to 
historically local and poor communities in the Cape.115  
The study by Isaacs shows the relevance and significance of fish as part of 
community networks, livelihood and solidarity. Drawing on her study, I argue that for 
these working class poor communities in the Cape, fish is not frozen, packaged hake 
bought in the hypermarket, or farmed salmon and trout found in the chilled aisles of 
expensive supermarkets like Woolworths. Fish is snoek. It is what is bought at the end 
of the day on the main road in your area, or on Sunday morning near the graveyard. It 
is bought from the local fish seller out of the back of his bakkie. It is a personal 
interaction – you decide which fish, how you want it cut whilst you chat with the 
seller and hear about the state of fishing and how the fishermen are doing. It is 
Sunday afternoons with the family, playing cards or dominoes. It is learning how to 
count, laugh and be communal. It is social and cultural cohesion. It is about the 
collective contribution to getting the fish to the table. The collecting of the money, 
buying, cleaning, preparing, serving, disposing of the bones, are all parts of a whole. 
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Everyone has a role when the fish is socially embedded outside the formal market. 
This fish is life. This, however, has increasingly come under threat due to the 
commodification and commercialisation of fisheries.  
5.10 Corporate versus community fishing   
Small-scale fisheries catch almost half of all fish caught for global consumption.116 
Important work has been done to show the significance of subsistence fishers from the 
point of view of providing livelihoods and food security.117 Unlike other places in the 
world, small-scale fisheries contribute less than 1% of fish caught in South Africa.118 
According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 
however, “small-scale and artisanal fisheries … play an important role in food 
security and nutrition, poverty eradication, equitable development and sustainable 
resource utilization.”119 This is important in the context of South Africa, where there 
is extreme inequality and high unemployment, making small-scale fisheries relevant 
for livelihoods and food sovereignty. Small-scale fisheries have the ability to meet 
multiple needs with a minimal carbon footprint whilst placing less strain on the 
marine commons and creating the greatest potential to facilitate food sovereignty.  
Small-scale fisheries promote an alternative approach to commercial fisheries, 
which encapsulate a logic of sufficiency. The distinctive form, scale and tools of this 
approach are vastly different from commercial fisheries. Embedded in small-scale 
fisheries are the traditional forms of fishing. This consists of one to no more than a 
few fishers collectively casting a line from the shore or net from a small boat, 
returning with the catch of the day for same-day sale and use. The fish is fresh and 
seasonal. It feeds the fishers’ family, neighbours and local community. In general, 
small-scale fisheries are driven by the local market where people know their fishers 
and know their fish. Small-scale fisheries are low-tech operations, which are not 
capital intensive. They tend to produce minimal waste. By its nature, small-scale 
fishing is guided by the weather and seasons. Over-harvesting is unlikely. Small-scale 
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fisheries rest on a logic of “enough is considered a good catch.” They show respect 
and understanding of the ocean and fish.  
The “Economic and Sectoral Study of the South African Fishing Industry” 
shows that “trawl fisheries are the largest, the most valuable and in some instances the 
most sophisticated of all commercial fishing sectors in South Africa.”120 It also shows 
that “in contrast to all other fishing sectors … trawl fisheries did not develop along 
the normal trajectory from subsistence to small scale to a large scale industrial 
fishery. Instead, from its early beginnings in the 1890s the trawl industry has operated 
as a ‘modern’ fishery.”121 In many ways, this report illustrates the overarching state 
policy to support commercial fisheries and undermine small-scale fisheries and 
related livelihoods. From the outset, commercial fisheries operated in open-access 
oceans until the apartheid regime sought to protect its commercial fisheries by 
prohibiting non-South African trawlers in its oceans. During the apartheid period, the 
state subsidised South African commercial fisheries. Today the largest and most 
mature fishing industry is demersal trawling, which had already started in the 
1890s.122 The scale and support for commercial fisheries by the state is at the expense 
of support to small-scale fisheries and is wasteful. 
Hake is the most valuable and industrialised element of South Africa’s fisheries. 
This is a highly capital and labour intensive industry.123 Its development and history is 
inextricably linked to the company Irvin and Johnson (I&J), a commercial fishery. 
From the onset of the industry, an oligopoly existed with indirect security of tenure.124 
By 2000, 84% of Total Allocated Catch (TAC) was generated through deep sea 
trawling. According to Sauer et el., “[a]s early as 1905 G.D. Irvin realised that the 
survival of the industry in the Cape would be entirely dependent on an efficient cold 
storage, distribution and marketing network to the Witwatersrand, which led him to 
acquire a cold storage company and then scheduling the famous fish train to 
Johannesburg.”125 Irvin and Johnson registered 27 trawlers in 1922 with additional 
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interests in whaling and sealing.126 After the ‘rape’ in the 1960s and the 1970s, 
property rights “were introduced at a time when stocks were in need of rebuilding.”127  
From the “Economic and Sectorial Study of the South Africa Fishing Industry” 
report it is clear that commercial fisheries have caused major depletion of stocks in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Since the1980s there have been attempts to rebuild fish stocks. 
This is not only true for demersal catches (sole, hake and yellow tail) but also, for 
instance, pelagic catches (anchovies and pilchards), squid, tuna and lobster. 
Commercial fisheries are characterised by the harvesting and sale of wild-caught fish 
for commercial sales and mostly rely on machine driven vessels, which are a 
minimum length of 25m. The vessels utilise high-end technology, generally have 
many workers on board, and are out on the deep seas for long periods of time. The 
vessels harvest large quantities of fish and often have cold-storage facilities aboard. 
These commercial vessels are fishery factories on the seas. Oftentimes these 
communities of men are migrant labourers at sea, dislocated and removed from their 
communities and families.  
The FAO report highlights that by contrast, “small-scale fisheries tend to be 
strongly anchored in local communities, reflecting often historic links to adjacent 
fishery resources, traditions and values and supporting social cohesion.”128 This 
contrast reflects the difference and history between the alienated waged worker and 
the livelihoods of those living off traditional craft and cottage skills. The former, is 
based on the logic of efficiency in the marketplace, and the latter, on the logic of 
sufficiency for a community.  
After 1994, “subsistence fishers were recognised for the first time by the MLRA 
and given legal rights to access marine resources.”129 In May 2014, the MLRA was 
promulgated. In it, small-scale fishers are defined as  
 
members of a small-scale fishing community engaged in fishing to meet food and basic 
livelihood needs, or directly involved in processing or marketing of fish, who traditionally 
operate in near-shore fishing grounds; mainly employ traditional low technology or passive 
fishing gear; undertake single-day fishing trips; and are engaged in consumption, barter or sale 
of fish or otherwise involved in commercial activity, all within the small-scale fisheries 
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The South African government introduced ITQ-based fisheries management as 
a means to facilitate redress and transformation.131 Isaacs points out, however, that 
“ITQs are de facto property access rights or privileges, and are primarily concerned 
with promoting economic efficiency rather than conservation, community welfare or 
equity.”132 Her observations concur with the arguments made by Macinko earlier in 
this chapter.133  
The logic of efficiency as described by Princen, and outlined and discussed in 
Chapter 2, has numerous problems. In the context of fisheries in South Africa, an 
important lesson to draw from the modern and commercial fisheries’ history since the 
early 1900s, is that the logic of efficiency resulted in massive stock exploitation over 
many decades, and specifically the stock depletion in the 1960s and 1970s. This very 
efficient vertical and highly commercialised sector, which sought to catch, market and 
distribute competitively in domestic and international spheres, plundered the South 
African marine commons and changed social relations such that we see greater 
inequality, loss of livelihood and loss of previous forms of food sovereignty and 
independence. 
The early commercialisation and industrialised dominance of the industry has 
masked the fisher and the fish. The orthodox logic of efficiency and the market has 
hidden the skills required in fishing as well as the socio-cultural losses confronted by 
those in small-scale fisheries. The possibilities and alternatives that small-scale 
fisheries present for a different paradigm of fish-food-community-marine commons as 
public goods must be brought to the fore. This logic of efficiency, whereby the market 
can indiscriminately allocate rights to historically disadvantaged individuals, has been 
shown to be highly problematic. If instead, the logic of sufficiency were applied, then 
bona fide fishers would be allocated rights and overfishing and wastage would be 
avoided entirely, as the long history of fishing and tradition cultivates a system that 
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ensures sustainability, as opposed to seeing the ocean and fish as a convenient place 
to turn a quick profit.  
The World Forum on Fisher People (WFFP), an international forum on fisher 
people, and the Masifundise Development Trust, a South African NGO working with 
small-scale fisher folk, often link their demands to and call for “the right to food 
sovereignty.”134 They demand the recognition of  a“small-scale fisheries model as 
preferred to exclusive economic zones,” and make a call to “reverse and prevent the 
privatization of fisheries resources, as through individual transferable quotas (ITQs) 
and similar systems that promote property rights.”135 They argue that industrial 
fishing should be prohibited inshore and seek to “prevent the displacement of fishing 
communities through the privatization of waters and lands of fishing communities for 
activities that include tourism, aquaculture, defence/military establishments, 
conservation and industry.”136 Furthermore, they “reject industrial aquaculture and 
genetically modified and exotic species in aquaculture.”137 Fisher people around the 
world and in South Africa are defending the marine commons. 
According to the 2015 WFFP and World Forum of Fish Harvesters and Fish 
Workers’ statement on COP21, they declared, “No to blue carbon, yes to food 
sovereignty and to climate justice.”138 Their powerful statement asserts that  
 
as the devastating consequences of climate change become ever more disastrous, it is likewise 
becoming ever more clear that the corporate-dominated UNFCCC-negotiations are not part of 
the solution but part of the problem. Instead of the necessary systemic changes that stop the 
profit-driven plunder of the earth’s resources through fossil-fuel extraction and deforestation, 
the only proposals coming from the negotiators are corporate friendly market-based solutions. 
In these so-called solutions, the prerequisite is to not conflict with corporate interests and 
corporate power but to strengthen them, by giving them more control over our natural 
resources.139  
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The statement further declares that creating blue carbon is a false solution. More 
than anything else, blue carbon seeks to commodify and commercialise new forms of 
the marine commons which is yet another attempt by commercial fisheries to employ 
green capitalism and market mechanisms as solutions. These solutions are propelled 
by the belief in the logic of efficiency and the accompanying assumption that the 
privatisation of the marine commons is in the interest of humanity. The WFFP argues 
that the solution to the ecological crisis, climate change and the marine commons’ 
depletion is small-scale fishers and small-scale farmers. According to the WFFP,  
 
aside from being ecologically just, small-scale fisheries also provide a livelihood for 90% of the 
some half a billion people employed in capture fisheries – half of which are women. Small-scale 
fishers are therefore a key actor in the struggle to ensure truly sustainably managed resources in 
a way that does not undermine the socio-economic needs of the many people, often highly 
marginalized, that are dependent on aquatic resources across the world and notably in the 
Global South.140 
 
5.11 Renewability – a natural and a commercial concept 
Renewability of fish stocks coupled with the commodification of fish and the 
commercialisation of fisheries has led to massive exploitation and undermined the 
self-sustainability of fish. According to the FAO, “fish stocks are a renewable 
resource … [but] over the years, [we] have suffered from a widespread notion that the 
seas are inexhaustible, economic pressures that have encouraged overexploitation and, 
until just over a decade ago, an international regime that gave almost unlimited access 
to the majority of them.”141 Another FAO study spanning the period 1950–2008 
reported that at least 25% of the world’s fish stocks have collapsed.142  
In support of the FAO findings, Pitcher and Cheung highlight that “recent 
analyses of fishery catches indicate that 70% of all world fish populations are 
unsustainably overexploited, while almost half of these (30% overall) have biomass 
collapsed to less than 10% of unfished levels.”143 They furthermore suggest that 
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forecast trends suggest imminent collapse.144 This ecological crisis demands serious 
questions of the reliance on modelling mechanisms to determine sustainability of 
fisheries. Substantial evidence suggests that many fish stocks are not able to rebuild 
due to over-depletion and collapsing stocks, leading to the extinction of various fish 
species.  
South Africa reports annually on the status of fish stocks, taking into account 
the environmental influences, management systems and harvesting rations. The 2014 
report noted that “50% of stocks are considered to be of concern … of these, 22% are 
considered depleted or heavily fished, and 28% are considered heavily depleted.”145 
This signals an unhealthy marine environment for South Africa, suggesting that the 
state needs to reflect on and re-examine its approach to fisheries. The approach 
adopted by DAFF in response to the dwindling stock, however, is technical and 
economic. The promotion of aquaculture through Operation Phakisa occurs despite 
the knowledge that “overfishing, and its associated environmental impacts, is our 
biggest global environmental challenge alongside the climate change that we 
currently face.”146  
Over the years, fisheries science in South Africa has developed sophisticated 
technologies, tools and models to harvest and assess the status of its fish stocks. 
Indeed, this approach offers the convenience and choice of buying the fish desired 
throughout the year, fresh or frozen, regardless of seasonality, at supermarkets all 
over the world. This however begs the question: At what cost? Could it be 
conceivable to eat fish seasonally rather than risk the complete depletion of stocks or 
the ruin of the marine commons?  
The ecological challenge of overfishing and small-scale fishers is rarely 
foregrounded within the ecological crisis discourse or within the dominant 
commercial fisheries, thus creating little challenge to the way in which commercial 
fishing is conducted. The increasing consumption of fish, the rate of harvesting and 
new technologies, have not set off alarms or generated campaigns for Save the Fish, 
as happened with Save the Rhino. According to Sahrhage and Lundbeck, although 
“humans have exploited fish populations for food and profit for thousands of years … 
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the last 150 years have seen huge increases in geographic reach and depth range, an 
unprecedented fishing intensity through new technology, and a global 
commoditization of fishery products.”147 This has affected fish stock renewability. 
Today, across the globe, aquaculture runs parallel to the wild harvesting of fish 
by commercial and small-scale fishers. Aquaculture occurs on land and is the farming 
of fish in controlled conditions outside the ocean or natural rivers whilst simulating 
these conditions.148 In 2014, the FAO reported that almost half of the fish consumed 
today are produced through aquaculture.149 In 2012, on a global scale, 158 million 
tonnes of fish is produced by capture fisheries and aquaculture combined, and some 
66.5 million tonnes is farmed fish.150 This has increased from 13.4% of fish 
production in 1990 and 25.7% in 2000.151 These figures reveal the scale of fisheries. 
Aquaculture is being presented as one solution to the declining health of the marine 
commons and fish stocks. Can this approach address the serious nature of the 
ecological crisis? Can it be a long-lasting solution with no ecologically detrimental 
effects? 
It is argued that the rapid growth in aquaculture is meant to meet the demand in 
rising global fish consumption.152 Farming of fish is now similar to the rapid 
commercialisation of maize production. At present, the genetic modification and 
mono-cropping of maize commercially, it is argued, create drought and pest resistant 
crops so as to meet global food demands. Currently though, maize is commercially 
produced for animal feed and more recently for biofuels. This indicates that maize 
production’s sole purpose is no longer to provide food. FishStat indicates that over the 
last three decades, “capture fisheries production increased from 69 million to 93 
million tons; during the same time, world aquaculture production increased from 5 
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million to 63 million tons.”153 This is a massive increase, and demonstrates both the 
exploitation of wild fish as well as the way fish farming has grown in a manner 
similar to that of maize farming. 
Mariculture is commercial fish farming in contained areas within an ocean or 
river. It is the farming of fish as a cash-crop and “includes a large proportion of 
carnivorous species, such as salmon, trout and groupers, higher in unit value and 
destined to supply more affluent markets.”154 Purportedly, farming of fish is to ensure 
food security and aims to meet the needs of increases in fish protein consumption, but 
as a cash-crop yielding high returns for a preferred food secure market, it calls the 
rationale of food security into question.155 The idea of maize and fish as cash crops 
needs to be problematised.   
The approach of fishing-for-development to meet the Millennial Development 
Goals was a key feature of the 2008 World Development Report.156 Propelled by the 
argument of meeting the food needs of a growing population, fish stocks and 
production are showing similar trends to maize stocks as commodities. The 
conservation approach, which is exemplified by interventions to protect rhinoceros 
stock, is less apparent. The latter, has benefitted from a flurry of international 
conservation campaigns and ambassadors signalling the importance of wildlife and 
nature, whereas maize is seen as food with no intrinsic value or connection to nature.  
To a large extent, this is a result of decades of maize mono-cropping, the 
proliferation of genetically modified (GM) maize production and the mega-industry 
of maize and related production. Rhinoceros by contrast, are considered endangered 
species as they are the targets of poaching and their horns are connected to illicit trade 
and trafficking. The dangers of mono-cropping, GMOs and use of chemical pesticide 
that are harmful to the soil, water, air and our bodies are well documented by 
organisations in South Africa.157 Unfortunately this knowledge has fallen on deaf 
ears. South Africa is the first country in Africa that promoted and cultivated GM 
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maize at the expense of local and indigenous maize.158 The campaign calling for “No 
to GMO maize,” in South Africa, at the start of the WTO negotiations, did not find 
groundswell support. The South African government, however, bought wholesale into 
IMF/WB and WTO propaganda and economic frameworks. 
Aquaculture and mariculture, like mono maize cropping, come with huge 
environmental risks, but they also “side-step the context-specific political questions of 
who ought to decide what is to be fished, where and how.”159 In the case of the 
former, it is necessary to point out that large tracts of land are required, and in many 
cases this has resulted in community displacement and land grabs in order to set up 
aqua ponds.160 In both forms of farming, there are risks of disease, parasites, bacterial 
and viral infections and water and land contamination. Traditional and small-scale 
fishers’ communities are being displaced through commercial fishing but also moved 
off land to make space for commercial aquaculture and mariculture ponds. Moreover, 
commercial aquaculture and mariculture increase small-scale fishers and the marine 
commons vulnerability.  
Naylor et al. alert us that “aquaculture’s pressure on forage fisheries remains 
hotly contested.”161 This is in part due to the high demand of wild fishmeal and fish 
oil, the production of which requires aquaculture methods.162 They highlight two main 
concerns given the “finite nature of global marine resources.”163 One, “the lack of 
suitable substitutes for feed and oil, places pressure on price responsiveness, hence if 
no ‘appropriate substitutes’ are found, prices will rise.”164 And two, that 
“globalization of fishmeal and fish oil trade has resulted in lower traceability of the 
origin of feed and hence reduced accountability by feed consumers for the pressure 
they place on specific forage fisheries.”165 This means that the origins of the fish have 
become increasing invalid.166 These concerns indicate the challenges of 
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commodifying and commercialising fish through aquaculture, highlighting the 
unsustainable pressures placed on the marine commons and small-scale fishing 
communities, as well as issues pertaining to safety with regards to eating 
commercially farmed fish.  
The WBs “Fish to 2030” report outlines the rate of growth of aquaculture but 
also important challenges. The report states that “aquaculture has grown at an 
impressive rate over the past decades ... But supplying fish sustainably—producing it 
without depleting productive natural resources and without damaging the precious 
aquatic environment—is a huge challenge. We continue to see excessive and 
irresponsible harvesting in capture fisheries and in aquaculture.”167 In South Africa 
today, aquaculture is in its infancy but there is growing financial support and 
motivation from the state and corporates to farm fish.168 Aquaculture, however, does 
not address the declining fish stocks and sustainability issues of the South African 
oceans or oceans more generally. Neither does it address the critical questions raised 
concerning what is farmed?, how much? and for whom? Commercial aquaculture as a 
technical solution to a fundamental question of the marine commons and fish stocks 
will only avert the problem temporarily. Could a solution be that we consume on a 
smaller scale and more wisely?  
In 2008, the WFFP declared that they “reject industrial aquaculture and 
genetically modified and exotic species in aquaculture.”169 The Slow Food Movement 
argues that industrial aquaculture is not a solution to overfishing.170 Both movements 
highlight the negative environmental damage of excessive organic waste from 
aquaculture that causes problems for the ecosystem. Specifically, the movement 
rejects that “genetically modified tuna, salmon and tilapia are now being farmed … 
research in this sector is growing rapidly in many countries … aimed primarily at 
sterilization, speeding up growth rates and improving resistance to cold and 
disease.”171  
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The recent developments in aquaculture suggest the further commodification 
and techno-industrialisation of fish. This side-steps the critical questions posed by the 
ecological crisis and specifically the overexploitation of the marine commons and fish 
in particular. More so, commercial farming of fish and fisheries maintain the 
dominant social relations that are central to fishing-for-profit and not fishing for need. 
Industrial fish farming reinforces the conception of nature formed during the 
Scientific Revolution; that is, that man, through science, can dominate nature for his 
own ends. I argue that this approach will not assist us in overcoming the ecological 
crisis; it will only exacerbate it. Locating fish, and those who fish, especially small-
scale fishers, within a broader holistic world view which fosters an appreciation of 
fish and fishers as deeply interconnected, will go a long way to recognise the 
“polyvalence” of fish and fishing communities.  
Most people have no idea that the fish they eat is farmed and many more do not 
know that fish farming places the ecosystem at risk. The argument that we need fish 
farming in order to feed people needs to be challenged. Fish farming is not only 
expensive, but also mainly caters to the middle class and the first world. It is 
commercially viable because the fish is sold to those who can afford the expensive 
price tag of salmon, trout, shrimps, oysters, etc. This reveals part of the motivation 
behind farming fish. 
 Permission to farm fish is one step away from conceding to modifying fish 
through vaccines and genetic engineering techniques. This is permission to alter the 
genetic code of organisms. It is important to understand that genetically modified 
crops require huge amounts of chemicals and constant scientific know-how and new 
and improved chemical and genetically modified varieties. The pesticides used for 
maize, for instance, and their effects on the environment are most famously 
documented in Rachel Carsons’ Silent Spring. In South Africa the work by the 
African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) reports the adverse effects of GMOs and 
pesticides but also bring to the fore what this means for smallholder farmers and farm 
workers. ACB furthermore asks “who owns our food system?”172 This is a critical 
question for the fishing industry, given the antibiotics and vaccines used in 
aquaculture, all of which carry dangers for nature and people.  
                                                




However, farming fish is a key component of Operation Phakisa. DAFF is 
aware of the challenges and risks of farming fish, but prioritises a mandate which 
seeks to manage the development and sustainable use of resources, and to maximise 
the economic potential of the sector.173 In other words, it has to ensure capitalist 
development and therefore capitalist sustainability. DAFF’s mandate states: “In line 
with international trends, the department recognizes fisheries as an economic activity 
rather than a purely environmental or biodiversity matter.”174 
It is this mandate and earlier approach by the South Africa state, as outlined 
from the earliest of periods, which rests on a narrow conception of fish and therefore 
nature, which favours commercial fishing and validates the logic of efficiency. This 
approach has, over time, eroded the cultural, social and customary practices of fishing 
communities in South Africa. This erosion and active prioritising of profit over fish 
and community has turned communities into factories. 
In so doing, it has destroyed livelihoods, food sovereignty and community 
autonomy. The adoption of ideas and assumptions from the Scientific Revolution, has 
altered and transformed coastal communities.  
The factory strips away the historical relationship within communities and 
between people and with the marine commons. It strips away an organic rhythm, 
respect and solidarity between people and nature. The commercial fish factory on land 
or on large-scale commercial vessels makes invisible both the historical and existing 
small-scale fishing communities’ social ecologies. The factory eats away at the 
relationships that coastal communities have with each other, with fish and the ocean. 
The factory creates, institutionalises and cements particular social relations between 
people. These social relations are not of equals but are dependant on the exploitation 
and domination over workers, fishing communities and fish. 
                                                





Chapter Six: Conclusion - Liberation Ideology and Ecological Crisis 
6.1  Introduction  
This dissertation has studied the politics of the ecological crisis by focussing on the 
politics of land, mining and fishing.  I have examined how government policy in these 
areas conceives of the relationship between nature and society. I have traced the 
inherited assumptions, ideas and arguments underpinning the relationship between 
nature and society, so as to make visible the ecological discourse in South Africa after 
apartheid.  
If this dissertation has done what it set out to do, it should be clear that nature is 
conceived of mainly as a natural resource and object to be extracted, controlled and 
dominated. This capitalist conception of nature has enabled and reinforced private 
ownership of nature and its objectification and commodification. I argue here that 
these are central features in land, mining and fishing policy respectively. These 
policies are laden with arguments of racial redress, transformation and redistribution, 
centring the legacy of racial dispossession and liberation ideology as prime 
motivators, obscuring the dominant conception of nature.  
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, it was argued that another relationship to nature 
simultaneously requires another relationship to society, premised on new social 
relations. In these chapters, I have shown how nature and society are affected and 
transformed over time by ideas of nature formed in the Scientific Revolution, which 
espoused market-based relations.  
In this final chapter, I turn to the question of political perspectives on why the 
South Africa government has narrowly focused on climate change and environmental 
policy, whilst neglecting the multi-dimensional nature of the ecological crisis. I argue 
that the government’s policy assumptions and approach to ecological modernisation 
and liberation ideology undermine the possibilities of another relationship to nature.  
The overwhelming effects of climate change have obliged all countries to 
enter into framework discussions and policy negotiations. Policies at national and 
international levels are being developed and implemented. This chapter aims to (i) 
show the reality and ideology of how the South African government is addressing the 
issue of climate change; (ii) outline critiques to the ANC’s neoliberal and ecological 
modernisation approach that has emerged in opposition to its ecological policies; and 
(iii) discuss whether there are elements of an alternative modernity emerging in and 
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from the struggles of working-class communities. In the process, this chapter provides 
an inventory and assessment of (supposed or real) agents for change in the South 
African ecological context.   
6.2 South Africa as “Champions of the earth”: liberation ideology and the 
environment 
South Africa is centrally positioned in climate change negotiations, specifically with 
the aim to place Africa on the global agenda.1 The country often mediates and 
facilitates discussions between the global North and South with regard to competing 
environmental agendas, and plays a prominent role in global environmental 
diplomacy.2 This is the role the country plays in peacekeeping and multilateral trade 
negotiations, in keeping with its African renaissance agenda and liberation ideology 
of Africanism and internationalism. Already as early as 1996, Thabo Mbeki made his 
famous, “I am an African” speech, which can be perhaps considered a precursor to 
conceptions and articulations of nature as having similar rights to human beings, in 
the context of citizenship and legal standing.  The speech opens thus: 
 
I am an African. 
 
I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, the 
deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that define the face of 
our native land.  
 
At times, and in fear, I have wondered whether I should concede equal citizenship of our 
country to the leopard and the lion, the elephant and the springbok, the hyena, the black 
mamba and the pestilential mosquito. 
 
A human presence among all these, a feature on the face of our native land thus defined, I 
know that none dare challenge me when I say - I am an African!3 
 
In 2002 the country hosted the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) and in 2005 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) awarded 
the South African government as “Champions of the Earth,” for the lead role it played 
in environmental governance and its “commitment to cultural and environmental 
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diversity.”4 In 2011 the country hosted the Conference of the Parties (COP17) and in 
2015 South Africa “led the Group of 77 plus China at COP21 in Paris in a successful 
negotiation process that resulted in the Paris Agreement.”5  
More recently the government championed two processes at the United Nations  
with regard to the environment. First, the UN resolution on “Harmony with Nature,” 
which is an initiative attempting to develop an earth-centred worldview where the 
“planet is not considered to be an inanimate object to be exploited, but as our 
common home, alive and subject to a plethora of dangers to its health.”6 The initiative 
engages with earth jurisprudence perspectives, arguing for a holistic system of 
governance. This perspective stresses that “economic growth for some has been 
achieved at the expense of the natural world,” and that “[a]t the core of the current 
anthropocentric worldview, the Earth is viewed as a source of raw materials to be 
commercialized, exploited, modified, altered and privatized.”7 This initiative draws 
on indigenous practices and knowledge. It furthermore recognises that nature has 
constitutional rights in certain nation states and therefore seeks to develop principles 
of eco-democracy, spirituality, and ethics.8  
Second, the South African government played a lead role in the UN with regard 
to a treaty binding countries to certain human rights and business regulations. With 
Ecuador, the South African government has drafted a resolution to foster a treaty to 
replace the current voluntary guidelines. The resolution has been signed by Cuba, 
Venezuela and Bolivia.9 South Africa played a lead role in securing the support of 
these countries. International NGOs such as FirstFood Information and Action 
Network (FIAN), the Transnational Institute (TNI) and the Treaty Alliance are 
                                                
4 United Nations Environmental Programme, “First-Ever UNEP ‘Champions of the Earth’ Presented to Seven 
Environmental Leaders,” accessed June 26, 2013, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=430&ArticleID=4775&l=en. 
5 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Minister Edna Molewa’s speech delivered by Deputy Director-General of 
Climate Change and Air Quality, Ms Judy Beaumont, at the National Stakeholder Consultation Session in 
Preparation for COP 22/CMP12,” accessed November 2, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/speech/molewa_atnationalstakeholder_consultationsessionforCOP22. 
6 United Nations General Assembly, “Harmony with Nature A/71/266,” 2, accessed September 16, 2016, 
http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/documents.html. 
7 United Nations General Assembly, “Harmony with Nature A/71/266,” 4. 
8 For a quick overview see UN “Harmony with Nature”: http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/index.html. 
9 United Nations General Assembly, “Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development,” Human Rights Council 26th session, accessed at 




rallying around and support the call.10 The South African government argues that this 
work at the UN reflects the guiding principles in its Bill of Rights.  
These global highlights give a false picture of national concerns about the 
government’s ecological modernisation approach. According to the Development 
Bank of South Africa (DBSA) country report on integrating environment and 
development, they “were concerned there was a dominant political paradigm that 
remained entrenched in promoting large-scale extractive industries (mining), pursuing 
high impact industrial projects (for example energy-intensive smelters, toll roads), 
and large scale agro-industries especially linked with genetically modified crops.”11 
The report highlighted that “[t]hese initiatives tended to favour the elite and growing 
consumerist society.”12 One account for this tendency, which contributes to an 
unsustainable relationship with nature, is the ANC national liberation movement’s 
critique of the apartheid state. Its critique was not against the capitalist economic 
approach of the apartheid state per se, but with its racist, separatist and segregationist 
approach, such that many ANC policies have been geared towards to neoliberalism 
and establishing a black bourgeoisie.13   
According to Carl Death, “tensions remain between South Africa’s performance 
and rhetoric on the global stage, and domestic development paths which continue to 
be environmentally unsustainable.”14 He notes that “while environment issues have 
rarely taken centre stage in foreign policy circles, it is significant that the environment 
and the landscape are powerful cultural and political motifs in South Africa.”15 This is 
part of South Africa’s rainbow nation identity-building process and government often 
“render[s] ‘the environment’ as a potentially nodal concept in South African national 
branding.”16 Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, as well as William Beinart and 
Peter Coates, argue that the national identity of South Africa is tied to “landscape, 
                                                
10 See for instance “Week of Mobilisation to #StopCorporateAbuse,” FIAN, accessed November 2, 2016, 
http://www.fian.org/en/news/article/week_of_mobilization_to_stopcorporateabuse/. See also “The Treaty on 
TNCs and the struggle to stop corporate impunity,” TNI, accessed November 2, 2016, 
https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-treaty-on-tncs-and-the-struggle-to-stop-corporate-impunity. 
11 DBSA, “What Works For Us: A South African Country Report for Tactics, Tools and Methods for Integrating 
Environment and Development,” (South Africa: DBSA, 2009), 13. 
12 DBSA, “What Works For Us,”13. 
13 For a convincing account of this approach, specifically under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, see William 
Gumede, “Was the ANC Trumped on the Economy” and “What’s Wrong with Being Filthy Rich,” in Thabo 
Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC (Cape Town: Zebra Books, 2005). 
14 Death, “Leading by Example,” 455. 




flora and fauna” as well as “a deep-seated attachment to the land, soil, the open veldt, 
the mountains and the sea in the South African imagination” respectively.17 
Central to the approach of ecological modernisation is that it “provides a way of 
thinking about how to move beyond the conflictual relationship that is often assumed 
to exist between the economy and the environment.”18 There are numerous strands of 
ecological modernisation, as outlined briefly in Chapter 1.19 But according to David 
Harvey’s critique, “[e]cological modernization depends upon and promotes a belief 
that economic activity systematically produces environmental harm and society 
should therefore adopt a proactive stance with respect to environmental regulation and 
ecological control.”20 The approach argues that “prevention is preferable to cure.”21 
Implicit, however, in ecological modernisation is the notion that capitalist 
modernisation and economic development spawn environmental costs. These 
environmental damages are unavoidable and are supposedly the price to pay for 
progress.  
At both national and international level, the South African government and 
business sector seem to be investing resources in environmental issues with the 
understanding that “prevention is preferable to cure.”22 Are these approaches by the 
South Africa government and business what George Monbiot describes as tokenism at 
best, and at worst, a flurry of green capitalism and consumerism?23 I argue that the 
South African government and business sector engender what can at best be described 
as green capitalism.  
The account of the fishing and marine policy as discussed in Chapter 5 shows 
that minimal transformation, redistribution and redress has occurred within the 
neoliberal framework adopted. Moreover, Chapter 5 demonstrated, when unpacking 
Operation Phakisa, that the government’s approach is premised on market-based 
solutions, consumerism and economic growth and trade investments. In Chapter 5, I 
                                                
17 Death, “Leading by Example,”460. The citation is drawn from the work of Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff, 
“Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse and the Postcolonial State,” The Journal of Southern African Studies 27 
(2001): 627-651; William Beinart and Peter Coates, Environment and History: The Taming of Nature in the USA 
and South Africa (London: Routledge, 1995), 77. 
18 Joseph Murphy, “Ecological modernisation,” Geoforum 31 (2000): 5. 
19 See Murphy, “Ecological Modernisation,” Geoforum 31(2000): 1-8; Arthur PJ Mol and Gert Spaargaren, 
“Ecological Modernisation Theory in Debate: A Review,” Environmental Politics 9 (2000): 17-49. 
20 For an overview of the origins of ecological modernisation see Murphy, “Ecological modernisation,” Geoforum 
31 (2000): 1–8. For a critique see David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference 
 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996): 377–383. 
21 Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, 377. 
22 Ibid. 
23 George Monbiot, HEAT: How to Stop the Planet from Burning (Allen Lane: Penguin, 2006). 
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argued that the government’s conception of fish is that of commodity and that the 
policy approach is aimed to conserve so as to exploit, favouring large-scale 
commercial fishing at the expense of small-scale fishers, their communities and fish 
stocks.  
According to Löwy, the burden of the ecological crisis will ultimately be placed 
on the poor.24 This is most clearly shown in Chapter 4, where the many traumas of 
mining are set out. I argued that mining-affected communities and mineworkers are 
constantly faced with the ecological fall out of extractivism, be it filthy and polluted 
air, water, land, etc., or the illusions of service delivery and paid work. Chapter 4 
made evident the objectification of mineworkers’ labour, as well as mining-affected 
communities and minerals, which permits the externalisation of the social and 
ecological costs of mining onto poor communities in peripheral areas. In Chapter 3, I 
highlighted that small-scale farmers, especially women from the RWA, have argued 
that they carry the brunt of drought and increases in temperature and are unable to 
sustain themselves. In the same chapter I argued that farmworkers and the rural poor 
are exposed to high levels of toxins and chemicals on large commercial farms, and 
their safety is placed in jeopardy and not taken into account by agricultural policy.    
Given the contrast of the South Africa international environmental engagements 
and its national ecological footprint in land, mining and fishing policy—as brought to 
the fore in Chapters 3, 4 and 5—is the international environmental identity and 
environmental imagination abroad mere branding and show? Or does the government 
approach reflect the history of the national liberation movement and the compromises 
of the negotiated settlement?  
I argue that they are not simply branding, but are in fact deeply tied to the 
ANC’s liberation ideology and its assumption that economic development and growth 
will deliver economic redistribution. At a national level, the ANC’s compromise and 
sway towards neoliberal policies has reinforced the Freedom Charter articulations of 
making natural resources work for the people. This is reflected in Chapter 4 when 
looking at the mining-for-development approach. It is also reflected in Chapters 3 and 
5, which show that the ANC’s liberation ideology assumes that racial dispossession 
                                                
24 Michael Löwy, “What is Ecosocialism?” in Ecosocialism or Barbarism, ed. J. Kelly and S. Malone (London: 
Socialist Resistance, 2006), 1. 
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can be remedied through racial transformation through private property ownership, as 
well as BEE quotas in fishing and BEE mining rights. 
At an international level, through the struggle to overcome apartheid, the ANC 
as a liberation movement assumed the status of Africa’s champion and a fighter 
against inequality between developed and developing states. After 1994, the new 
South African government assigned itself this role and almost always has a key seat in 
negotiations on behalf of Africa. It is globally positioned as defending human rights 
and resisting indignities. It is important to bear in mind that as the democratic state 
regained its international standing so did its corporations; many went transnational 
and were listed on international stock exchanges.  
6.3 Reality and ideology  
According to the Yale Environmental Performance Index of 2012, South Africa 
ranked 128th out of 132 countries, making it “one of the world’s worst performers 
and the worst in Africa.”25 The index “ranks the countries of the world on aggregated 
measures of environmental performance, in sectors like air and water quality, forest 
and fisheries protection, regulation of pesticides, and greenhouse gas emissions.”26 
Given that South Africa’s economy was and continues to be driven by a mineral-
energy complex based on extractives, a highly mechanised commercial agricultural 
and finance sector, and since the late 1980s, a neoliberal export-orientated economy, 
these statistics should not come as a surprise.27  
The country’s Gini coefficient mirrors the Yale index ranking, making it one of 
the most unequal societies in the world.28 This reality was reflected in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 and specifically came to the fore with the farmworkers’ as well as 
mineworkers’ strikes, as shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and also demonstrated 
starkly in Chapter 3 when looking at the concentration of land before and after 1994.  
The South Africa government acknowledges that it is the second-largest 
contributor to carbon emissions in Africa and that its greenhouse gas emissions per 
                                                
25 “Troubling Trends for South Africa,” Environmental Performance Index, accessed November 6, 2016, 
http://epi.yale.edu/node/12125. 
26 “Troubling Trends for South Africa.” EPI is a problematic index and is not without critique. Recently Social 
Watch argued that the index “greenwashes” the rich. 
27 As outlined in Chapter 1. 




capita are greater than other developing countries such as Brazil and China.29 
According to the DEA, “South Africa’s historically low-cost energy supply, together 
with the predominance of extractive industries, have combined to create our highly 
energy-intensive economy, with coal as the main fuel source, the most carbon-
intensive fossil fuel.”30 Additionally the DEA recognises that “[c]oal dominates the 
South African energy system, accounting for 74% of primary energy supply and 23% 
of final energy consumption. In 2010, South Africa generated 94% of its electricity 
using coal.”31  
The South African government, however, confidently states they have put 
mechanisms in place to respond adequately to the demands of climate change and 
intend to do so on the basis of “science and equity.”32 The government argues that in 
response to agricultural strain and food insecurity in rural areas, as well as drought, 
water scarcity, coastal floods and rising ocean temperatures affecting livelihoods, they 
“have long put in place progressive, innovative and proactive policies and plans to 
deal with an ever-changing climate.”33 Their overarching policies in this regard are 
“contained in the National Development Plan (NDP), National Strategy for 
Sustainable Development, a National Climate Change Response Policy, Green 
Economy Strategy, and Integrated Resource Plan (IRP),” as well as the Industrial 
Policy and Action Plan.34 
In response to both the energy crisis and unemployment crisis in South Africa, 
the government has adopted a green economy approach, fuelled by a green 
technology revolution. In other words, the government has embarked on ecological 
modernisation, with the hope of fostering technological industrialisation and 
employment.35 Aspects of the NDP have already been discussed and analysed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, but at the heart of ecological modernisation is the rhetoric of 
                                                
29 Department of Environmental Affairs “Minister Edna Molewa’s speech delivered by Deputy Director-General 
of Climate Change and Air Quality, Ms Judy Beaumont, at the National Stakeholder Consultation Session in 
Preparation for COP 22/CMP12,” accessed November 2, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/speech/molewa_atnationalstakeholder_consultationsessionforCOP22. 
30 Department of Environmental Affairs “Minister Edna Molewa’s speech.” 
31 Ibid. 
32 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Discussion Document: South Africa’s intended National Determined 
Contribution (INDC): 1 August 2015,” accessed February 3, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/event/international/cop21cmp11_climatechange_paris_position. 
33 “Summary of South Africa’s position at COP21-CMP 11 in Paris, France.” accessed February 3, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/event/international/cop21cmp11_climatechange_paris_position. 
34 “Summary of South Africa’s position at COP21-CMP 11 in Paris, France.” 
35 According to Death, ecological modernist theory “tended to focus on curbing industrial pollution, hi-tech green 
industry, advanced transport systems, large-scale renewable energy systems, and other ‘techno-fixes’,” whilst they 
neglected the kind of conservation practice which is prominent in Africa. See Death, “Leading by Example,”126. 
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sustainability and the government’s attempt to obscure the conflict and promote the 
belief that it is resolvable when firstly, there are prevention mechanisms in place and 
secondly, there is recognition that environmental costs must be factored in and 
assumed.  
The South African government has adopted ecological modernisation as its 
approach, as reflected in the policies outlined below. According to government, it 
“plans to deal with an ever-changing climate” implying that they do not see climate 
change occurring as a result of the capitalist system, nor do they need to address the 
economic system per se. Instead, all they need to do is resolve the conflict and find a 
balance which, according to the government’s approach—discussed in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5—is via market-based instruments, such as property rights through WBWS, 
Mining Charter ratings for BEE mineral rights, and ITQs for fishing.  
The 2010 National Growth Path (NGP) aims to create 5 million jobs by 2020 
and the 2011 Green Economy Accord seeks to do this through creating green jobs.36 
The Accord has identified the following as vital areas to focus on: the rollout of 
renewable energy; biofuels for cars; clean coal; waste recycling; retrofitting of 
buildings; improving mass transport; electrification of poor communities; localisation 
for job creation; support for COP and its processes and agreements; and implementing 
an adaptation fund.37 
As early as 2006, the government put forward processes toward facilitating 
market-based instruments with regards to climate. Market-based instruments and 
mechanisms to address the climate change crisis are in many ways an extension of the 
government’s approach to land, minerals and metals and fish; they are reflections of 
the government’s deeply held conception of nature as mainly an economic end, as I 
argued in the preceding chapters. Buying and selling climate space, neutralising 
climate as scientific and as an object, enables the rationalisation of the 
commodification of clean or dirty air. Hence, after the draft of the “Environmental 
Fiscal Reform Policy Paper,” government soon introduced measures such as levies for 
                                                
36 Economic Development Department, “The New Growth Path: Framework” (Pretoria: Economic Development 
Department, 2011), 25, accessed 2014, http://www.economic.gov.za/communications/publications/new-growth-
path-series; Economic Development Department, “The New Growth Path: Accord 4: Green Economy Accord” 
(Pretoria: Economic Development Department, 2011), accessed 2014, 
http://www.economic.gov.za/communications/publications/green-economy-accord. 




electricity generation, motorcar emissions, incandescent light bulbs, along with tax 
measures to incentivise renewable electricity generation and biofuels production.38 In 
addition, it made investments in the management of biodiversity conservation as 
detailed below. 
Towards the end of 2010, the paper on “Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
The Carbon Tax Option” was published for discussion, outlining various policy 
options for carbon taxes. According to the government, it “recognises the important 
role for market-based instruments that create fiscal incentives and disincentives 
…Thus, South Africa will employ market-based instruments as part of a suite of 
policy interventions to support the transition to a lower carbon economy.”39 It is the 
perspective of the government that  
 
[t]hese instruments will be designed to incentivise behaviour change at the individual, 
institutional and macro-economic levels for a climate-resilient South Africa contributing to a 
diversification of our energy mix, drive people to implement far-reaching energy efficiency 
measures, achieve passenger modal shifts, and generate investments in new and cleaner 
technologies and industries.40  
 
The legacy of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons perspective and the logic of 
efficiency, as outlined in Chapter 2, is evident in the government’s approach above.  
Government’s approach ties in directly with South African trade policy 
objectives that seek “radical economic transformation” through “accelerated 
industrialisation and localisation.”41 This is an indication of the ANC-led 
government’s perspective of what they define as radical and transformative. Much of 
this is premised on the idea that the role of government is to facilitate, incentivise and 
regulate business.42 Industry and business is the vehicle; capital the engine of 
                                                
38 Department of Environmental Affairs,  “National Climate Change Response White Paper” (Pretoria: Department 
of Environment Affairs, 2011), 20-21. For a detailed overview of incentives see the Republic of South Africa’s “A 
Framework for Considering Market-Based Instruments to Support Environmental Fiscal Reform in South Africa” 
(Pretoria: National Treasury, 2006), 86. 
39 Department of Environmental Affairs, “National Climate Change Response White Paper” 20-21, 42, accessed 
October 25, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pdf. 
40 Department of Environmental Affairs, “National Climate Change Response White Paper,” 42. 
41 Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter, “South Africa’s Trade and Investment Policy” (presentation to the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, July 22, 2015), accessed August 11, 2016, 
http://www.dti.gov.za/parliament/2015/SA_Trade_Investment_Policy.pdf. 
42 Economic Development Department, “The New Growth Path: Accord 4: Green Economy Accord,” 8. 
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transformation.43 According to government it “has a key role to play in fostering 
green industrial development, using existing and new tools and incentives.”44 The 
Accord adds that “South Africa has a productive innovation sector… However, 
bringing these state of the art technologies to market requires capital and provides 
significant investment opportunities. These are some of the areas of the Green 
Economy that are open to rapid development and investment.”45 Business supports 
the Accord and upon signing it, Futhi Mtoba said that “[b]usiness is engaged in a 
number of activities that will contribute to the successful implementation of a Green 
Economy Strategy.”46 
Production and growth remain the drivers of South African trade policy. The 
NGP underscores that five trade-offs are required: present consumption and future 
growth; new industry and innovation; substantial risk; and currency 
competitiveness.47 The fifth trade-off, according to NGP is “[b]etween the present 
costs and future benefits of a green economy.”48 
What is understood as “present costs” is unclear. Government, however, sees 
jobs as the key driver for the future and is “[t]argeting more labour-absorbing 
activities across the main economic sectors – the agricultural and mining value chains, 
manufacturing and services.”49 It is safe to assume that re-industrialisation is based on 
mitigating emissions for today, whilst seeking to “take advantage of new 
opportunities in the knowledge and green economies” for tomorrow.50 Although the 
government recognises its huge carbon footprint it argues that in Africa there are 
“[e]normous reserves of raw materials and 60% of unused arable agricultural land 
globally.”51 In other words, South Africa can pass on the ecological fallout to another 
country and its people in Africa, for a price. In the same way, well-off South Africans 
can have a non-stop supply of energy in the urban areas whilst externalising the 
destructive costs upon a mining-affected community where coal is being mined. 
                                                
43 The Accord asks for business to commit to the plan. 
44 Economic Development Department, “The New Growth Path: Framework,” 8. 
45 Ibid., 7. 
46 Ibid., 5. 
47 Ibid., 8. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 24. 
50 Ibid. 




The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) continues to identify mining and 
agricultural extraction as growth and development areas for trade at national and 
continental levels. It seeks to grow the South African economic market and footprint 
in the region and beyond. The NGP argues that “[a] zero-sum conflict over existing 
resources and jobs will not provide South Africa with a unifying vision.”52 Instead 
according to the NGP “[w]e need to grow both the size of the economy and the 
number of decent work opportunities it provides.”53  
The South African government’s trade policy as well as its  macro-economic 
policy aim to mainstream green policy, but remain committed to the logic of 
efficiency.54 The government’s approach set out above, assumes that the country 
needs to grow, consume, work, exploit and profiteer more, instead of conceding 
redistribution of the abundance equitably, acting with more constraint and 
mindfulness and recognising all the unpaid work that significantly subsidises 
production. Although the NGP mentions decent work, the government seems 
reluctant to engage meaningfully with, or support calls for decent wages or a living 
wage, let alone a national minimal wage.55   
The most glaring challenge of the New Growth Plan is that it appears that the 
fundamentals are business as usual, a continuation of an extractivist model combined 
with a new preoccupation with the green technology revolution and transfer and a 
“flurry of green capitalism.” This neatly connects with the ANC-led government’s 
COP position. It saw the Paris agreement as a success and took the lead in the 
Marrakesh process, championing market-based instruments to address climate 
change.56  
6.4 Papering over the contradictions  
According to government, “[t]he nature of the climate change challenge is one 
characterised by the overuse of a global commons in an unequal world.”57 It therefore 
                                                
52 Economic Development Department, “The New Growth Path: Framework,” 37. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The logic of efficiency, as outlined and critiqued by Thomas Princen (discussed in depth in Chapter 2) is the 
antithesis of putting the brakes on the ecological crisis. 
55 For a recent overview on this discussion in South Africa see Eddie Cottle, Towards a South African National 
Minimum Wage (Cape Town: LRS, 2015). 
56 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Summary of the South Africa’s position at COP21-CMP 11 in Paris, 
France,” accessed Oct 18, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/event/international/cop21cmp11_climatechange_paris_position. 
57 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Discussion Document: South Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC): 1 August 2015,” 3. 
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argues for “fair, effective and binding multilateral agreement under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto 
Protocol at COP 21 and CMP 11 in Paris … [guided by] the principles of equity and 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities [which] must 
apply operationally to any Agreement under the Convention.”58 And yet, 
government’s national position is narrowly focused on issues of capacity building, 
transparency, the green fund, commitments that rules are agreed upon by 2020, 
further financing for adaptation and institutional governance.59  
Considering government policy and reports, there appears to be no further 
analysis of the “overuse of the global commons,” except that some use them more, 
and disproportionately, and this unfairly limits equitable use. How the global 
commons are used and to what end is not part of the discussion and analysis, nor is 
there an examination of how we conceive of the global commons. This analytical 
shortcoming of how and to what extent the global commons are used in the case of  
South Africa was demonstrated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The chapters brought to the 
fore respectively, how land, minerals and metals, and fish are used and to what end, as 
a result of an inherited and unexamined conception of nature.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that when land was separated from people, it was no 
longer solely used for cultivation, feeding, well-being and community. Instead, land 
as private property permits land use for any end, but tends to favour use related to 
private profit. I argued that the economic surplus value of land, which occurred with 
private property when economic gains trump ecological balance, breaks the ecological 
sustainability of the land. In Chapter 4, I argued that when minerals and metals are 
objectified, it is easy to prioritise the economic gains of mining above the way and 
extent we use the products of mining. In Chapter 5, I argued that when fish is 
transformed into mainly a commodity through industrialisation, the logics of profits 
outweigh fish as life.  
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According to Edna Molewa, “[a]s concerns for the environment grow, there is a 
shift globally towards green, climate resilient and low carbon development policies 
and pathways.”60 In accordance with this shift she outlines that  
 
[o]ur Green Economy Strategy has eight key pillars, namely: green buildings and the built 
environment; sustainable transport and infrastructure; clean energy and energy efficiency; 
natural resource conservation and management; sustainable waste management; water 
management; sustainable consumption and production and agriculture food production and 
forestry.61  
 
It would seem, as shown in Chapter 4, that by the term “sustainable” Molewa means a 
balance between social, political and economic arguments. Yet, with the predictable 
prioritising of the economic argument, based on its assumption that economic growth 
will render jobs and a “better life for all,” then the only element of green in the Green 
Economy Strategy is the zooming in on the environment as the new market.  
Molewa argues that “[r]educing, recovering or minimising waste provides 
opportunities for socio-economic development; new jobs and businesses; maximising 
resource recovery for downstream manufacturing growth and reducing reliance on 
declining natural resources.”62 This focus on waste-recycling is aligned to economic 
growth and job creation gains. There is a cost-benefit approach where costs of 
environmental harm are outweighed by benefits measured by increasing GDP and job 
creation premised on opportunities presented by greening the economy. The 
perspective constantly seeks to appease an economic rationale and the logic of 
efficiency, consumption, production and growth. This is affirmed as the “rational” 
choice.  
In Chapter 5, I argued the same point by showing how government intends to 
grow the aquaculture market. Government’s approach is not about doing the right or 
best thing given the ecological crisis or ecological injustices. As argued in Chapter 2, 
the consequences and implications that accompany the logic of efficiency are in 
conflict with an ecologically and socially just society.63  
                                                
60 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Minister Edna Molewa tables Department of Environmental Affairs 
2015/2016 Budget Vote policy statement,” accessed November 1, 2016, 
https://www.environment.gov.za/speech/molewa_2015-16_budgetvote_policystatement. 
61 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Minister Edna Molewa tables …” 
62 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Minister Edna Molewa tables …” 
63 Refer to Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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Another key area of state intervention has to do with nature conservation and 
biodiversity.64 An element of the government’s response to climate change, is to 
direct resources into “biodiversity asset management” as a component of its 
adaptation plan as outlined in its National Climate Change Response policy. Elements 
of the plan include assessment, research, enhancing effective management, curbing 
invasive and alien species and expanding protected area networks.65 The approach to 
sustainability is driven by developing a green economy so as to increase revenue 
streams, jobs and income generation linked to ecotourism. Asset management of 
biodiversity is aimed at expanding gene banks, conservation efforts and protected 
areas as well as enhancing forecasting of natural resource assets and liabilities.66  
According to Molewa, “our very success in conserving South Africa’s 
biodiversity, has turned us into a target for unscrupulous operators involved in 
organized, transnational environmental and wildlife crime.”67 The speech, tabled in 
parliament, stated that “[w]hether it is illegal logging or fishing, species smuggling, 
the dumping of toxic and hazardous waste, or wildlife poaching – environmental 
crime is often tied to other forms of criminal activity.”68 
Significant resources have gone into crime prevention at this level, and when 
reported this is always discussed in light of revenue lost. There is no evidence of 
discussions by Molewa regarding her criminalisation of small-scale farmers, artisanal 
miners or fisher folk who attempt to reclaim access after they are robbed of their 
access to the commons through state imposed enclosures and sale of private property.  
Green states, according to Death, are “states in which the governance of 
environmental issues has become central and is closely linked to core imperatives of 
survival, maintenance of domestic order, generation of finance, capital accumulation 
and political legitimation.”69 He argues that Green States exist in Africa and have 
been integral to a modernisation strategy despite the argument that it is primarily a 
                                                
64 South Africa had a Biodiversity Act and institutions in place. 
65 Department of Environmental Affairs, Change Response White Paper,” (Pretoria: Department of Environment 
Affairs, 2011) 20-21, accessed October 25, 2016,  
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66 Department of Environmental Affairs, “National Climate Change Response White Paper,” 21. 
67 Department of Environmental Affairs, “Minister Edna Molewa tables ...” 
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phenomenon of states in the North.70 He identifies South Africa as such a state on the 
basis of rhetoric, rather than reality.  
According to Beinart “at various moments in the twentieth century the South 
African state enacted far-reaching measures for environmental regulation, and 
initiated propaganda drives to encourage conservation, in the process spending 
millions of pounds and passing wide-ranging laws.”71 Death asks “[w]hat else are 
vaccination campaigns (for livestock and humans), the creation and management of 
biodiversity enclaves, urban sanitation reforms, programmes to eliminate alien 
invasive species, anti-poaching drives, and wildlife conservation if not ‘a form of 
politics entailing the administration of the processes of life of populations’” but 
environmental regulation?72  
The state economic-environmental approach is reflected in how it thinks about 
biodiversity. According to Minister Molewa, “[w]ithout our richly endowed 
ecosystem services, natural resources and biodiversity base – there would be limited 
water, jobs, food, shelter, fuel, and medicine – not to mention the damage to key 
economic sectors like energy, agriculture and tourism.”73 This worldview holds that 
biodiversity’s function and purpose is to sustain humans and economic imperatives. 
This is in keeping with the Scientific Revolution’s emphasis on “the hegemony of 
mechanistic science as a marker of progress” and requires human domination of 
nature.74  
I argue that this worldview inherited from Western modernity continues to 
permeate, and is reflected within, the South African government’s policy and 
approach to climate change, as outlined above. The South African state fosters the 
idea that it can oversee a balance between environment harm and economic growth. It 
is clear that the state recognises the contradictions, but papers over them and advances 
a macro-economic policy that is dependent on resource extraction and capital 
accumulation that externalises the fallout. 
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6.5 Critiques of the ANC’s neoliberal and ecological modernisation agenda 
Government’s economic development model and ecological modernisation agenda in 
South Africa are both contested. There is some continuity amongst socio-economic 
justice groups whose impetus stems from anti-globalisation and anti-privatisation 
mobilisation around water, energy, land, coasts and dams as well as anti-retroviral 
drugs and privatisation and commodification of goods and services at local, national, 
regional and continental levels. Groups such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF), 
the Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and 
Jubilee2000 (an anti-debt movement), to mention a few, put forward a broadly anti-
neoliberal analysis. Many groups emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a 
response to GEAR.  
Patrick Bond offers a useful overview of the movements from below who are 
engaged in aspects of ecological critique. He names the new movement “climate 
justice,” as, according to him, it “best fuses a variety of progressive political-
economic and political-ecological currents to combat the most serious threat humanity 
and most other species face in the twenty-first century.”75 By sketching the global 
climate justice traditions, three parallels can be drawn to the South Africa landscape.76 
Firstly, a politics of anti-racist environmentalism is reflected in many of the anti-
neoliberal organisations engaged in service delivery single issue-campaigns, and 
which begin to “link social justice to ecological problems.”77 Secondly, “late 1990s 
Jubilee movements against Northern financial domination of the South” and “the 
2000s global justice movement” also find expression and have brought that critique to 
the ecological crisis.78 Thirdly, “the Bolivian government-sponsored April 2010 
Peoples’ World Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in 
Cochabamba” resonated with three fronts in South Africa: with traditional middle-
class environmental groups who are predominantly white—they have done much 
work to link Rights of Mother Earth to ideas of Ubuntu; with those who campaigned 
and mobilised around the no-to-commercialisation of water and were in solidarity 
with Bolivians against the Cochabamba Water Wars of 2000, calling for the end to 
ecological debt through the Jubilee South Campaign; and those in the land and seed 
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movement, who have moved beyond land as cultural and sacred and inserted a strong 
class and race dimension into the analysis.79 
Of equal significance, Bond argues that “when fused as climate justice and 
when transcending ‘not in my back yard’ sentiments, these interrelated and often 
overlapping (although sometimes conflicting) traditions are mainly aimed at building 
mass-based popular movements, bringing together ‘green’ and ‘red’ politics.”80 
Importantly, he argues that this politics can only come together when “articulating not 
only the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions but also the need to transform 
our inherited systems of materials extraction, transport and distribution, energy-
generation, production of goods and services, consumption, disposal and financing.”81 
Organisations that emerged from 2008 on around single-issue campaigns have 
grown and expanded into work on food sovereignty campaigns, climate change, fisher 
folk, small-scale farmers and cooperatives, seeds and GMOs, as well as on issues 
related to extractives and waste pickers. More recently, they have formed broader 
platforms and alliances. Some of the organisations and movements mentioned in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are central to building the new alliances. Campaigns such as One 
Million Climate Jobs, the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign and popular 
organisations such as Mining-affected Communities Affected in Action (MACUA), 
Southern African Rural Women’s Assembly (RWA), Inyanda, Women and Mining 
(WoMin), Masifundise and Beyond Coal converge to bring local and national issues 
to the fore. As noted by Death, “[i]ssues related to land, food, and agriculture remain 
important concerns for environmental activists in movements over food sovereignty, 
genetically modified crops, land rights, deforestation, and consumption.”82 
With the build-up towards COP17 in Durban, South African community socio-
economic environmental justice groups or national environmental groups, which have 
a history prior to more popular campaigns on climate change—such as GroundWork, 
the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, Vaal Environmental Justice 
Alliance, Highveld Environmental Justice Network, Earthlife, Earthjustice, Friends of 
the Earth South Africa—developed broader platforms and campaigns. Traditional 
environmental and trade policy NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 
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Biowatch, the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), Earthlife Africa (ELA), the 
African Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), Greenpeace and the Economic Justice 
Network (EJN) joined broad alliances.  
The politics of socio-economic-ecological justice is waged on multiple fronts 
and opposes government’s neoliberal ecological modernisation project at the level of 
analysis, critique and organisation. The first stake was at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD), where protestors marched from Alexandra 
township to Sandton City under the banner of the Social Movement Indaba and the 
Anti-Privatisation Forum. The march was between 20 000 and 25 000 people strong 
and it exposed the pro-capitalist agenda of the WSSD. This process developed 
alternatives, organisation and resistance to confront the onslaught of neoliberal 
ecological modernisation. The second stake was COP17 where united efforts around 
climate change converged around the “Million Climate Jobs Campaign: to a just low 
carbon transition to combat unemployment and climate change.”83 This campaign has 
been able to bring many groups together.  
In 2012, the Marikana Solidarity Campaign fostered and saw the convergence 
of many groups nationally. The Bench Marks Foundation and MACUA were 
instrumental in bringing to the fore the ecological and social destruction of mining 
within mining-affected communities. Through Marikana and the solidarity campaign, 
many mining-affected communities soon made national and provincial links.  
Not all groups working on climate participate in and join the broader socio-
economic-ecological spaces. Some research-based environmental organisations tend 
to focus on mitigation and adaptation and often those who are based in academia such 
as the Climate Systems Analyst Group and African Climate and Development 
Initiative (ACDI) focus on technological solutions, quantify the impacts of climate 
change and embark on modelling and forecasting. They tend to produce high-level 
reports and work at the national and international policy level. These centres aim to 
influence research agendas and policy, they are well funded and in most instances 
connected with expert groups on an international level. These centres do not aim to 
undermine the status quo and see themselves as contributing to “rational” scientific 
knowledge. 
                                                




Others, like the Sustainability Institute (SI), seek to develop proposals and 
tangible alternatives for a just transition and offer a systems approach. Their 
philosophy runs towards “imagining just futures,” holding that “in our post-colonial 
and post-apartheid explorations means questioning continuously the traps of modern 
consumerism, isolation, dis-connect and destructive competition.”84 They argue that 
“[b]ecoming indigenous in the 21st century is honouring and acknowledging fully our 
African heritages with all their complexities, and interrogating without fear the 
possibilities of different and more just futures.”85 
Over the past few years, public interest law and human rights organisations such 
as the Centre for Applied Law (CALS), Centre for Environmental Rights (CER), 
Social Economic Rights Institute (SERI) and Legal Resource Centre (LRC) have 
taken on litigation work on behalf of communities. They use the constitution to 
defend the right to access clean, safe, adequate water, air and environment as well as 
to create a legal framework to protect the safety and health of communities affected 
adversely by environmental degradation.  
These human rights groups use lobbying tactics, effective media strategies and 
campaigns to bring environmental violations and degradation effects into the public 
arena. They have started to look at issues of compliance. CER launched a 2016 report 
“Full Disclosure: The Truth about Corporate Compliance,” showing the effects of 
environmental impacts and lack of compliance.86 This is necessary work, but it is not 
always clear if they are able to make visible the issues that are hidden within and 
beyond a human rights-based approach. Questions of regulations, compliance and 
improved governance of businesses and transnational corporations are not seeking to 
address the systemic ecological fallout of extractivist activities.  
The NGOs working on environmental corporate governance, illicit tax flows 
and extractives (agriculture and minerals), such as the Economic Justice Network and 
Masifundise Development Trust, galvanise around campaigns on international “best 
                                                
84 The Sustainability Institute, “Our Way,” accessed November 25, 2016, 
http://www.sustainabilityinstitute.net/about/our-way. 
85 The Sustainability Institute, “Our Way.” 





practices,” “minimum standards,” voluntary guidelines and engagements.87 We have 
seen this nationally and internationally with regard to fishing as well as with regard to 
mining extractives. A tension exists as some argue for immediate minimal victories 
and seek voluntary standards, while others, who struggle for larger reforms and 
protection, argue for binding treaties.88 Others, still, do not want to engage with the 
official processes and are reticent about collaborating with the UN. There are 
numerous challenges with regard to best practices and minimum standards, as often 
these are based on a model of society where GDP growth and profit share prices are 
revered. The critique of this approach is brought to the fore by the South African Stop 
Corporate Impunity campaign, linked to broader global processes. 
Defenders of Mother Earth argue for the rights of nature. These groups draw on 
experiences from Latin America and go beyond legal human rights and environmental 
groups. Joining international alliances, these groups advocate that Nature has rights 
and these rights should be reflected in countries’ constitutions. They draw on 
examples from the Ecuadorian and Bolivian constitutions.  
According to Cormac Cullinan, “the Charter does not focus specifically on 
climate change and instead seeks to address the dysfunctional relationship between 
humans and Nature which drives the human behaviour that causes climate change, 
among many other symptoms.”89 A key aspect of the charter is to foster the 
inalienable rights of nature. The charter argues that nature is sacred, that there is a 
need to live in harmony with nature and there is a “need to take decisive action to turn 
the course of our societies away from selfishness, greed, exploitation, and 
separateness.”90 
Critical analyses of the government’s conservation approach - linked to eco-
tourism as a central aspect of its green agenda - expose how important it is to not be 
steered by government or funders to only focus on its climate change policy 
propaganda. Maano Ramutsindela levels an important critique on three fronts, tied to 
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a broader critique of the government’s ecological modernisation perspective. Firstly, 
conservation philanthropy is deeply extractivist and the private sector “sees 
conservation areas as a niche market for capital accumulation, with companies in 
particular using it to develop their competitive advantage.”91 This echoes the 
argument I made in Chapter 4 regarding mining and government’s bent on minerals 
and minerals as the country’s comparative advantage. Secondly, to understand “how 
labour is involved in producing conservation goods and services” and specifically to 
recognise that “land use change from both subsistence and commercial agriculture 
entails a significant shift in the use of labour.”92 In Chapter 3, I argued that work on 
the land transformed dramatically from collective, shared and communal to labour 
bought, privately sold and individualised. Thirdly, that private conservation is about 
the protection of private property at the expense of land restoration.93 Hence, 
Ramutsindela affirms my argument in Chapter 3 that private property is a cornerstone 
of a capitalist conception of nature and that it undermines racial redress and land 
restoration.  
Ramutsindela argues that “private nature reserves use environmental 
philanthropy to achieve three interrelated objectives: to push back land claims, to give 
wealth-generating activities a human face, and to control a labour pool for purposes of 
upmarket ecotourism ventures.”94 Environmental philanthropy is undoubtedly linked 
to similar assumptions as those underpinning ecological modernisation and assumes 
that the conflict between economic profits can be balanced with environmental 
damage prevention. According to Ramutsindela, “reserves are involved in business 
ventures where both conservation and profit-making intersect.”95  
Ramutsindela’s perspective is in sharp contrast to government’s argument that 
eco-tourism ensures ecological balance, revenue and jobs. This form of eco-tourism is 
aligned to an ecological modernisation approach regardless of the type of jobs, quality 
of livelihood improvements, or costs of going green. According to Ramutsindela, 
“[p]hilanthropy is extractive both materially and discursively, and its extractive nature 
is laid bare when altruism is overtaken by political and economic interests. Materially 
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business exploits labour for profit maximisation but then use[s] philanthropy to 
address the social ills created by the business enterprise. This makes philanthropy part 
of the process of labour exploitation.”96 The particular conception of nature becomes 
apparent when the agenda of capital accumulation is exposed. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
I argued that the exploitation of nature through a focus on land, minerals and metals 
and fish occurs simultaneously with the exploitation of labour, paid or unpaid.  
6.6 No to extractivism: emergence of an alternative modernity? 
A call for mining to stop and for no new mining is a challenge to the government, 
mining companies and traditional authorities’ current ecological approach and 
industrialisation efforts in South Africa. But these calls likewise challenge ecological 
modernisation opponents and critics. These defiant calls are slowly mounting, 
demanding an interrogation of inherited assumptions, conceptions and practices with 
regards to nature and extraction and what has come to be understood as normal.  
In Chapter 4, I traced the history of mining and its socio-economic impacts and 
argued that ecological devastation is a central feature of the model of extractivism. I 
exposed the deeply entrenched assumptions and conceptions of mining, which are tied 
up with industrialisation, development, progress and modernity and reflected in 
government policy. In so doing, Chapter 4 argued that conceiving of mining as 
normal, permits the externalisation of costs and burdens onto mining-affected 
communities. I argued that making mining normal means normalising the exploitation 
of nature and labour, both paid and unpaid, simultaneously. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
argued that the mechanistic worldview of the domination and control over nature 
bound up with ideas of “modernity,” “progress,” and “development,” inherited from 
the Scientific Revolution need to be made visible and examined, given the ecological 
crisis. The Amadiba community saying “no to mining” makes this process of 
examination concrete and immediate. 
The Amadiba Crisis Committee (ACC) states that “[f]or ten years we have said 
no to mining, whatever colour it takes. It does not matter even if you bring your 
‘Blacks’. Our land is not for sale! We want to develop our agriculture and tourism. 
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Your mining is not development. It is destruction of our land. It is killings and 
violence, no matter if it is black or white.”97  
This resistance and absolute refusal to allow mining operations to commence 
hinges upon the Amadiba’s community organisation, mobilisation and determination 
to fight against a process, which they argue, will undermine and destroy their way of 
life. They are adamant that their ability to maintain autonomy, feed and care for 
themselves will be obliterated and that their relationships to one another and nature 
will be destroyed.  
What are the promises and limitations of the ACC’s call for “no to mining” of 
titanium in Pondoland by Australian-owned Mineral Resource Commodities (MRC) 
and Transworld Energy (TEM)? To answer this question—central to this 
dissertation—we need to ask how the ACC imagines their society, but also opens 
possibilities for how to reimagine society at large.  
ACC’s call for “no to mining,” is revealing for numerous reasons. First, the 
ACC are clear that mining is not going to deliver the development they want, nor are 
they under any illusions of the promise that mining allegedly holds. They understand 
the destruction that mining brings and will not be pressured or bullied by the mining 
companies, or the “rational talk” of scientists, experts or government officials and the 
like. They reject carrying the costs and burdens of mining-for-capitalist-development 
and they are not convinced by arguments for sustainable mining.  
In 2007, Patrick Caruso, the brother of the CEO of the Australian mining 
company, said “there is always blood where there are these types of projects (mining) 
and in my experience, you cannot have development without blood.”98 Caruso 
exposes the acceptance of the costs that mining companies concede as inherent to 
mining development. Who primarily benefits from this type of development and 
bloodshed? Chapter 4 shows clearly that it is rarely the mining-affected communities 
who benefit. 
In 2016, after the brutal assassination of the chairperson of the ACC, Sikhosiphi 
Bazooka Rhadebe, a memorandum to the Australian High Commissioner was 
released. The memorandum stated that communities in South Africa have the right to 
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say “no to mining and to decide on its own development,” and that they “must be 
respected and all intimidation stopped.”99 The memo highlighted that “[a]lready five 
major activists in this area have died over the last eight years for their right to say no. 
How many more people must die before something is done?”100 The memorandum by 
Bench Marks Foundation affirms the ACC’s position on the right to say no to mining.  
Second, the ACC argues that mining will cause the destruction of their land. 
Land is integral to their lives, and the members of the ACC are determined to defend 
their land. Often when the ACC members raise their concerns about their land, they 
not only raise its cultural heritage and ancestral connections, but also articulate a deep 
sense of themselves as one with the land.101 The ACC refers to a deep reciprocity 
between the care of the land and its care for the community.  
This suggests another type of relationship with the land than the dominant or 
legislated one of land as private property, as I outlined in Chapter 3. Xolobeni in 
Pondoland is not private property and the Amadiba community are not separated from 
their land. Could a reimagined and new lived relationship (beyond the cultural and 
ancestral connection) with each other and land be drawn from the ACC’s 
campaigning? Is their relationship to the land a reflection of their relationships with 
one another? 
Third, the government and mining companies instigate and use violence and 
conflict to displace communities to gain access to land, minerals and metals. Since 
2007, prospecting in the Xolobeni area has been the cause of great tension within the 
community as well as between the community, government and mining companies. 
These various conflicts have left the Amadiba community on constant high alert. The 
community is not prepared to acquiesce their claim to a different life envisaged by the 
government through mining-for-development.  
Fourth, the government completely disregards the views of the community and 
has little interest in seeking consent for mining when handing out mining rights.102 
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Government assumes neither the function of protector of capital interests, nor that of 
guardian of its people, land and minerals. Mining companies and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) appear to have legal rights that supersede citizen’s constitutional 
protections. For the ACC, the community, people and land are paramount. 
Government siding with both the national and international mining companies shows 
clearly where its allegiance lies.   
Fifth, it is immaterial who the owner of the mining company is – black or white, 
national or transnational. It makes no difference to the ACC. The government, 
however, tends to favour BEE and local content for mining, as reflected in its policy 
and Mining Charter. It has a constant rhetoric of encouraging black accumulation in 
the mineral and metals sector. 
Sixth, no to mining suggests that the members of the ACC are not interested in 
the jobs that mining creates and type of work that it generates. They do not see this 
type of work as fit for humans. However, they argue they should not be denied their 
constitutional right to access running water, electricity, education and health care, as 
promised by the democratic government. The ACC does not regard the situation as 
either/or. Instead, it argues for an alternative that does not destroy land, or the 
community’s relationships with the land and one another.  
Seventh, the ACC members insist they must be central to discussions that 
determine what happens to them. They cannot be excluded from decisions that impact 
where and how they live. This is a direct challenge to externalising the costs of 
mining. The ACC insistence that it will not tolerate any ecological destruction offers 
us an opportunity to fully review, and pose critical questions about, mining-for-
development. It makes visible the development model that mining implies and 
exposes the government’s approach to economic development. The ACC argues that 
if mining has been the backbone of the economy and wealth generation for decades, 
then where is the alleged development of electrical and telephone lines, decent work, 
free quality education and health etc., that were promised with mining-for-
development for all South Africans?  
The resistance of the ACC, and many others across the world, who are united 
under the “Yes to life, No to mining” movement, raises critical questions about the 
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costs of the mining-for-development paradigm and who benefits.103 Mining extraction 
takes place deep below the earth or through open cast mines, but at a distance from 
urban centres where water, roads, electricity, health care, education, connectivity, etc., 
are potentially easily accessible. The extraction takes place in remote areas, far from 
sight. Those who work in the mines and who subsidise the mines are often invisible, 
disposable and replaceable. “They” are easily written off when “they” are not near, 
connected and visible.104  
Making visible the defiance against mining-for-development through capitalist 
exploitation, by concretely giving a name and place to it, makes it hard to mute the 
voices. The insinuation that those in rural areas are uneducated, traditional, not 
forward thinking, opposed to progress and uncivilised, is deeply linked to conceptions 
of modernity and the propaganda of progressivism and particular assumptions of 
Western civilisation.  
Although neglected by the propaganda of progressivism, the alternative 
modernity as presented by the ACC is collective, communal, land and often food 
sufficient, carbon light and consumes far less. What is regarded as modern is 
presented as “rational,” urban, educated, intelligent, secular, non-traditional, pro-
industrialisation and mining-for-capitalist-development. This conception of modernity 
is also highly consumptive, wasteful, technologically dependent, energy demanding, 
carbon heavy, individualistic and competitive. It is based, as pointed out in Chapter 2 
and argued in Chapter 5, on the logic of efficiency and not the logic of sufficiency.  
Princen’s articulation of the logic of sufficiency, as discussed in Chapter 2, is in 
essence to recognise the current ecological crisis and constraints and heed the idea 
and practice that “enough is as good as a feast.” He reminds us that too much is 
undesirable and means not enough for others most of the time. He argues that we do 
not require so much, and for all of the time. He suggests that is the wrong standard of 
human flourishing.  According to Princen “the challenge will be living well by living 
well within our means.”105 
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According to Neville Alexander, “[t]oday, we know that political diversity is as 
important for a humane society as are bio- and cultural diversity. For some years now, 
it has dawned on me that a humanism of the 21st century will have to be based on 
what Gorz calls the principle of sufficiency, which, for the sake of a broader 
understanding of what this concept entails, I have transliterated as ‘Enough is as good 
as a feast.’”106 Alexander puts forward that “[i]t ought to be obvious that if the 
structures and processes of modern industrial societies were informed and shaped by 
this view of life, most of the currently existing social modalities and human desires 
and activities in most contemporary states would forthwith become antiquated and 
counterproductive.”107 
The ACC members want alternatives to mining-for-capitalist development, 
which are not in conflict with how they wish to live in Xolobeni. Specifically, they 
seek alternatives that honour their alternative relationship with and dependence on the 
land. They seek alternatives that respect what they value, and that recognise what is 
important for community, solidarity and ecological balance. Any employment 
fostered must not create conflict, nor should it undermine the voices of the 
community or the close-knit relationships within the community.  
The ACC is insistent that mining extractivism will destroy their ecosystem and 
relationship with one another and the land.108 The ACC has made numerous 
exchanges with other areas in the country and the world where mining has occurred 
and they are adamant that they do not want capitalist development, destruction and 
socio-economic inequality in their community, as well as the high levels of ill-health 
and toxicity that comes with mining. 
The ACC is not resisting modernity. It is suggesting an alternative modernity. 
The ACC is constantly confronted with questions about what that means and it would 
look like. They are expected to have answers, and many who are in solidarity try to 
suggest alternatives and offer support. This is important, but it seems equally 
important to note the dangers this could represent for the ACC. The vocabulary, 
frameworks and worldviews that external organisations bring could do an injustice to 
the ACC, but also give them strength. To draw upon a vocabulary of the sacred, 
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cultural, indigenous and customary rights of the earth is to extend towards 
conceptions of pre-modernity on the one hand but also the exceptionalism of this 
particular case. The ACC is saying no to mining, but should it be supported only 
because of the beauty of the area and the pristine landscape? Should their call for self-
autonomy and self-determination not suffice? 
The pressure to have answers places a burden on the ACC. Yet, their daily 
resistance is part of an alternative. To defend against daily external attacks and 
maintain this resistance for ten years has shaped the alternatives. This continued 
commitment reflects a deep collective understanding by the community of what they 
want. It is through this process that a new relationship between nature and society can 
be formed. 
The solidarity from beyond the ACC is important and should amplify this 
resistance. The ACC should propel onlookers to build in their own locations and 
organisations further resistance against pro-capitalist development models. Together, 
by saying no, they could bring an end to the mantra that there-is-no-alternative.  
Recently, the ACC suggested eco-tourism and agriculture based on an holistic 
approach, fostered and regulated by their consent, as an element of building an 
alternative. The ACC is not arguing for the eco-tourism being peddled by the 
government in its Green Accord. They have rejected and resisted the construction of a 
highway and bridge that the government has promoted for eco-tourism, so it is clear 
they are not suggesting an eco-tourism model based on capitalist profit. The ACC 
might be proposing locally controlled and directed work of the landscape they live in. 
It is unclear, but again, the dangers of external pressure to show the alternative or 
adopt a vocabulary that is not theirs, is necessary to flag. The worldview that 
capitalist work and money are defining features of modernity and are necessary for 
development needs to be interrogated. Do the people of the Amadiba community not 
work every day to care for themselves and live in balance with the landscape they 
inhabit? 
In many ways, the ACC affirms Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva’s subsistence 
framework as part of an alternative.109 Broadly, Mies’ and Shiva’s analysis challenges 
a mining-for-capitalist development; or agriculture-for-capitalist development; or 
fishing-for-capitalist development paradigm, as fostered by the South African policy 
                                                
109 Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (Halifax: Zed Books, 1993), 297 – 322. 
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on land, mining and fishing. Their analysis arises from a critique of the separation of 
nature and society, which arose from the Scientific Revolution, the subsequent 
alienating social relations as well as the process of capitalist and patriarchal 
accumulation.  
I will briefly mention five of their ten elements. They argue that: one, 
“economic activity is not to produce an ever-growing mountain of commodities and 
money for anonymous markets but for the creation of life – the satisfaction of 
fundamental human needs.”110 Two, subsistence is based on [a]“new relationship with 
nature and among people, where the division of labour – man-woman; manual-
mental; urban-rural” is undone. They propose to replace it instead with “principles of 
reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, reliability, sharing, caring, respect (for individual 
and responsibility for the ‘whole’), subsistence, security-reliance on community (not 
bank accounts or state).”111 Three, “participatory processes and grassroots 
democracy” are essential elements for a substance perspective.112 This means that 
people should not be bullied into decisions or ignored, but that their consent is 
required. Four, divisions between “politics-economics; public-private” should be 
abolished and people should live the “personal is political.”113 Lastly, people should 
“resist all forms of further privatisation and commercialisation of commons.”114 
The ACC resistance is a challenge to business as usual where government hands 
out mining rights and mining companies prospect and extract. For the critics, it 
challenges reformist approaches that tinker with compliance, taxes and environmental 
standards to improve business. For those who see the resistance as articulations 
towards a different society, it challenges any one-size fits all alternative. Of 
importance, their resistance compels deep reflection and analysis of long-held 
assumptions and unexamined conceptions of nature. It enlivens discussions and opens 
new possibilities.  
Resistance against mining is being led by the communities and the prominence 
of women in this struggle is telling; it is as if 500 years later, they are responding to 
Francis Bacon’s masculine extractivism, determined to fight back and make 
themselves and nature visible as they reclaim and redefine social relations within 
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society. Many women are done with bearing the burden, acting as shock absorbers, 
mothering and nurturing to subsidise an unequal, oppressive and exploitative system. 
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